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ABSTRACT
Since the mid-1970's, Quality of Working Life programs (QWL)
have been initiated in several municipalities and other public
sector organizations across the United States. Although the
number of such efforts is increasing, it is not clear that
they will become permanent features of workplace governance
systems.
This thesis addresses the question of whether QWL is likely to
become a permanent feature of municipal organizations. It
examines this issue by assessing the extent to which QWL is
supported by fundamental features of municipal organizational
contexts -- the tasks and political structures of municipal
contexts.
Primary data consists of a case study of one city's effort to
introduce a QWL program over a two and one-half year period.
Secondary data from other municipalities is used for
comparative purposes.
The findings of the study are that municipal contexts
generally do not support the institutionalization of QWL as
permanent features of workplace governance systems, but that,
under the right circumstances, they do support the
introduction and periodic rebirth of such initiatives.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Gary Marx
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
David Olsen, one of the foremost consultant-practitioners
on quality of working life systems (QWL) and labor-management
cooperation, made the following statements at a conference
devoted to QWL in municipalities in February 1985:
"If QWL is such a good thing, why, after 12 or 13 years of
experience with it in the U.S. isn't there more of it? Why
is it so difficult to convince people to begin new
efforts? Why are QWL systems, once established, so fragile
and difficult to sustain? ... Over the past ten years, more
than 30 jurisdictions have initiated public sector QWL
systems or efforts of some sort. But right now there are
fewer than ten actively involved with QWL.' (Mazany, 1985;
oo. 37-38)
The perplexity of practitioners like Olsen has an honest
ring to it. 'Cooperation" and "quality of working life" are
concepts that sound so desirable in the abstract, that it is,
perhaps, difficult to understand why they are so fragile and
difficult to sustain in city governments.
This thesis is an attempt to respond to Olsen's
questions. It is the product of a case study of the efforts
of one city, Boston, to design and implement a QWL program
over a two and one-half year period (April 1984 to November
1986).
Like Olsen, the organizer and director of Boston's QWL
program brought to the effort a belief in the goodness of
workplace democracy and a strong faith that a QWL program could
be successfully implemented and become a central feature of
revitalized service delivery system in the City.
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Despite initial skepticism by most parties in the City,
there was at least tacit acceptance by a majority of key union
and management decision makers that the idea of grassroots
worker participation was a good one and that QWL was worth a
shot, especially since the first 18 months of the program
would be funded by a Federal grant.
After two years of operation, however, it was far from
certain that QWL, or any other form of ongoing, meaningful
worker participation would become a permanent feature in the
City, although the program had made achievements.
Worker-manager problem-solving teams had been organized
in two departments (and in a third, midway through the study
period). In these two departments, several initiatives had
been achieved. In one, floors were swept, restrooms cleaned
and some dangerous wiring was removed. One worker group had
devised a flextime plan covering several workers. In both
departments, workers also clamored for wage increases through
job classification upgrades and for more training. By the end
of the study period, it seemed likely that some of these
initatives would be implemented.
Yet the problem-solving process itself did not work well
at all. Communications within and between departments were
poor, commitments were vague and deadlines often meaningless.
This exacerbated existing resentments on the part of workers
and managers and created new ones. It also undermined the
development of a sense of program efficacy. In fact, many
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participants could see no relationship whatsoever between
their efforts and program results, or believed that the
results were superficial placating devices.
These problems were exacerbated by, but also fueled,
debilitating conflicts between the program director and staff.
These conflicts eventually led to a staff crisis, the result
of which was a program moratorium lasting for three months.
By the end of the moratorium, one department had pulled out of
the program. Several months later, activity in the two
remaining departments was at a much lower level than
previously and no new departments had been brought into the
program.
Yet the program was not dead. By November 1986 (two
years after the start of program operations), the program had
experienced a rejuvenation. Worker-manager problem-solving
groups were established in two additional, small departments
and plans to implement the program in a third department had
been made. The administration had assumed the financial costs
of the program, and the Mayor's support had been conveyed by
top assistants. Both the administration and union expressed
hope and optimism about the future of the program.
Certainly the Boston QWL program fits the descriptions
'fragile and difficult to sustain' used by Olsen. The purpose
of this study is to explain why this is the case and to offer
some assessment of the probable long-term status of QWL in
this city. My approach to this task is based upon the premise
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that QWL performance ultimately depends upon whether and to
what extent it is supported by the organizational context into
which it is introduced. The most relevant features are an
organization's tasks, task environment and political
structure.
Hence my examination of the performance of QWL in Boston
and assessment of its probable future stability rests upon a
detailed description of these contextual features and of the
routine labor-management relations that these features
support. This description will show that the context supports
routine workplace relations that are not at all cooperative.
A detailed description of the QWL initiation and
implementation processes will illustrate how these
non-cooperative relations continually rise to the surface and
undermine QWL program processes, rendering the entire effort
unstable.
Chapter 1 of the thesis provides an overview of the
historical development of QWL, the social and economic forces
which account for its current widespread popularity in the
private sector and its mixed performance to date.
Chapter 2 describes the methodology and data collected
for the case study. Chapter 3 describes the initial stimulus
of the Boston program and decisions of administration and
union leaders to join or not to join the program. These
responses are analyzed in light of the features of the
organizational context which shape the parties' interests and
agendas for QWL.
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Chapters 4 and 5 describe and analyze the structure,
implementation and operations of the program in two
departments and attitudes of participants after one year of
program operations. Chapter 6 analyzes the nature of program
leadership. Chapter 7 offers an assessment of the prospects
for institutionalization of the program. The gist of this
assessment is that QWL will probably not become a permanent
feature of most departments in the City, because the City's
tasks, task environments and political structure do not
support such systems. Nevertheless, cycles of QWL program
initiation, instability, decline and rejuvenation are likely
to recur for the forseeable future.
Chapter 8 reviews the case study and survey literature of
QWL programs in other municipalities, finding that, on the
surface at least, there appear to be many features common to
municipal QWL programs, including cycles of QWL birth,
instability and decline.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND: QWL IN THE U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR
QWL is a term that has been applied to dozens of different
kinds of organizational change efforts in thousands of
organizations over the past 10 - 15 years. Various practical
purposes, ideologies and social forces underly these efforts
as well.
The purpose of this chapter is to sort through this jungle
a bit, by distinguishing among various programatic forms,
describing the reasons why they are started and the extent to
which they become permanent features of organizational
settings. Most of the activity and analyses of these efforts
to date has taken place in the private sector. Hence the
scope of this chapter will be confined to the private sector.
(Public sector efforts will be reviewed in Chapter 8, below).
As this discussion will show, the performance record of
QUL to date is rather mixed. Although program operational
problems, such as poor training of participants or lack of
effective leadership, have often been blamed for QWL failures,
logic and evidence point to more fundamental features of the
organizational context, such as tasks and political structure,
as the factors which shape routine organizational behavior and
.QWL performance.
-11-
QWL and related programs are 'structural Corganization]
interventions which attempt to generate greater worker
interest, involvement and effort toward achieving important
organizational goals.' (Schuster p. 3) They generally entail
increased initiative on the part of workers, either to improve
production directly or to improve working conditions and
thereby create a better environment for production. The
acronym QWL, for 'quality of working life," emerged in the
early 1970's as a generic term for organizational change
efforts focused on workers.
One significant aspect of these efforts is that they
constitute a minor reversal in the application of Taylorist
principles of work organization, which have generally
determined organizational forms and management practices
throughout the twentieth century. Taylorism is based on the
detail division of labor and separation of conception and
direction of the production process by managers, from the
execution of production routines by workers. (Taylor, 1947)
Unionization in the 1930's introduced a measure of
power-sharing and bi-lateral bargaining over certain features
of the manager-worker relationship, such as employment status,
wages and work rules, but it did not entail labor-management
collaboration in the work process or in organizational
decision making. In theory at least, QWL may be regarded as a
move in the direction of more collaborative worker-manager
relations. (Hecksher, 1981)
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In addition to the term QWL, 'Labor-Management
Cooperation' (LMC) is a generic term that refers to efforts
with structured union involvement. Some LMC efforts may look
like the joint labor-management committees that have been used
for decades to discuss and resolve various non-contractural
union-management issues, but many current efforts become
broader in scope and structure, directly involving workers on
the shopfloor and/or in mid-level, department wide committees
of worker representatives and managers.
Ecmaof_QWL
This section describes some of the more common QWL
structures currently in use.
(A) Shopfloor Groups
Shopfloor groups are committees of 6-12 workers from the
same production unit, often including first line supervisors.
Most groups meet one hour per week to discuss and sometimes
implement improvements in production or working conditions
within the unit.
American organization theorists have long believed that
shopfloor groups are an excellent vehicle to harness the
energy, solidarity and self-discipline of primary peer groups
in the service of larger organizational goals. Yet, until
recently, these notions have often been overshadowed by
Taylorist principles, which hold that autonomous shopfloor
groups inevitably work counter to broader organizational goals
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and should therefore be destroyed or suppressed, not
harnessed. (Burawoy, 1979; Crozier, 1964; Hill, 1981;
Heckscher, 1981, ch. 1; Taylor, 1947) (1)
Quality circles and problem-solving groups are the most
widely used types of shopfloor groups and are distinguished
from others by their relatively open agendas. Although some
group discussion topics are usually pre-defined as
"off-limits,' especially if there is an existing collective
bargaining agreement whose provisions might conflict with the
small group resolutions, quality circles and problem-solving
groups generally touch on many aspects of shopfloor life.
A second type of shopfloor group arrangement is the
productivity-based group incentive scheme, which pays
organization members a percentage of the labor-cost savings
from suggestions made in shopfloor groups and approved by
Labor-Management 'screening committees." The most popular of
these is the Scanlon Plan. (McGregor, 1966; Schuster, 1984)
A third type of shopfloor worker group is the semi-
autonomous team. Its powers and responsibilities are
generally far more extensive than those of problem-solving
groups; often including production planning, trouble-shooting,
task assignments and wage setting. Semi-autonomous teams
constitute a break with bureaucratic organizational forms,
insofar as team members typically rotate among production and
ancillary tasks and earn relatively equal pay. (Heckscher,
1981, ch. 1; Hill, 1981; and Walton, 1980)
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Thus far, the use of semi-autonomous teams has been
limited to new or retrofitted plants using highly automated,
continuous process technology, such as oil, chemicals, food
processing, electronics and recently, steel production and
automobile assembly. Production work forces in these plants
are generally smaller than their non-automated counterparts
and are more highly skilled. Overall, labor costs in these
plants are a lower percentage of production costs than in
other plants. (Storper and Walker, 1984)
(B) Organization-Wide Structures
Quality of Working Life structures in unionized companies
generally include a company-wide or plant-wide committee of
executive level labor and management representatives who
oversee the QWL effort. In some companies, the entire effort
is organized and conducted by this committee, but in many such
cases, worker participation committees are eventually
developed as the relationship matures and more trust is
developed. (Schuster, 1984; and Kochan, 1983)
The parallel hierarchy has become a very popular
organization-wide QWL structure, especially in unionized
settings. Depending upon the size of the organization, it
usually consists of three tiers: The bottom tier consists of
quality circles or problem-solving groups that generate
initiatives and pass them upward to a department-wide
committee for approval. The department-wide committee is
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comprised of 6 - 12 department managers and union
representatives. It reviews the initiatives of the quality
circle, approves or rejects them and directs their enactment.
A company-wide or organization-wide steering committee,
consisting of executive-level labor and management
representatives, guides and oversees the implementation of the
program in various departments. (Herrick, 1983, introduction;
Kochan, 1983) Figure 1.1 depicts a typical parallel hierarchy
structure.
WbIL-dapmning?
Over the past 10-15 years, QWL programs, especially the
problem-solving group/quality circle variant, have covered the
entire corporate landscape. Lawler and Mohrman (1985)
reported that over 90% of all Fortune 500 companies have
initiated some form of QWL effort. Kochan (1983) reported
that as of 1982, 1,000 companies had started quality circles,
100 others had introduced autonomous work groups and 500
others had Scanlon plans. Schuster (1984) cited even higher
figures. Why are so many companies initiating QWL programs?
The answer to this question is somewhat complex, for two
reasons: First, QWL efforts have been advocated and justified
by managers and organization analysts as responses to problems
of very different natures. Second, QWL theories and practices
are permeated with political ideologies and agendas, some of
which are mutually incompatible.
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FIGURE 1.1
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Before 1971, neither managers nor analysts in the United
States showed much interest in QWL. The GM Lordstown strike
of 1971 and the U.S. HEW Department Report ck-n-mria
(1973), which cited worker alienation as a serious problem in
production work, helped to generate a great deal of interest
in worker health, job satisfaction and well- being and the
implications of these factors for smooth and stable
production. (Greenberg, 1975; Kochan, 1983)
Specific analyses of the problems and prescriptions for
reform differed according to political ideology and
intellectual specialization. On the left, sociologists
Sennett and Cobb (1972) documented the 'hidden injuries' of
meritocratic production systems, in which those at the bottom
of the ladder were condemned to feeling inferior for not
climbing higher, while suffering estrangement from peer groups
when they did move up. Marxist political economists, such as
Braverman (1974), argued that an ever-increasing detail
division of labor and stunting of personal development were
inevitable results of capitalism, which only the overthrow of
capitalist production relations could change. Democratic
socialist labor economists, such as Gorz (1967) argued for
shopfloor participation as a way of gradually developing a
radical consciousness among workers that would result in an
overthrow of capitalist production relations. (See also
Pateman, 1971.)
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Mainstream management psychologists, such as Argyris
(1965, 1978), did not criticize capitalist production
relations or market forces, but decried what they saw as the
stunting of personal development and growth in bureaucratic
organizations. They claimed that through appropriate
management practices, particularly more open communication and
conflict resolution procedures, organization members could
learn to integrate individual and organizational needs more
adequately. (See also Kohn, 1969; and McGregor, 1959.)
Just how closely these analyses and prescriptions
reflected reality is not certain, but according to national
surveys conducted in the mid-seventies, workers wanted more
say in decisions directly affecting their lives on the
shopfloor. (Kantor, 1977; Heckscher, 1981; see also Kusterer,
1977)
Most of the QWL efforts that were initiated in the early
to mid-1970's were management-sponsored and did not include
unions as partners in the process. Most also focused largely
on individual, job enlargement programs which added together
routinized tasks to make jobs more enjoyable and fulfilling
for workers; rather than shopfloor groups. (Hackman, 1980;
Herbst, 1974) As Heckscher (1981) and Kochan (1983) point
out, neither job enlargement nor QWL generally, took root
during this first wave of activity despite a couple of notable
experiments with semi-autonomous teams. (Zager and Rosow,
1982)
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By the end of the 1970's, U.S. auto, steel and electronic
appliance and components manufacturers were losing market
share to lower-priced, high quality producers, most of which
were Japanese. As popular concern turned toward job loss,
foreign competition and low American productivity,
organization theorists began to promote QWL and especially
worker participation as solutions to these problems. Simmons
and Mares (1983) argued that worker participation and
labor-management cooperation in general, lead to higher
productivity. Peters and Waterman (1982), in their best-
seller, IacbhofEcelne, included worker participation
in shopfloor decisionmaking in their recipe for successful
organizations.
Others,- such as Sabel (1981) and Piore (1983) argued that
high-wage, developed countries like the U.S. have only two
viable responses to low-wage competition from developing
countries: One is to continue to produce for mass markets but
to automate as much of the production process as possible and
to reduce the number of job classifications, thus lowering the
percentage of labor costs in the final product and making the
remaining labor force as flexible as possible. This is done
in many industries as part of semi-autonomous team
arrangements, such as food, chemicals, oil, steel, computer
assembly and recently, auto assembly.
The second alternative is to produce high quality
specialty goods for what Sabel and Piore see as an increasing
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number of small market niches where price competition is not
highly relevant. This strategy requires a primary focus on
flexibility, rather than standardization, since it entails
shorter production runs of non-standard goods and hence
requires frequent adjustments and close collaboration among
highly skilled design, marketing and production workers. This
second alternative is most favorable to advocates for worker
participation, since it requires a high degree of worker-
manager collaboration.
Overshadowing such academic arguments is a recent
fascination in the popular press and management literature
with Japanese management practices, which derives from the
competitiveness of Japanese products in U.S. markets. The
current GM-Toyota Joint Venture in Fremont, California, is in
part, at least, an effort by GM to learn Japanese management
techniques.
The American image of Japanese companies is that workers
are highly committed to the fulfillment of organizational
goals and willingly work overtime and at a frenetic pace to
produce, but also to monitor and correct problems in the
process. This is ascribed to the Japanese culture of group
cohesiveness and to the use of quality circles on the
shopfloor. The American translation is that more 'teamwork"
and worker participation through quality circles can yield
higher commitment, higher productivity and high quality
production. (See Parker, 1985)
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Thus, QWL efforts since the late 19 70's have been
popularized and justified on the grounds of organizational
competitiveness, productivity and effectiveness and have been
focused primarily on group, rather than individual activity.
The earlier concerns with workers' mental health, job
satisfaction, company loyalty and even with political
consciousness have not been discarded, however. They have
been incorporated as disparate and to some extent,
contradictory agendas for QWL.
Schuster (1984) finds in his study of 38 union-management
programs, that the primary focal points of quality circles,
gainsharing programs and labor-management cooperation
committees tend to differ somewhat, although all programs
pursue the goals of cost reductions, quality improvements,
improvements in psychological well-being, increasing employee
involvement and sharing organizational improvements (pp.
82-84). (See also Heckscher, 1981).
Both Schuster and Kochan (1983) cite cases in which QWL
began as a worker- or union-inspired effort to save jobs
threatened by low-wage competition, although most efforts are
initiated by managers as part of cost-cutting and/or
technological restructuring initiatives. Lawler and Mohrman
(1985), however, claim that many executives introduce quality
circles because they are a fad; 'they symbolize modern
participative management' (p.66) and Dickson (1983), reports
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that political ideology often influences management decisions
to initiate QWL efforts. In short, no single factor accounts
for the spread of QWL initiatives throughout American
companies.
HQw-WallI_-QWL-Qiog?
Assessing the overall performance of U.S. QWL efforts is
even more difficult than determining why they have spread
throughout American companies. Clearly a lot of programs have
been initiated, but that does not make them successful. As
Lawler and Mohrman (1985) point out in their analysis of
quality circles, it is always possible to find things to
successfully improve in the workplace, at least in the
short-run.
The primary purpose of this discussion, however, is to
assess the medium- to long-term performance of QWL, i.e., the
extent to which it becomes institutionalized as a 2ermnentn
feature of workplace governance systems. Although more
longitudinal research needs to be done, some studies of the
success or staying power of private sector QWL efforts over
the medium-term are now available. The results, it seems, are
mixed.
(A) Quality Circles and Problem-Solving Groups
According to Lawler and Mohrman (1985), the vast majority
of quality circles and problem-solving groups go through "peak
and peter out' cycles, in which an early burst of enthusiasm
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and activity is followed by a falling off of activity and
eventual group disintegration, or disenchantment. The major
symptoms of the cycle include the following:
(1) Managers often initiate the programs because they
symbolize modern management techniques, or seem to be a
low-cost, low-risk way to achieve morale or productivity
improvements. (See also Smeltzer and Kedia, 1985 and Demos
Research, 1983 & 1984.)
(2) Despite initial reluctance on the part of workers, it
is usually possible to get enough volunteers for quality
circles, since people generally want to contribute to the
organization and they want to participate in making decisions
that affect their work areas. (See also Kusterer, 1977 and
Heckscher, 1981, ch. 2.)
(3) Most quality circles are able to identify problems and
to come up with a few initiatives or suggestions to be
approved by management. Where unions are participants in the
process, a parallel hierarchy structure is usually used, so
that quality circle initiatives go to a mid-level
labor-management committee for approval.
(4) The approval stage is the first serious hurdle to be
crossed by a quality circle:
'Usually the people who have to accept and act on the
ideas the circle generates are middle-level managers, most
of whom have no role in the quality circle and little
experience either soliciting or responding to ideas from
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subordinates. They may be uncomfortable listening to ideas
that they feel they should have thought of themselves or
that will change their own work activities. Also, they
may be too busy ... these middle managers often resist the
new ideas; they either formally reject them or take a
long time to respond. (p. 68)
Yet, because middle managers may be under a great deal of
pressure and sometimes direct orders to accept initial
suggestions, they may reluctantly do so. This, however, leads
them to resent the program. (See also Schlesinger, 1984.)
(5) The implementation stage is also a serious hurdle:
'In most organizations, approval does not mean
implementation. Indeed, time after time we found
situations where managers accepted many of the initial
ideas with great fanfare but didn't implement them. The
result was a serious loss of credibility of both the
program and management... Implementing ideas often
involves cooperation of many people and... requires money
and manpower... in many cases the people who are in charge
of putting the circle's ideas into action are not involved
in the group's initial activities and therefore have
little investment in them...if the ideas are never
converted into action, QC programs usually lose their
momentum and die...a significant percentage of QC programs
end at this point.' (p. 68)
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(6) In the few cases where quality circle initiatives are
implemented and produce significant cost savings or other
clear benefits, new challenges arise. Sometimes tensions
arise between program participants (insiders) and
non-participants (outsiders). Sometimes, group members'
aspirations are raised by their experience of efficaciousness
and they begin to resent the non-cooperative way they are
treated by management outside the quality circle. This
provokes conflicts and/or desires for a job change. Some
members begin asking for financial rewards for their efforts.
(See also Gorz, 1967; Witte, 1980; Walton, 1980; and Demos
Research, 1984.)
Kochan (1983) and Heckscher (1981) also cite several cases
where problem-solving groups become demoralized at this point,
after management takes unexpected, unliateral actions, such as
a merger or shifting production out of the plant to low-wage
plants elsewhere.
(7) Finally, the possibility of expanding the program
often provokes the first serious thought about its utility to
the organization and to management objectives: "Unfortunately,
when executives try to document the savings from early QC
ideas, they often turn out to be smaller than originally
estimated. ... the. typical program either begins to decline or
becomes a different kind of program at this point.' (Lawler
and Mohrman, p. 69)
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(B) Semi-Autonomous Teams
Semi-autonomous team efforts seem to go through cycles
that are similar to those of quality circles and
problem-solving groups. These cycles appear to be less
extreme, however, since the teams are used mostly in new,
highly automated settings to operate costly capital
equipment. Much of the greater worker responsibility and
initiative is thus built into the job and delimited by the
technology. (Walton, 1980; Heckscher, 1981 ch. 1) As Hill
(1981) also points out, computers and automated systems
generally provide management with more accurate and timely
information about the status of operations, so managers can
give workers more 'freedom' at the point of production, while
retaining control over the overall pace and flow of
production. (See also Blauner, 1964; Braverman, 1974; and
Szymanski, 1976.)
Yet, according to Walton (1980), Kochan (1983), Witte
(1980) and Heckscher (1981), the egalitarian task and wage
structures and the somewhat contradictory responsibility to
top management for self-management of accountability, are
features that are very difficult to institutionalize.
Internal team conflicts sometimes arise, especially where
skill and training levels are mixed; they can easily undermine
the solidarity needed to make the team function effectively.
Moreover, as new technology is de-bugged, there is less need
for the teams to meet and less opportunity to socialize new
members into the system or resolve low-level conflicts,
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Most important, the teams must meet top management's goals
for productivity and profitability. Since these are mass
production systems and the equipment is costly, high rates of
productivity are required, if management is to meet its
obligations to shareholders. The imposition of top management
production and profitability goals on a 'self-management"
system results in conflicts, demoralization and, in most
cases, the re-introduction of line supervisor-type roles.
Yet, some features of the semi-autonomous team system,
such as task rotations, performance of ancillary tasks by
production workers and the use of fewer pay classifications
than in traditional, bureaucratic firms, seem to take root as
permanent features.
(C) Gainsharing Plans
Schuster (1984) analyzed the impacts of gainsharing
programs on organizational productivity over time.
Productivity gainsharing programs are similar to quality
circles and problem-solving groups, in that supervisory roles
and the division of tasks are left intact. It is only in the
act of generating successful initiatives (under the Scanlon
plan, but not other gainsharing plans) that the program
constitutes any change in organizational communication or
decision making patterns.
Schuster studied the impacts on productivity of the
Scanlon, Rucker and Improshare gainsharing programs; not their
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longevity. He indicates however, that of the three plans
studied, Scanlon seemed to have more staying power than the
others, possibly because it includes worker participation in
generating initiatives and organization-wide sharing of gains,
both of which help to pull the organization together as a
team.
On the whole, QWL seems to be more than just a fad, but it
also appears to be very difficult to institutionalize in
private sector settings. Those QWL structures which build
greater worker initiative and teamwork into the administration
of automated production processes (as in semi-autonomous
teams) or leave the existing bureaucratic structure intact and
provide for direct and organization-wide compensation for
worker initiatives that are approved by top management (as in
the Scanlon plans), seem to take root the best.
The most popular efforts, quality circles and
problem-solving groups, seem to be unstable and transitory;
and even semi-autonomous teams exhibit a tendency to fall or
slide back toward more traditional, bureaucratic control
systems. Of course, as these aspects of the efforts slide
back, so too do worker initiative and commitment. (Walton,
1980; Witte, 1980; Heckscher, 1981; Kochan, 1983; but cf.
Burawoy, 1979) What accounts for this mixed performance and
instability of QWL systems?
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As experiences with QWL accumulate, it is becoming
increasingly clear, especially to practitioners who believe
that the basic ideas and applications of QWL are sound, that
there are important requirements for administering the
programs if they are to be successful:
(1) lecadwmZylly.cc talegQals - All relevant
parties must desire to participate. Their goals and
expectations of the program must be clearly stated and
accepted, if not shared, by other parties, and reflected in
the program design and documents. This includes executive and
middle management, workers and union representatives. (Kochan,
1976 & 1983; Schuster, 1984; Parker, 1985) As was mentioned
above, however, QWL becomes the carrier for many different and
sometimes conflicting goals. A fascination with Japanese
productivity, and 'participatory management,' as described by
Lawler and Morhman (1985), beliefs in the goodness of
workplace democracy and worker control, or desires to improve
the psychological well-being of organization members, as well
as more pragmatic goals, may all be brought to bear on a
single QWL effort.
(2) Decision makers must conduct a 2eiQc-QAlYIi5_Qf
organizational communication and decision making patterns, to
make sure that the organization can respond to the issues
generated by program committees. (Olsen, 1983; Smeltzer and
Kedia, 1985)
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(3) Strong Commitment to and in tiv-upmQet for
the effort by all management and union levels, especially by
executives, is required to overcome inertia and continually
establish a priority for the program. (Smeltzer and Kedia,
1985; Kochan, 1983; Walton, 1975)
(4) A solid foundation of tcajinig and oQcializatijn_tQ_
QWL-QQc2et, both of d
ti cg iced, at least at the begining, is necessary to
address fears and to provide skills to conduct the process.
(Schuster, 1984; Nadler, Hanlon, Lawler, 1980; Ronchi, 1983)
(5) Related to training, etfacilitatin of program
meetings, sillfulningndguidac of program processes
and f is also generally
acknowledged as important to a program's success or failure.
Some practitioner-theorists, such as Argyris (1983) and Ronchi
(1983), place great emphasis on third-party facilitation,
claiming that goals, commitment and the relationship of QWL to
the collective bargaining process (below) change frequently.
What is crucial, in their view, is that the individual
participants learn how to communicate more effectively, to
surface and resolve conflicts, so that issues such as
commitment can be addressed. On this view, an organizational
intervention such as QWL is successful when the parties have
learned from the process, since such individuals are the basis
of a healthy organization. (See also Bennis and Slater, 1969;
Fisher and Ury, 1981)
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(6) Relaionsbi2-ofQW llectiebgaining - The
standard assumption on this issue has been that QWL efforts
must stay clear of collective bargaining issues, since QWL
generally affects only a few parts of a bargaining unit at one
time and because the type of collaborative, or integrative
negotiations required for QWL are incompatible with and may be
undermined by, or become subsumed in the adversarial nature of
collective bargaining issues. Maintaining this goal in
practice is often impossible, so that continual redefinition
of boundaries is required during the process. (Kochan, 1983;
Parker, 1985; Schuster, 1984; Smeltzer and Kedia, 1985; cf.
Ronchi and Morgan, 1983)
Clearly these operational requirements are important and
no doubt many of the early failures of quality circles and
problem-solving groups, cited by Lawler and Mohrman and
others, can be traced to a failure to observe them. Yet the
fact that many QWL efforts start out well enough but then
fade, or slide back toward more traditional forms of
authority, cannot be satisfactorily explained by program
operational requirements alone. If the problems were only
operational, then surely there would be sufficient willpower
in the organization to solve them and pursue the purposes for
which the effort was first attempted. More to the point, an
exclusive focus on operational requirements tells one nothing
about wby such requirements might not be met; why certain
executives might not provide sustained active support for the
program and why participant goals might be disparate.
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The discussion up to this point has focused on the
operational requirements for the success or stability of
various types of QWL efforts over time. Yet a closer look at
some of the QWL literature and even a cursory glance at
organization theory, show that factors larger than QWL
operational dynamics condition and determine the fate of QWL
initiatives, as they do all day-to-day organizational decision
making and behavior. One can divide these larger factors into
many or fewer categories, but most organizational theory and
research tend to focus on two: Tasks (and Task Environments)
and Politics. These factors vary by industry, if not from one
organization to another. Taken together, they constitute the
context within which all organizational decision making and
behavior takes place. An understanding of behavior in
organizations therefore requires an understanding of the
context that shapes and determines it.
(A) Organizational Tasks are the purposes the organization
serves. They are determined by social needs and wants, as
mediated by product markets and public policy, or what one
might call task environments. (See for example, Smith, 1982;
Marx, 1977; Piore, 1980; Sabel, 1981; Weber, 1981; and Wilson,
1978.)
The relevance of organization tasks and task environments
to QWL structures is noted in both the theoretical and case
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study literatures. Sabel (1981) and Piore (1983), as
described above, advocate QWL in the belief that it is an
effective response to increased product market competition in
mass production industries. The research of Heckscher (1981),
Kochan (1983) and Schuster (1984) indicates that QWL is, at
least in part, a response to these product market conditions.
Yet product markets differ by industry, as do production
technologies. Hence it should not be surprising to find that
QWL forms also differ by industry. Heckscher (1981) notes
that individual job enhancement efforts are found mostly in
service industries. Semi-autonomous teams, on the other hand,
are found mostly in automated and continuous production
processes, such as oil refining, chemicals, food processing,
and more recently, steel production. (Heckscher, 1981;
Kochan, 1983; Sabel, 1981; Walton, 1980) Craft-type
production processes, such as those in the aircraft and
construction industries also use semi-autonomous team type
arrangements. (Storper and Walker, 1984; Sabel, 1981; Piore,
1983) Problem-solving groups and quality circles, while more
widespread than other QWL forms, are often found in mechanized
assembly and related types of production processes, such as
automobile assembly and home appliance production. (Storper
and Walker, 1984; Heckscher, 1981; Kochan, 1983)
(B) Political Structure, or Politics, refers to the
interests of the parties with a stake in the production
process itself (as opposed to the final product of the
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process) and their power to successfully pursue those
interests by making or influencing decisions. Such power is
determined by a variety of forces, including state and
national policies, labor market supply and demand and the
nature and extent of interest group organization. The
importance of political structure to routine organizational
behavior and decisionmaking is often noted in organization
theory. (See for example, Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979;
Fox, 1974; Gorz, 1967; Gouldner, 1954; Hill, 1981; Kochan,
1980; Kusterer, 1977; Marx, 1977; Oppenheimer; 1985; Sabel,
1981; and Storper and Walker, 1984.)
The importance of political structure is also noted in
some of the QWL literature. The organization- or plant-wide
labor-management committee, for example, is used mostly in
unionized organizations where management recognizes or is
forced to recognize the union's interest in such matters.
Quality circles in unionized organizations usually include
shop stewards and other mechanisms to ensure union input.
(Kochan, 1983 and Schuster, 1984) As Storper and Walker
(1984) show, collaborative labor-management relations are more
prevalent in industries requiring highly skilled workers,
because these workers have more bargaining power. Similarly,
Storper and Walker indicate that unionized workers in some
industries, such as automobile assembly, are able to command
higher wages than their market value and are able to exercise
greater influence in organizational decisions than they would
be able to without the union.
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Some of the QWL case study literature relects the
importance of both tasks and politics to QWL design and
processes. Kochan's (1983) case studies of an automotive
supply manufacturer, a meatpacking plant and a newspaper
publisher, show how task environments characterized by
intensive price competition (in the first two cases) and a
balance of power strongly favorable to management (in all
three cases, but especially in the third case) undermine QWL
efforts over time.
Piore (1983) describes how the fluctuating demand which
characterizes the task environment of the construction
industry and the high level of skill required of construction
workers, create the basis for a community in which the
contractors in one season are workers in the next and the two
often work side by side on a job. Construction trade unions
enable the potential for this type of community to be
realized, by keeping worker wages high and organizing the
hiring process.
Analogously, Hill (1981) describes how a desire by
Japanese managers to avoid an increase in worker power through
unionization, led them to adopt lifetime employment policies
and other 'bureaucratic paternalist' measures, as Hill calls
them, to ensure worker loyalty. Hill notes that these
policies were made possible by stable product markets, or task
environments.
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Witte (1980) shows how a lack of collective worker power
vis-a-viz management, as well as a lack of cohesion or
commonly accepted standards among workers, undermined an
experiment involving both shopfloor and organization-wide QWL.
Except for these vignettes, however, the QWL literature
does not shed a great deal of light on the compatibility of
QWL structures with specific organizational contexts. Yet, if
organizational behavior is shaped and determined by task
environments and politics -- and there is no reason to doubt
this -- then it stands to reason that QWL, like any
organizational structure, must ultimately be supported by an
organization's task environment and political structure if it
is to become integrated into organizational behavior patterns.
It might be unnecessary to make such a point, were it not
for the superficiality and ideological overtones of so many
QWL efforts and analyses, as described above. Yet it is these
superficial overtones of QUL that make it necessary to examine
the quality of fit between QWL structures and existing
organizational contexts, to deterine where, why and to what
extent QWL becomes a more or less permanent organizational
feature and where it does not.
The absence from the literature of detailed studies of the
fit between QWL and organizational contexts may result in
tendencies by students and practitioners of QWL to see program
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operational requirements as of primary importance to QWL
success, to perpetuate myths about the universal applicability
of QWL structures to all types of organizations, and perhaps
to fail to appreciate the types of contextual changes that
might be necessary in organizational settings before
collaborative labor-management relations can be realized.
Such tendencies seem to be particularly apparent in the
literature on public sector QWL. Of the few studies of public
sector QWL efforts that have been published to date, most were
written by practitioners, almost all emphasize program
operational requirements, rather than contextual features of
organizations and many are also permeated with ideological
justifications and boosterism. (See, for example, Trist,
1980; Herrick, 1983; Mazany, 1985; Ingle, 1983) In short,
there is an unmet need for non-partisan, detailed analysis of
attempts to fit QWL into public sector organizational
contexts.
The purpose of this study is to address this need. The
initiation and implementation of a QWL program in the City of
Boston is described in detail. As it happens, the
implementation process is anything but smooth and one could
easily claim that a failure to observe program operational
requirements is at fault. An analysis of the City's tasks,
task environment and political structure, however, leads to a
different conclusion; namely, that the organizational context
is not supportive of QWL and that QWL efforts can therefore be
expected to be unstable there.
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The study does not attempt to prove conclusively that the
features of the organizational context, rather than program
operational requirements, are the primary causes of QWL
instability in Boston or elsewhere. Rather, the goal is
simply to establish the plausibility that such is the case.
To do so, I will describe, in detail, the process by which QWL
was initiated in the City, in order to show that it did not
arise from commonly perceived needs witbin the City and that
the agendas of labor and management for QWL were disparate and
conflicting.
Next, I will show, via detailed description, that these
disparate and conflicting agendas are supported by the City's
task environments and political structure, neither of which
appear to be changing (in contrast to the changes that may be
taking place in some private sector contexts, as described
above).
Next, I will describe the task environment and political
structure of the City as a whole and of two departments in
which the QWL program was implemented, as well as the routine
behavior and labor-management relations that these larger
factors normally support. I will show that these task
environments and political structures support routine
relations that are not highly cooperative.
Finally, I will describe the program operations processes
in considerable detail, in order to show that the conflicting
agendas of labor and management that are supported by the task
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environment and political structure, rose to the surface in
the QWL committees and undermined the cooperative process.
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NOTES - CHAPTER 1
(1) In the late 1940's and early 1950's, Scanlon plans and
problem-solving groups were developed for large, unionized
American firms to facilitate product and process changes and
overcome the minor inefficiencies of large, bureaucratic
organizations. Both also had antecendents in incentive
schemes of previous decades and previous experiments with
worker participation. (Heckscher, 1981; Kochan and Dyer, 1976)
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CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY
IotcQduction
This chapter describes the approach and research tools
that I used to study the Boston Labor-Management Cooperation
Program. Before proceeding with that discussion, a word about
the manner in which I gained access to the research site is in
order. I initially became involved with the Boston program in
April 1984, as a co-author of a successful funding proposal to
the U.S. Department of Labor, through which the program was
created. Thereafter, my role was strictly that of an outside
research evaluator. Portions of my work were funded by the
U.S. Department of Labor, directly and through the program,
but most of the work was done without pay. I provided
analyses of routine workplace relations and of the
Labor-Management Cooperation Program to the City and to the
Department of Labor in accordance with their specific
information needs, which differed from the needs of the
thesis.
As a researcher, I enjoyed mostly unfettered access to
program committee meetings, to worksites, to City employees
and to all documents that I requested. With some exceptions,
I was free to conduct the research as I deemed appropriate.
An explanation of these exceptions and other details about the
development of my research questions, the conditions under
which I gained entre to the site and the manner in which I
developed my research role, are provided in Appendix A.
-42-
Data for the study was collected over a two and one-half
year period, from February 1984 to November 1986, although
most of the data was collected from November 1984 to January
1986. Table 2.1 provides a chronology of the research
process.
8e2caCQb
This study describes an attempt to fit a QWL program
structure into the City of Boston organizational context and
assesses the quality of that fit. The basic premise is that
QWL efforts will only be stable and successful over time if
they are supported by the fundamental features of the
organizational context. Hence my description entails a
detailed account of the dynamics of the program -- its
initiation, implementation and operation in two City
departments -- and an analysis of the organizational context
-- the tasks, task environment and politics of the departments
in which the program was implemented and of the City
administration in general.
Since no single type or source of data could provide such
different types of information, I used several methods and
data sources. I used document and newspaper analysis, paper
and pencil surveys, in-depth semi-structured interviews,
informal interviews and observation of work routines and
program committee meetings.
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TABLE 2.1
CHRONOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH
Embcwacy_:_Macab-12Q4: I interview AFSCME and SEIU officials
about labor relations in the City of Boston as data for a
possible newspaper article.
Maccb-r-epcil_12Q4: A local activist named Roberts
(pseudonym) approaches City administrators, SEIU and AFSCME
officials, and suggests they apply to the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service of the U.S. Department of Labor to
fund a three-tier worker participation program. The
administration and SEIU agree, but AFSCME declines to
participate. Roberts asks a colleague and me to draft the
FMCS proposal. We draft the proposal, which is funded by the
FMCS.
Ocobc_-Nmbec.-284: Eist8Qyd-fScfxm~nd
Injteciewa± I am hired with a few colleagues by the Boston
Labor-Management Cooperation Program to conduct a study of
routine workplace relations and attitudes about participation
in a labor-management cooperation program in two departments
-- Assessing and Police Operations/911. The study consists of
surveys, interviews and observation of work routines. I also
interview administrators and SEIU officials on their
perceptions of and goals for the program.
NQyebec±._12a4: I begin attending program planning and
training sessions.
Jyc__y _2 : Worksite groups and departmentwide
committees meet on a regular basis. I observe these meetings
and meetings of the Citywide Labor-Management Oversight
Committee. I also conduct informal interviews and observe
daily work routines.
Mayz_6wgz±_L-12a5: I analyze documents and records and
interview various informants to develop a picture of the task
environment and political structure of the City
administration.
yc The program is suspended due to a
staff conflict that expands into a major dispute between the
SEIU and administration. I continue to conduct week.ly
informal interviews with participants in each department and
with program staff and union officials.
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(TABLE 2.1 cont'd)
Seetembec:-QQbc- 1 25: I spend 25 additional hours in
observation of work routines in the Assessing Department and
Police/911.
b12-a ya126: I conduct a second round of
interviews and surveys in Assessing, Police Operations/9ii,
Staff and Oversight Committee.
J c:-ab-26: I submit reports on the research to the
LMC Program and continue to conduct informal interviews.
c I remain in contact with the Labor -
Management Cooperation Program through a colleague who is
conducting research on the program under a U.S. Department of
Labor grant. I also maintain contact through a program staff
member and an informant who is associated with certain
administrators.
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The use of multiple methods to describe a phenomenon,
called 'triangulation,' is regarded as acceptable practice by
qualitative methodologists. It is based on the assumption
that 'the weaknesses in each single method will be compensated
by the counter-balancing strengths of another.' (Jick, 1979,
p. 604) The researcher using triangulation looks for
convergent results among the various methods used. Where
divergence arises, the researcher must attempt to reconcile
it, often enriching and deepening the overall analysis in the
process.
Jick (1979) notes an absence of established rules for
lending more or less weight to a particular data type when
triangulating: 'His or her claim to validity rests on a
judgement...'a capacity to organize materials within a
plausible framework.'" (p. 608, quoting Weiss, 1968). The
following discussion describes each of the methods I used and
the data I collected, noting some of the strengths and
weaknesses of each. It also provides examples of how I
handled divergences among data types and used one type of data
to supplement or guide the use of another.
A) u were used primarily to build a
description of the City's task environment and political
structure since unionization in the 1960's and the tasks and
politics of two departments in which the QWL program was
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implemented during its first year. Some of the more useful
documents include Nancy Lombardo's detailed account of the
development of relations between the City administration and
the miscellaneous employee unions, the Service Employees
International Union and the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, from the early 1960's through
1976: I
Unions, 1979, which is available at the Massachusetts State
Library. Through the Boston Public Library and Boston
Municipal Research Bureau, I obtained copies of the City
Charter, relevant State statutes and City ordinances,
statistics on employment levels and financial management
reports published during the 1976 fiscal crisis and during the
transition to a new administration in January, 1984.
The City's Office of Labor Relations made its grievance
and strike files available and the City's Personnel Division
and Management Information Systems department provided
wage/salary and turnover statistics for City employees.
The President of the SEIU provided me with two file
folders crammed full of documents describing internal union
politics from 1975 through 1981. These data, along with
verbal reports from union members and managers about the
development of the administration-SEIU relationship, provided
crucial background data for my analysis of the SEIU's decision
to join the Labor-Management Cooperation Program.
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The most comprehensive and, in some ways, the most
informative written data, came from Ib _BotQlQke daily
newspaper and, to a lesser extent, IbQDHdcgId
ihmecicaol. Thanks to the intelligence and good graces of a
Qgbe librarian, I was able to quickly and efficiently trace
certain themes from the late 1960's through 1984. These
themes included the administration's relations with AFSCME and
SEIU, including collective bargaining, work stoppages and the
internal politics of the SEIU; the State/City civil service
system; patronage; fiscal crises; Mayor-City Council and
Mayor-State Legislature politics; the Assessing Department and
Police Operations unit, where the Labor-Management Cooperation
Program was implemented. Throughout 1985 and 1986, I
maintained my own clipping service on these issues.
I also collected documents generated by the
Labor-Management Cooperation program, to supplement my other
sources of data on program operations and to note the
discrepancies between my observations and information that was
communicated by those involved in the program. (See Van
Maanen, 1979, for a discussion of the use of such
discrepancies.) These documents included structure and
process design, training materials, memoranda and minutes from
program committee meetings.
(B) E QdEeociy of workers, supervisors and
middle managers were administered at the time of program
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implementation in November 1984 and one year later. I
designed the surveys, using a combination of validated QWL
research questions, questions which I developed from responses
to interviews I administered in the City, and questions
requested by the Program Director (See Table 2.3 and Appendix
A).
The surveys served two purposes that could not be served
by the other research methods I used. They provided a check
on the representativeness of in-depth interview data (see
below) on organizational tasks and politics. They also
provided comparable data across departments, on attitudes
about the program and the numbers of workers and supervisors
who were willing to participate. On some issues, such as the
extent to which workers and supervisors are perceived to
follow each others' expectations, the survey data showed
patterns that helped to focus my analysis of interview and
observation data.
Table 2.2 shows the total population and numbers of
persons interviewed and surveyed on the program's Citywide
Labor-Management Oversight Committee, on the program staff,
and in the two departments where the program was initially
implemented (Assessing and Police Operations). As the table
shows, the survey covered large percentages of workers,
supervisors and middle managers in Assessing and Police
Operations. I did not administer surveys to senior managers,
administrators and union officials, since the survey's primary
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TABLE 2.2
SURVEYS AND INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN
THE BOSTON LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION PROGRAM
Total * Number Number
Population Interviewed Surveyed
11/84 12/85 11/84 12/85 11/84 12/85
----------------------------------------------------------
Citywide L-M
Oversight
Committee 12 12 12 10 0 0
Assessing
Department 158 133 23 15 91 76
Police
Operations
Unit 80 110 18 8 61 42
LMC Program
Staff 5 5 3 4 0 0
Other Informant+ Interviews Conducted
March, 1984: 2 interviews
Spring/Summer, 1985: 10 interviews
* Total Populations consist of:
Citywide Labor-Management Oversight Committee: Twelve
representatives of the Flynn administration and SEIU Local
#285.
Assessing Department: Includes members of SEIU Local #285,
of whom there were 108 in November 1984 and 98 in December
1985; and non-union managers and line supervisors, of whom
there were 50 in November 1984 and 35 in December 1985.
AFSCME members, of whom there were 31 in 1984 and 34 in 1985,
were not included in the LMC Program or in the study.
Police Operations/911: Includes civilian operators, whose
numbers were 63 and 93 in 1984 and 1985, respectively;
Thirteen police duty supervisors, and the four senior managers
who served on the Police Department Committee of the LMC
Program. Police cadets, whose numbers fluctuated between nine
and 20 during the study period, were excluded from the study,
as were police dispatchers, of whom there were 50 in 1985.
Neither of these latter two groups was involved in any way
with the LMC Program.
+ Other Informants are described in Chapter 2, Section c(i).
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purpose was to provide a basis to judge the extent to which
data from the interview sample were representative of the
entire population. Since I interviewed all senior managers,
relevant administrators and union officials, rather than just
a sample, it made little sense to ask them to submit to a
survey that would have done little more than duplicate the
interview process in a crude fashion.
I administered the surveys after obtaining permission from
the union and each department's management and after memos had
been sent by the program director, union president and
department management to all workers and supervisors,
explaining the nature and purposes of the survey. For each
department and, in the case of the 911 unit, for each shift, I
administered the surveys on a day on which most people were
expected to be at work. Accompanied by a union steward or
other worker, I distributed one survey to each person and
returned two hours later to collect the surveys. (1)
Copies of the survey instruments are provided Appendix A.
Table 2.3 provides a synopsis of the items covered in the
surveys, including sources for survey questions which I did
not construct myself.
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TABLE 2.3
SURVEY AND INTERVIEW THEMES FOR
WORKER AND SUPERVISOR SURVEY AND INTERVIEW
* Satisfaction with pay, promotions, employment security
(AT&T/CWA Survey, 1981)
* Sources of greatest and least satisfaction in tasks and
work climate.
* Worklife aspects that respondents most wanted to see changed
(Demos Research, 1984).
* Decisions on which respondents wanted more input than they
currently believed they had. (Adapted from European
Industrial Democracy survey, 1977).
(Demos Research, 1984)
* Description of expectations/norms for everyday work related
behavior: (a) among workers, (b) between workers and
supervisors, (c) between middle managers and supervisors.
* Description of extent to which respondents perceive others
as actually following these expectations (extent of
normative consensus or cohesion).
* Descriptions of methods and vehicles commonly used for
resolving conflict and perceived efficacy of the methods.
These questions constructed from interview responses)
* Hirings and Promotions
* Lay-offs and firings
(Questions based on Fox, 1974; Sabel, 1981)
IV. i
* Perception of purposes and nature of administration and
Union support for the program
* Desire to participate and rationales for or against
participation (adapted from Witte, 1980)
* Views of program strengths and weaknesses after one year
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Section II of Table 2.3 deserves some additional
explanation. Before constructing the survey, I conducted
in-depth interviews (see part C below). Using responses to
open-ended interview questions about primary workplace norms
and conflict resolution procedures, I developed multiple
choice survey questions to check the representativeness of the
interview results. For example, using interview responses to
the question: "What do workers in your work area expect of
each other?,' I constructed the following range of possible
survey answers and asked respondents to check the two most
important ones:
---- Very little - they don't care what people do.
--- Do your job as it's defined in the written job
description
Figure things out on your own and don't bother people
--- Do the best and most professional job you can for the
City
---- Cover them so they won't get in trouble with the
supervisor
---- Cooperate with everyone to help get the work done
--- Be friendly and sociable
-- Other (specify)
I used no scaling principles to construct this or similar
survey questions; I simply listed all responses from the
interview question as survey response choices. On this
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particular question and ones like it, however, interview and
survey responses diverged and led me to place more confidence
in the interview results. In the interviews, the most
prevalent response to the question about supervisor
expectations of workers was 'just do your job as it's
defined.' On the survey, the most prevalent response was 'do
the best and most professional job you can." My
interpretation of the divergence was that the interview
response was probably the more truthful, in so far as actual
expectations are concerned (which I confirmed many times
through observation and informal interviews). I interpreted
the survey response as one of many attempts by workers to
convince the administration that they were not respected,
treated or paid commensurate with the contributions they made
to the City.
Although I found this result interesting and useful, I cut
this question and ones like it out of the second survey round
(but kept it in the interviews), in favor of a less time-
consuming survey and one that focused more on program process
issues.
(C) mSctcdn jiws were the single most
valuable source of data for the study. I conducted interviews
with several groups of program participants and informants, as
depicted in Table 2.2. These groups are the following:
(i) Interviews with 'Other Informants:' Officials in
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the Office of Labor Relations and Personnel Division under the
previous administration, previous officials in the SEIU,
former and current City Councillors, academics, a journalist
and other informed observers of municipal labor-management
relations in the City, as well as officials in the State
Department of Personnel (Civil Service) who handle relations
with the City. In all, eleven persons were interviewed for at
least 60 minutes during 1985.
The purpose of these interviews was to provide an
understanding of the City's political structure, by exploring
the nature and politics of the institutions through which the
parties pursue their interests. All interviewees were also
asked about the significance of QWL for the administration-
union relationship as they understood it.
In most cases, I was able to check and confirm statements
made by one person with those of others in this group, or with
other sources. Since most of these interviews were conducted
after I had done some document research, I had concrete
instances with which to provoke stories and explanations from
interviewees.
(ii) Interviews with current City administration
officials, including the Director of Adminstrative Services
(essentially the "vice-mayor"), Director and Assistant
Director of the Office of Labor Relations, Supervisor of
Personnel, Budget Director, Chief Policy Advisor to the Mayor
and his Assistant; AFSCME Regional Director and City of
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Boston business representative; SEIU President, business
representatives and chief stewards for City Hall and the
Police Department. With the exception of the AFSCME
officials, all of these persons were members of the
Labor-Management Oversight Committee. Interviews of 45-90
minutes were conducted during the first six months of program
stimulus, decision and design and again approximately one year
later. Most of these interviews were taped, by permission.
These interviews used semi-structured formats and focused
on the following themes:
* Reasons why the administration and SEIU did join the program
and why AFSCME did not.
* Goals of the administration and SEIU for the program.
* Perceptions of the actual and desired status of worker-
manager relations at the executive levels and within
departments, including the level of mutual trust and power
between the parties. Relationship of collective bargaining to
the program.
* Reasons why the Assessing Department, Police Operations Unit
and later, the Retirement Board were chosen for the program
and perceptions by respondents as to the status of
worker-manager relations in those departments.
* Reasons for the respondents' personal involvement in the
program, the nature and level of personal commitment to the
program, and the respondents' expectations for time and energy
to be spent on the program.
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* After one year, descriptions of program processes, strengths
and weaknesses, explanations of actions taken and for the
extent of accomplishments by the program to date.
(iii) Interviews with five senior managers in the
departments in which the program was implemented, as well as
eight middle managers and a sample of line supervisors and
workers. For the first interview round, worker and supervisor
samples were chosen randomly from each functional unit and
from each shift in each department. Sixty to ninety - minute
interviews were conducted at the time of program
implementation and again after one year of program operation.
All of the first-round interviews were taped, by permission.
Only about one-half of the second round interviews were taped,
as I chose to do less taping to save time.
For the second interview round, all middle and senior
managers were re-interviewed and a portion of the supervisors
and workers from the first-round were re-interviewed. In
addition, new worker and supervisor interviewees were added to
the sample to replace turnover and ensure a sample mix by
participants, non-participants, drop-outs, leaders and
non-leaders.
Worker and supervisor interviews included the same themes
as the surveys discussed above, but also included several
questions about the respondents' perceptions of the purposes
and functioning of the program and about the politics and
effectiveness of the union at regulating the employment
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relationship in ways that members considered to be fair. The
second interview round focused more on program processes,
especially the progress of initiatives, as well as reciprocal
effects of the program and routine workplace relations.
All middle and senior managers who participated in the
program were interviewed. The first round of middle manager
and senior manager interviews consisted of questions from both
the worker interviews and administrator interviews (ii,
above), focusing on perceptions of worker-supervisor-manager
relations wiTbin the department and managers' purposes and
goals for the program. I also asked managers about the nature
of feedback from the department's task environment, the intra-
departmental political structure, and their strategic plans
for the department.
Through personal observation of the program over the
course of the first year, it became apparent to me that some
middle and senior managers, especially in the Assessing
department, were uncomfortable with the program. It also
became clear that intec-departmental politics created
significant bottlenecks in program processes. For the second
interview round, I tried to focus on these issues to gain a
better understanding of manager needs and of relations between
departments.
(iv) Interviews with program staff: director, outside
consultant, two program facilitators and clerical workers.
The program director and full-time facilitator were
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interviewed at the time of program implementation and again
after one year. The external consultant was formally
interviewed once, after one year. Two other staff members
were interviewed once each.
These interviews focused on three themes:
* Respondents' perceptions of the City's task environment,
political structure and routine workplace relations;
* Respondents' philosophies and strategies for the program;
* Specific actions already taken and planned for the future,
such as training, guidance of individual participants and
internal staff dynamics.
(v) Informal interviews were conducted frequently
throughout the entire study period with program staff,
workers, supervisors, managers, administrators, union
officials, and with personal acquaintances in managerial and
professional positions in other City departments. These
interviews took place in the City Hall and Police Department
snack bars, at parties, over lunch and sometimes on the phone.
They lasted from five minutes to two hours and focused on the
City's political structure, tasks and routine workplace
relations. Over the 18-month period from November 1984 to
March 1986, I spent about 200 hours conducting these
interviews.
(D) calQeaion of daily work routines, staff and
participant training sessions, program planning sessions,
staff meetings and program committee meetings. From January
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1985 through November 1985, I entered the site two or three
days each week, attending every program meeting scheduled for
that day and using the remainder of my time to observe work
routines and conduct informal interviews. This worked out to
approximately 70 hours of work routine observation in the two
departments which are the major focus of this study, 80 hours
of observation of training sessions, planning sessions and
staff meetings, and 200 hours of observation of program
committee meetings. (See Appendix A for details)
The primary purpose of personal observation was to
understand how the program operated. Yet observation also
proved to be an invaluable source of information about the
organizational context. It was the glue which held the other
methods in my research project together; it provided me with a
knowledge of everyday events that helped me to construct
interview questions and it helped me build rapport with
program participants. It also helped me to understand and
explain divergent perspectives about the program that surfaced
in interviews and surveys.
In conclusion, every type and source of data contributed
something substantial to this study. With the exception of
the instances noted above, the different methods yielded
convergent, rather than divergent, results, so the analysis
was straightforward. But as Bogdan (1972) and Whyte (1981)
also found, the challenge was to organize 59-muab data into
one framework and one story.
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CHAPTER 2 - NOTES
(1) Although this process generally went smoothly, I
encountered some problems during the first survey round in the
Assessing Department. Because of the structural, physical and
demographic complexity of the department, I had difficulty
deciding how to identify and group respondents for the first
survey round. To leave my options open, I asked survey
respondents to place their surveys in envelopes with their
names on them, but not to write their names on the surveys.
Workers expressed great reluctance to put their names on their
survey envelopes, however; their comments were an indication
of the bitter relations between workers and managers and even
between workers and the union. By the time of the second
round, I knew almost everyone personally and understood the
structure of the department better. I asked respondents to
circle the name of their unit on the survey, which most did.
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CHAPTER 3
INITIATION OF THE BOSTON
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION PROGRAM
lQtcQdUctiQQ
This chapter describes the initiation of Boston's Labor-
Management Cooperation program. First, the process by which
QWL was introduced to labor and management officials and their
responses to the idea will be described. The interests and
agendas of these officials for QWL will then be analyzed.
Finally, the features of the organizational context within
which these agendas are formed -- the City's task environment
and political structure -- will be described.
Before proceeding, a brief sketch of the City's management
structure and of the institutions which govern the employment
relationship will help to frame the events to be described.
The City of Boston has a Strong Mayor-Weak City Council
form of government. Mayors are elected for four-year terms;
Councillors for two years. The Mayor has authority and
responsibility for the conduct of all administrative affairs,
including the preparation of a budget and the negotiation of
collective bargaining agreements. (This excludes the school
system, over which the Mayor and Council have only limited
budgetary review authority).
Boston is a legal subdivision of the State of
Massachusetts. Its activities are regulated by State statutes
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and are overseen by various State agencies. The City relies
directly upon the State for financial assistance, as well as
for the authority to raise all revenues.
In 1985, the City of Boston and Boston school system
employed a combined total of 20,614 persons. Of these, about
18,000 could be classified as career civil servants or
professionals and the rest as mayoral appointees.
Municipal employees were granted collective bargaining
rights in 1965. By 1970, most non-managerial workers were
represented by a union. Today, about 16,500 employees are
union members. Table 3.1 depicts the size of Boston municipal
employee union membership as of December 1983.
As Table 3.1 shows, five unions represent over 80% of the
unionized workforce. Of these five, three are craft unions,
representing teachers, firefighters and police patrolmen. The
remaining two large unions, the Service Employees'
International Union (SEIU) local #285 and the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)
Council 93, represent clerical, technical and blue-collar
civil servants in the City; the so-called "miscellaneous
employees' (Katz, 1979). Together they comprise almost 40% of
the City's unionized workforce. Although AFSCME represents
primarily blue-collar workers and SEIU represents technical
and clerical workers, their jurisdictions actually cut across
these lines and across many departments throughout the City.
These two unions are the focus of the study.
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TABLE 3.1
CITY OF BOSTON
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE UNION MEMBERSHIP
Name-Qf_UQiQQ SizaoQf_12483
AFSCME Council 93 3,415
SEIU Local #285
City Unit (incl hospital non-nursing) 1,800
Nurses (RN, LPN, PHN) 875
Total 2,975
Internat'l Assoc. of Fire Fighters, Local 718 1,657
Boston Police Patrolmen's Association 1,500
House Officers Association 272
Police Detectives Benevolent Society 247
Police Superior Officers'Federation 235
Library Professional Staff Association 127
Housing Inspectors Association 65
Int'l Brotherhood of Fire Fighters and Oilers 43
Boston Typographical Union #13 23
Graphic Arts Local #600 21
Graphic Arts Local #67 18
Int'l Bro'hood of Electrical Workers, Local #103 13
Boston Teachers Union 4,479
All Other School Bargaining Units* 1,957
TOTAL UNION MEMBERS 16,812
TOTAL CITY EMPLOYEES 21,113
-----------------------------------------------------
* Other school unions include 400 cafeteria workers
represented by AFSCME Council-93 and 35 planning and
engineering workers represented by SEIU Local 285.
-----------------------------------------------------
Sources: BQsQn-locniio, City of Boston, 1984, pp. XI -
2-3; Boston Municipal Research Bureau, 'Payroll Count'
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The City employment relationship is formally governed by
two, partially redundant institutions, the 103-year old State
civil service system and the collective bargaining system. At
the City level, civil service employment, promotion and salary
raise regulations are administered by the 42-person Personnel
Division. Collective bargaining is handled by the Office of
Labor Relations, which was established in 1971. The size of
this office has ranged from two to 13 persons and was seven or
eight throughout most of 1986.
Both the Office of Labor Relations and Personnel Division
are under the authority of the Administrative Services
Department, an umbrella agency established in the 1950's to
coordinate and oversee internal service departments, including
Personnel, Labor Relations, Management Information Systems
(Data Processing) and Budget.
In addition to Personnel and Labor Relations, a third
institution, the Mayor's political organization, governs the
employment relationship of nQn-administrators through hirings
and sometimes raises and promotions. (It is the means by
which most all administrators are first hired and, in part,
promoted, transferred, etc.) This institution operates
through the Personnel Division and sometimes through
individual departments directly; at times, offices have been
set up specifically for the purpose of political hiring.
At the time the study period began (Spring 1984), the City
had just elected a new Mayor, populist Raymond Flynn. His
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predecessor, Kevin White, had served four consecutive terms
since 1968. Although a popular mayor for much of that period,
White declined to run in 1983, after recession, fiscal crises,
and lay-offs combined with the alleged increasing use of
patronage to shore up his political organization and base of
support, led to brief walk-outs by AFSCME and SEIU, increased
criticism from the City Council and media and State reluctance
to support the City's financial aid requests.
Ib-SimulufQoc_ QWLioo
In their model of a union-management cooperation process,
Kochan and Dyer (1976) hypothesize that, since collective
bargaining is the preferred means of communication, the
parties 'will only be stimulated to initiate a search to
embark- on joint change efforts when under great pressure to do
so, i.e., when a felt hurt is experienced,' from external or
internal sources, which the existing formal bargaining process
is perceived as ineffective in addressing. As examples of
external pressures they mention competition, as well as
government regulations regarding health and safety or other
policies. Internal pressures include worker pressures for
health and safety or work humanization. (pp 64-66)
QWL began in Boston despite the absence of such strong
pressures. Certainly there were pressures on the
administration to improve services and keep costs down, but
for reasons to be explained in this chapter, these pressures
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were not of such a nature as to induce Boston administrators
and unions to inii a r to embark on a joint change
effort. Indeed, QWL was not something that either party
actively sought at all.
Rather, QWL was sold to them in package form; they bought
it as an inexpensive and low-risk way of achieving partially
disparate goals of low-to-medium priority. The 'salesman' was
a local college instructor and political activist, who will be
referred to here as Roberts.
Roberts' self-chosen mission was to bring quality circles
to the City of Boston and hopefully get a job in the process.
He had learned of quality circles while visiting an
electronics plant a few years earlier. He believed that they
were a step in the direction of socialism, mostly because he
saw them as helping to develop a radical consciousness among
workers, similar to Gorz and others described in Chapter 1.
Ultimately, he believed that 'workers should participate in
every decision in the workplace" and tried to solicit union
interest in QWL primarily on that basis. (1)
Roberts also believed that quality circles and
citizen-worker service monitoring committees could be the core
of an effort to improve City services, believing that the
primary problem with the City's reputedly poor service quality
lay in lack of motivation and assertiveness by workers, and
lack of worker-manager cooperation. He solicited management
support for QWL primarily on this basis.
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Roberts had no prior experience with QWL programs; indeed,
his knowledge of QWL was limited to a tour of a plant using
quality circles and a couple of graduate courses on the
subject. Through this coursework, he had come to believe that
the interpersonal communication techniques developed by
Argyris (1965, 1981) and others for management effectiveness
training were appropriate mechanisms to bring about worker-
manager cooperation. Although he had no experience with the
use of these or other interactive techniques, he viewed them
as important to the success of QWL discussion groups and
ultimately, to the development of socialism. (2)
During the early days of the 1983 mayoral race, Roberts
presented himself to the Flynn campaign as a management and
labor relations expert and submitted a few position papers on
quality circles and labor-management relations. He also
lobbied the candidate's advisors to make quality circles and
worker participation a major campaign plank, but without
success.
From the election in November 1983 through the Spring of
1984, Roberts remained on the periphery of the new
administration, continuing to press mayoral aides and the
Director of Administrative Services for a job. He pressed the
new Director of Personnel to transform that office from one
that only processed paperwork for new hires, raises and salary
upgrades, into a modern human resources development
department, by hiring Roberts to initiate QWL and related
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human resources programs.
He also initiated discussions with the Director of the
Office of Labor Relations and with that person's assistant,
who expressed enthusiasm for the idea of labor-management
cooperation. Through these efforts, Roberts was able to
convince key administrators that he had expertise in QWL and
human resources issues, although this was not, apparently,
sufficient to land him a job.
In the meantime, Roberts suggested to leaders of the two
miscellaneous unions, AFSCME and SEIU, that they support and
help to lobby for a worker participation program in the City,
although neither greeted his ideas warmly. He did not
approach any other unions, such as the policemen or firemen,
he told me later, because he felt uncomfortable with these
militaristic workers.' (3)
Early in 1984, Roberts learned of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service's (FMCS, a division of the U.S.
Department of Labor) program to fund up to $100,000 of the
costs of labor-management cooperation efforts over an 18-month
period. At the end of March, he induced the Director of
Personnel and other administrators to consider the possibility
of FMCS funding of a labor-management cooperation program,
partly by telling the Personnel Director that the Assistant
Director of Labor Relations was planning to initiate
union-management problem-solving groups in the Library
Department, without first consulting with Personnel. (4)
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Since turf battles between these two offices are easily
ignited, Roberts' statements apparently upset the Personnel
Director enough to induce him to focus on the issue.
Early in April, about six weeks before the application
deadline for FMCS funding, Roberts organized a meeting which
included the Director of Administrative Services, the Mayor's
Chief Policy Advisor, the Personnel Director, the Director and
Assistant Director of the Office of Labor Relations, and high
level representatives of AFSCME and SEIU, to discuss the FMCS
grant program and a possible labor-management cooperation
program structure.
Roberts presented his design for a QWL program that was
based on the San Francisco Work Improvement Program. Its
structure is similar to the bottom-up parallel hierarchy often
used in labor-management cooperation programs, as discussed in
Chapter 1. Roberts' plan consisted of a Citywide Labor-
Management Policy Committee, Departmental Committees of Labor
and Management representatives, Work Unit Committees of
workers and citizens, and Worker Quality Circles on the
shopfloor. Initiatives were to come primarily from the
Quality Circles and Work Unit Committees and focus on ways to
improve service delivery.
The response to Roberts' program proposal at this meeting
was mixed. AFSCME representatives expressed displeasure with
the proposed focus on grassroots initiative; by the end of
April, they had decided not to participate in the program.
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Both the Personnel Director and Office of Labor Relations
officials were initially lukewarm on the program and became
more skeptical when AFSCME decided not to participate.
On the other hand, the SEIU leadership decided that with
some structural modifications, they would be willing to go
into the program on a trial basis. The Director of
Administrative Services reportedly expressed the view that,
because of its small size and scope, the program could do no
harm and might be a substitute for wage increases. (5)
Eventually, the Personnel Director came to espouse a similar
view. The Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor expressed strong
support for the program, on ideological and pragmatic grounds
similar to Roberts'.
With the assent of one large union and the two key
administration decision makers who were second only to the
Mayor in authority, and the lack of strong resistance from
Personnel or Labor Relations, the City's grant application to
the FMCS went forward. The budget for the grant was
structured so as to include most of Roberts' full-time salary
for 18 months, as well as for other staff salaries. The
City's own contributions were to come almost solely from in
kind sources, such as worker release time for meetings. This
troubled the outside consultant, who stated retrospectively:
"When the program first started, I was concerned that the
commitment seemed to be thin from two sides: First, AFSCME
pulling out meant that the agreement to go forth wasn't
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very solid. Secondly, the program began financed largely
through the soft money of a Federal grant. What was the
City putting in? What's the solidness of the commitment?
... the whole thing was undercapitalized.' (6)
If the FMCS had any reservations about the solidness of
the commitment, it did not let them stand in the way of
approval of the City's grant proposal. By August 1984, the
proposal had been approved; Roberts had been hired as the
Personnel Division's Deputy Director for Human Resources and
had begun to set up the machinery to implement the program.
Chapter 4 will pick up the story at this point. The
following section will discuss the reasons why key decision
makers responded to Roberts' QWL overture as they did.
Kochan and Dyer (1976) predict that a joint commitment by
labor and management to embark on a specific change effort
will be more likely to develop when:
(a) 'both the union and the employer perceive the change
as being instrumental to the attainment of goals valued by
their respective organizations;'
(b) 'the parties are willing to negotiate and make
compromises over the goals or the targets of the change
program;'
(c) 'coalitions or individual power holders within each
organization do not attempt to block the organization from
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participating in the joint effort." (pp. 68-69)
In Boston, condition (a) was fulfilled to a sufficient
extent for SEIU and the administration that they were willing
to embark on the QWL effort, despite the fact that their
agendas for QWL were disparate and, in many ways,
conflicting. Moreover, Roberts was willing to compromise with
SEIU by scratching the worker-citizen committees from the
program design.
For the leaders of AFSCME, neither condition (a) nor (b)
was fulfilled, as they had no desire to participate in a
labor-management cooperation program that would focus on
grassroots initiatives. Since Roberts would not compromise on
the issue and since the administration took no actions to
effect a compromise, AFSCME refused to participate.
(A) AFSCME's Response to QWL
Before discussing AFSCME's response to QWL, a word about
the union's governance structure is in order. AFSCME Council
93 is a statewide organization representing about 50,000
public service workers. The Council is organized into
regions; each region elects a number of representatives to the
150-member Executive Board, proportional to the number of
members in the region. The Board in turn elects Council
officers. There are 14 AFSCME locals in the City of Boston,
representing almost 4,000 blue collar and technical workers,
in departments such as Health and Hospitals and Public Works.
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The Executive Director of Council 93 has presided over the
union since he first organized an AFSCME local at the Boston
City Hospital in the 1950's. All key decisions involving
Boston affairs, including contract negotiations, are
reportedly made by him, through and in consultation with the
Metro Regional Coordinator and City Representative. (Union
local officers have some input into minor contract details and
day-to-day issues). It is these leaders whose views are
important for understanding AFSCME's decision not to
participate in the QWL program. (7)
AFSCME's decision not to participate in the QWL program
was preceded by a certain amount of ambivalence on the part of
these leaders. On the one hand, they wanted to establish a
cooperative relationship with the new administration. Ever
since they had successfully pressured the White administration
to establish the Office of Labor Relations in 1971, AFSCME
leaders had sought to maintain regular access to and
consistency in relations with the administration through that
office. (8)
This worked well until the late 1970's, when the Office of
Labor Relations lost power to the Mayor's political
organization and to the Personnel Division; the latter's
director is widely regarded as having been a political force
in his own right, by virtue of his ability to manipulate civil
service regulations in making appointments, granting raises,
etc. From 1978-1983, labor relations deteriorated in the
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City, as reflected in the large increases in grievances and
work stoppages during this period, depicted in Table 3.2 and
Appendix B. Note that many of the work stoppages had to do
with alleged use of political criteria in hirings, promotions
and lay-offs. (9)
AFSCME leaders were happy to see Mayor White leave,
expressing the view that he had become 'a dictator.' The
union declared its support for candidate Flynn before the
Mayoral primary. In March 1984, AFSCME leaders stated that
they would be 'glad to cooperate with Flynn, as soon as he
figures out what he wants to do.' They mentioned improved
street repair equipment and better payroll procedures as
issues of primary concern and expressed a desire to negotiate
a contract (due to be signed in June 1984, but not actually
signed until one year later). Most of all, they expressed a
desire for communication of intentions from the
administration, i.e., from someone in a position of authority.
On the other hand, neither the specific form of
cooperation offered through QWL, nor the manner in which it
was offered, was appealing to the AFSCME leaders. At the time
of Roberts' overture, they had hardly been introduced to the
key players in the new administration and, from what I was
able to gather, had received no formal communications as to
the administration's intentions for handling contract
negotiations or any other issue of concern to them. Roberts
was not even a City employee when he proposed the FMCS grant
TABLE 3.2
NUMBER OF GRIEVANCES FILED ANNUALLY
BY SEIU AND AFSCME, 1967 - 1985
'67 168 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 "76 177 178 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85*
SEIU
Health&Nospitals 0 3 3 1 5 6 3 20 11 3 4 18 17 21 25 18 37 11, 3
Police Civllians 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 9 7 7 8 6 3 0 0 0
YAC& Parks Life 0 4 3 4 1 4 2 3 3 7 9 5 18 7 11 4 0 4 0 U
City Hatl/County 0 4 4 6 7 11 15 13 10 16 20 21 33 41 41 58 29 16 0
Total 1 11 11 11 13 21 22 37 25 27 42 51 75 77 83 83 66 31 3
AFSCME
Nealth & Nospitals 0 7 3 3 3 6 6 5 7 9 13 37 26 60 50 44 37 27 12
Libr Non-Profess't 0 6 19 11 5 9 14 3 7 16 19 26 30 22 10 23 19 13 4
Total 1 14 26 24 21 29 41 20 35 40 63 112 120 166 94 108 95 100 47
* = Includes data through July, 1985 only.
YAC & Parks Life a Youth Activities Commission & Lifeguards in Parks Department.
Libr Non-Proft = Library Non-Professionals
Source: Boston Office of Labor Relations Grievance Files, July, 1985.
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application in April 1984, much less one in a position of
authority.
Although this April meeting was the very first discussion
between administration and union officials about QWL, Roberts
insisted that the unions immediately decide whether or not
they would participate, since the grant proposal deadline was
less than six weeks away. Hence discussion was immediately
narrowed to details and groundrules for the program, which
excluded the broader discussions that AFSCME leaders desired.
The bottom-up QWL process design also conflicted with
AFSCME's established internal operating procedures. AFSCME's
leaders are chosen democratically, but they then make all-
policy decisions and manage the union's relationship with the
administration on behalf of the electorate. As traditional
unionists, the AFSCME leaders believe that managers should
manage and workers should grieve unfair practices -- tbcgugb
their elected representatives. Likewise, it is the domain of
elected leaders to work with the administration and managers
to bring about workplace improvements. (10) The Metro
Coordinator for Council 93 made it quite clear that Roberts'
QWL overture was incompatible with such a system, at the April
1984 meeting: 'You're turning my union upside down! I make
the decisions here. I know what's needed down there...This
will be nothing but a bitch session.'
One might reasonably ask why AFSCME leaders clung so
tenaciously to their top-down operating procedures, even if it
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meant foregoing a chance to achieve some workplace
improvements. One AFSCME official suggested that the leaders
simply did not want to give up their personal power to the
rank and file; a view that was shared by Roberts, some SEIU
officials and an administrator. (11) This explanation is
plausible, but fails to satisfy completely.
According to an AFSCME official, one longtime observer of
labor relations in the City and Lombardo (1979), AFSCME's
top-down, centralized structure and access through the Office
of Labor Relations, has been the means whereby the union has
traditionally tried to maintain distance between its members
and the Mayor's political organization. AFSCME leaders
believe that to the extent that their members think their
interests can be served (or at least not harmed) by taking
their cues from political operatives or political winds, they
will not support the union and safeguards or procedures won by
the union will be dead letters. (12)
The QWL program threatened to undermine this carefully
managed separation. Moreover, the program was not to be
housed in the Office of Labor Relations, through which AFSCME
leaders wanted to establish a good relationship with the new
administration, but in the Personnel Department, which AFSCME
considered to be an organ of the Mayor's political
organization and had been fighting for several years. The
Director of the Office of Labor Relations stated later: 'I
know that with the State [which also initiated a QWL program
-78-
in 1984], their program is structured somewhat differently and
as a consequence, they have avoided some of the problems we
have had with AFSCME for instance, and their refusal to
participate. I also know that if we rename this program and
put it in this office, AFSCME will participate. (13)
Interviews with AFSCME leaders in March 1984, indicate
that they did not share Roberts' views that workers were part
of the problem with service delivery; to the extent that
workers might be part of the problem, good management should
be able to take care of it. Nor did they share Roberts'
philosophy of worker participation in problem-solving groups
as a way to build a radical consciousness among workers. Like
most labor leaders in the state, they were not interested in
radical consciousness, but in management compliance with a
good contract and in good lines of communication with the
administration. (14)
To recall Kochan's and Dyer's (1976) conditions for a
decision to embark on a cooperative venture, this program did
not appear to AFSCME leaders to be a viable way to achieve
tbcic valued goals and they did not value the apparent goals
of the program.
(B) SEIU's Response to QWL
SEIU Local #285 is also a statewide organization,
representing approximately 10,000 clerical, technical and
nursing workers, mostly in government, universities and
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private health care institutions. Like AFSCME Council 93,
Local 285 began as a City of Boston union. Its 3,000 Boston
members are still the largest contingent of the union and its
1,500 Hospital workers are the center of union leadership and
activism.
The Local's formal governance structure consists of 13
jurisdictions in two divisions, Health Care and Public
Employees. Each of the 13 jurisdictions elects
representatives to its division; these representatives oversee
Executive officers. Executives are elected directly by
membership plebiscite and serve for three-year terms. There
are five SEIU bargaining units in the City of Boston, each of
which (in theory) elects representatives to the Local's
negotiating committee and votes separately on its contract.
Past and current officials acknowledge that the
governance structure is somewhat pro forma, however, since de
facto power is concentrated mostly in the hands of the staff
and officers, who have the time and resources to organize.
The decision to join the QWL program was made primarily by
the union President, in consultation with the Executive
Director and several staff members. (The International was
informed of the program, but it did not play a role in the
local's decision). Like AFSCME Council 93, the SEIU
leadership did not initially embrace Roberts' QWL proposal.
The President said: "We've had a half-dozen labor-management
committees in the contract for years that [the administration
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has] never funded or convened. Why not get those started?
What's going on?' (15) Some leaders viewed QWL as generally a
union-busting tool. Most were skeptical that the new
administration was really serious about improving labor-
management relations or working conditions.
Eventually, however, these leaders found three reasons for
participating in the program: First, to strengthen the union
and their own leadership, by organizing the membership in City
Hall departments, to get them to "be more aggressive, stand up
for themselves," and to establish lines of communication there
'before Flynn establishes his machine.' Second, to 'get to
know' the new administrators better, especially as preparation
for contract talks. Third, to achieve concrete improvements
in working conditions. (16)
These three pragmatic reasons were generally cast in terms
of a broader, democratic socialist ideology which included a
belief in shopfloor democracy and in the conscientious
delivery of public services. SEIU leaders stated that
improvements in working conditions might help to make City
workers more conscientious. In this respect, there was at
least superficial compatibility between Roberts' espoused
political views and the worldview of SEIU leaders.
The SEIU leaders had been working toward their goal of
establishing a stronger and more aggressive union for over ten
years. From the time of its origins in the 1950's until 1977,
however, the Local was reportedly ruled in an informal fashion
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by two men, the President and Treasurer, who were friends of
the Mayor and whose representation of memers entailed mostly
brokering of raises and promotions for indiyiduals. Informed
observers claim that the Local operated almost as an arm of
the Mayor's political organization and that no attention was
devoted to developing the union at the shopfloor level. (17)
According to SEIU documents and current leaders, several
militant staffworkers* and City Hospital workers (including
the woman who was to become President in 1981) organized a
'Movement for Union Democracy' in 1974. This group attempted
to steer the union toward more aggressive shopfloor organizing
and a more assertive stance with the administration. In 1976,
the group wrote to IbeBgstQnQlobe and suggested that the
paper investigate the relationship of Local 285's leaders to
the Mayor. The Globels investigation concluded that the
leaders had held 'no show jobs' in the City through Mayoral
largesse for several years and had been able to acquire City
owned real estate cheaply. This led to a public scandal,
investigations by the Boston Finance Commission and an end to
the no show jobs practice. (18)
The Union Democracy Group also complained to the SEIU
International that the Local's election and accounting
practices were fraudulent. The International investigated the
----------------------------------------------------------
*These staffworkers were paid by AFSCME Council 93 and SEIU
Local 285 to organize State workers.
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charges, placed Local 285 under receivership and relieved its
two leaders of their duties in 1977.
By 1978, the union had been restructured. Formal
elections were held and a union staffworker was elected
President. By 1981, when this President was up for
re-election, many staffworkers, as well as the City Hospital
militants, had grown alienated from his leadership and claimed
that he had no interest in developing the union at the
shopfloor level. (19)
The Hospital militants constructed an opposition slate,
which included a former staffworker of the President and one
of the organizers of the 'Union Democracy" movement six years
earlier. This slate won a narrow victory and ran unopposed
for re-election in 1984.
Yet relations on the shopfloor apparently remained as they
had been prior to the 1981 election. At the City Hospital,
the political base of the militants and the home of an
aggressive AFSCME local, workers frequently and unhesitatingly
asserted their rights vis-a-viz management and engaged in
various forms of union activity. (20) City Hall workers, on
the other hand, who traditionally were dominated by the
Mayor's political organization and received little attention
through shopfloor organizing, remained inactive in the union,
even failing to elect representatives to the union's contract
negotiating committee in 1984 and 1985. (21)
Moreover, relations between the leadership, on the one
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hand, and the City Hall and Police Department civilian workers
on the other, were not good. The leaders complained that it
was almost impossible to induce City Hall workers to volunteer
to be shop stewards or even to follow through on grievances
once they had made a complaint, because of their fears of
management retaliation. (A few Assessing workers admitted to
me that they declined to pursue grievances because of such
fears). 'They want the union [staff] to do all the fighting
for them,' one official said a few times. 'When you tell them
you're just a resource and tbay have to fight, they don't want
to hear it.' (22)
From November 1984 through most of 1985, however, I was
often told by workers that the City Hall Business
Representative did little aggressive organizing or steward
development and that the union was generally unresponsive in
both City Hall and in the Police Department: 'They talk a lot
about democracy,' said one Assessing worker, 'but they never
ask you what you think about things ... I volunteered to
become a steward, but I had to keep calling them to get
information on the union. They never came to me.' 'They
never give you copies of the contract or union handbooks or
anything,' said another. 'I call and call and call,' said one
Police Operations worker, 'but they don't even return my
calls.' (23)
Racial And political differences exacerbated these
problems. In the Mayoral election of 1983, the SEIU
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leadership endorsed Flynn's black, left-of center opponent.
This endorsement was reportedly welcomed by the large numbers
of blacks and liberals who work at the Hospital, but was
publicly opposed by more conservative whites who work in City
Hall and at Police Headquarters. This racial/political split
was also apparent at the 1985 SEIU Christmas Party, at which
an estimated 90% of the non-staff participants were black
Hospital workers. Likewise, SEIU rallies held at City Hall
during the Spring 1985 contract negotiations were attended
almost exclusively by Hospital workers.
QWL offered the SEIU leadership a low-cost, no-risk way to
begin to overcome this split and organize the City Hall and
civilian Police Department workers. Through the union's QWL
program committee facilitator, the union would be able to
supplement the efforts of its Business Representatives.
Although SEIU leaders viewed QWL generally as a cooptative,
union-busting tool, there was nothing to bust in City Hall or
in the Police Department. Indeed, the leadership resisted
suggestions by the Office of Labor Relations to implement the
program in the Hospital, where the union was well-organized.
(24)
The second reason cited for the SEIU leadership's entry
into the QWL program was, as the President put it: 'We needed
to take every opportunity possible to get to know [the new
administration] better for the contract negotiations." (25)
QUL offered the possibility of more contact and an additional
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channel of access to information and decision making.
This did not mean that the leadership viewed QWL as
entailing a more relaxed relationship with the
administration. On the contrary, the President consistently
and publicly contradicted Roberts, every time he publicly
stated goals of the QWL program of changing "them and us to
we.' 'No, it's still 'them and us,'' she would assert. 'But on
some things we can cooperate.' (26) Although they told me
they were "going easy with' the administration in contract
talks during the Fall of 1984 (despite the fact that the
contract was supposed to be signed by June 1984), SEIU leaders
did not hesitate to conduct a spirited public campaign and
plan a work stoppage when by April 1985, they still did not
have a wage offer they found satisfactory.
The third reason why the SEIU leaders decided to join the
QUL program was to improve working conditions. Unlike the
AFSCME leaders, who believed that their ability to maintain
and improve working conditions over the long-term depended
primarily upon consistent contract administration by the
Office of Labor Relations, SEIU was both more entrepreneurial
and less respectful of the formal system of union access.
They would use whatever means they could to pursue their goals
of higher wages, non-political personnel management
procedures, and management solicitation of union input into
workplace decisions. Indeed, the President stated publicly
that "there's no reason why the things we get in one
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department can't be given to other departments [who aren't in
the program] also." (27)
QWL is often cast as a way to improve productivity, but
SEIU leaders were extremely leery of any such purpose,
believing it might undermine the union and lead to a worsening
of working conditions. (See Parker, 1985 on this point). They
demanded that the City's FMCS proposal contain no references
to productivity and vehemently opposed occasional casual
statements by some managers and administrators that
productivity improvements should be a conscious goal of QWL.
Unlike AFSCME, then, SEIU leaders were able to identify
valued goals which they thought the QWL program might
achieve. Moreover, despite widespread skepticism within the
SEIU staff and officer ranks, no coalitions arose to oppose
the program. The President's frequently voiced 'cynical
optimism,' as she called it, was apparently enough to convince
others that the union was not being undermined.
(C) The Administration's Response to QWL
This section will focus mainly on the reasons given by the
administration's two most powerful decision makers, next to
the Mayor, for agreeing to embark on the QWL program: The
Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor and the Director of
Administrative Services.
Throughout the study period, the activities of the Chief
Policy Advisor were focused primarily on housing and economic
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development, neighborhood participation projects and
troubleshooting whenever and wherever the Mayor needed him.
The Policy Advisor's espoused views of QWL, his rationales
for participating in the program and his actions during the
study period, were somewhat contradictory. On the one hand,
he espoused stronger support for the concept than any other
administrator or union leader, except for Roberts himself.
According to Roberts, the Policy Advisor was the only person
on Flynn's staff who expressed interest in QWL furing the
mayoral campaign. After Roberts made his proposal to request
FMCS funding in the Spring of 1984, the Policy Advisor played
what Roberts termed a 'godfather role" for the idea, arguing
in the program's behalf to other administrators and later,
helping Roberts choose departments where the program should be
implemented. (28)
Like Roberts, the Policy Advisor saw QWL as part of a new
philosophy of government, focused on excellent service
delivery and neighborhood participation, the achievement of
which would entail a total transformation of service delivery
processes in the City. This was not only desirable, but,
according to the Policy Advisor, necessary to the City's
financial well-being:
'It's much broader than [a worker-manager morale problem].
It's in the culture. Management can do better, but it's
got to be an orchestrated turnaround in the public's
perception of what public employees are worth. Good
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managers; it's a snowball that needs to pick up the steam
and size. The managers need to be able to motivate the
workers, the workers need to feel more of a stake in their
job that will create better services and we will
skillfully project that. And then that gets verified by
those receiving the services. And then we have the kind of
turnaround that will make public employment more valued by
the public at large and by the people doing the work."
But 'Eif] the public believes that public workers are just
on the payroll and don't get anything done, then we will
continue the current trends of de-funding" through
taxpayer revolts and State reluctance to support the
City.' (29)
Other components of the strategy, with which the Policy
Advisor was more closely involved, would include the
establishment of Neighborhood Councils and other structures
through which citizens could share:
"in decision making on zoning, on broad police regulation
issues, licenses, property sales and dispositions,
development decisions, as well as basic service delivery
processes. Also there is a participation and service
delivery component that we have already tested once with
some success in a short term way coupled with the Spring
[1984 citywide] clean-up. It involved mid-level managers
sitting down with the heads of various community
organizations... Looking at what they wanted to clean up
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in their neighborhood ... and then being able to discuss
that with the mid-level managers from the service
departments... in a decision making process which decided
what to do based on what the departments could offer....'
(30)
Yet, according to Roberts, the Policy Advisor refused to
promoted QWL as a campaign plank during the mayoral race,
since Roberts could not demonstrate the program's cost savings
in advance. (31) Even by the Fall of 1984, the Policy Advisor
did not believe that the QWL program was worthy of the Mayor's
personal political capital or public support:
'When] it's at the point that I know it's working, I'll
feel good about projecting it in our general campaign that
says that Flynn works hard and so do the people that work
for him and for you.' (32)
Asked one year later why he had never mentioned the
program to the Mayor or tried to enlist the Mayor's active
support for the program, the Policy Advisor gave a similar
response:
I'm not going to get the Mayor involved in something that
is not a viable project or could waste his time.' (33)
The Policy Advisor also expressed ambiguous views about
the significance of QWL for union-administration relations.
On the one hand, he said that the program constituted a 'new
area for dialogue" with the union and that the administration
would generally try to 'strike up a cooperative and planning
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relationship with organized labor' when embarking on various
service- or neighborhood-related initiatives. (34)
He also acknowledged 'a sense of shared ideology' between
himself and the many other left-liberal democrats who were
part of Flynn's campaign organization on the one hand, and the
leaders of the SEIU, on the other. (35)
On the other hand, he acknowledged no active role for the
administration or union in running the program. Rather, the
program was to be administered in a decentralized fashion, as
a voluntary tool for department heads:
This program [has] to earn its spurs with department
heads. Where they want it and think it's a good thing,
that's where it will work best.' (36)
Indeed, he stated that program activity should focus on
the point of service delivery and worker-manager relations,
not union-management or union-administration relations. Like
Roberts, he stated that the key to successful QWL was
aggressive, shopfloor organizing by QWL program committee
facilitators, who would bring worker- manager conflicts to the
surface and then take the views of the two parties into a
successful process of negotiation and compromise. (37)
Although the support of the Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor
was important, the Administrative Services Director was the
key decision maker whose support for QWL was necessary to
allow the program to be initiated and later, to be continued.
The Director oversees crucial internal service functions of
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the City -- Personnel, Labor Relations, Budget, Management
Information Systems, Purchasing and Health Benefits. The
holder of this position is generally a chief confidant of the
Mayor. The Administrative Services Director during the study
period was Flynn's election campaign director.
Until the end of 1985, I was not able to interview the
Administrative Services Director and saw him only at two
management meetings called for the purpose of resolving a
program staff crisis. He did not attend the monthly Oversight
Committee meetings and was reportedly not accessible to
program staff. Accordi-ng to many administrators, managers,
union officials and other observers, he was generally
inaccessible, but he refused to delegate decision making
authority, allowing issues and problems to bottleneck until he
was pushed into acting.
According to several sources, Roberts conducted an
intensive lobbying campaign of the Administrative Services
Director, but he stated that he was unable to get the latter
to focus for long on the QWL idea; even after the April 1984
meeting to discuss the FMCS funding proposal, he reportedly
held out to Roberts the possibility of a job not related to
QWL or Personnel.
Around the time of the April meeting, however, the
Director reportedly said to Roberts of QWL: 4"We have no money
to offer [the workers], so QWL seems like a good idea.. .What
do we have to lose?' He agreed to allow the FMCS application
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to go forward, but made no commitments of time or money beyond
that. (38). When I interviewed him in the Fall of 1985, he
did not espouse a philosophy of worker participation as a key
to transforming the culture of City Hall, or anything of the
sort. He stated simply: 'We're in this program to improve
worker morale." (39)
The Administrative Services Director's operational view of
the program was that program facilitators would 'beat up the
managers' when necessary, he said, to get them to respond to
worker initiatives, but, like the Policy Advisor, he also
believed that the ultimate decision as to whether or not a
department would participate in the program should be left to
those same managers who were being beaten up. (40)
He also stated that the scope of the program should be
limited to dealing with worker-manager issues within
departments. Other, larger problems, such as irrationalities
in the personnel system overall, payroll procedures, or
building and computer maintenance issues, would 'have to be
taken care of on a catch as catch can basis for now.' (41)
In response to written suggestions I made in March 1986, that
the program be changed to use worker participation as a way of
implementing, from the top down, systems reforms devised
through union-management cooperation, he reportedly replied
that he had no interest in using QWL in that way. (42)
The Administrative Services Director did not interpret the
QWL program as a major effort in union-management cooperation,
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or as part of a transformation of the service delivery
process. Rather, he demonstrated and stated a view of
labor-management relations that was in many respects
consistent with the previous administration's practice of
simply keeping the unions from 'making a stink:' 'More union
input is not the issue,' he said. 'You want to make sure the
unions don't gQggQg you.' (43) (See Lombardo, 1979)
Accordingly, when a plan for major operational
restructuring and staff reductions at the City Hospital was
developed in 1985, Hospital officials reportedly followed his
directives not to provide the union with information on
details or the opportunity to comment, until the finished plan
had been presented to the public. This incensed the SEIU
leadership and led to a public protest of the Hospital's
action. Likewise, Labor Relations officials complained that
the Administrative Services Director refused to allow them to
make a reasonable compromise with the SEIU on contract wage
demands, although negotiations were stalemated throughout the
Fall of 1984 and Winter of 1985. A few minutes before the
union had scheduled a strike vote, he reportedly phoned the
SEIU Executive Director and made a five percent wage increase
offer. (44)
By the end of 1985, however, the SEIU leadership had come
to regard the Director and the Flynn administration generally
as 'more progressive and reasonable than the White
administration ever was,' although eliciting such
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reasonableness often seemed to SEIU leaders to require a
public stink. (45)
The responses of officials in the Office of Labor
Relations to Roberts' QWL proposal were ambivalent (although
they did not have the authority to do anything about it).
They were not opposed to the concept per se, but troubled that
the program would go ahead over AFSCME's opposition. Through
several years of experience with both unions, they had come to
respect AFSCME's diligence at maintaining communication with
their office and criticized the SEIU, who 'want to be
concerned with the very highest policy kinds of decisions.
And they have never really tried to establish communication on
the little levels. ... AFSCME works very hard at the day to
day communication... they do a better job than ESEIU] Local
285 does.' (46)
Moreover, these officials did not perceive the program as
addressing fundamental causes of poor worker morale,
specifically patronage hiring practices, the failure of
managers to comply with collective bargaining agreements in
their treatment of workers, and lack of responsiveness by
internal service departments to the needs of City employees
generally.
On the other hand, the Labor Relations Director believed
that the program would be beneficial to worker-manager
relations: 'The mere fact that there is a group where the
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employees get to speak to the managers without fear of
reprisal and point out some things that are wrong" was
positive. (47) Moreover, he stated that without the FMCS
funding, this type of structured dialogue could not take
place, since his office was underfunded and understaffed as it
was.
Like the SEIU leadership, Labor Relations officials also
perceived the program as having a secondary benefit of
improving union-management communication, since, as the
Director put it: 'It will force [the SEIU President] and me to
talk more.' They saw the program as but one sign of a
generally improving union-management climate since Flynn had
become Mayor, marked mostly by union forbearance and
willingness to talk before filing grievance charges. (48)
The Personnel Director, who had been Flynn's chief
assistant for many years, was uneasy about the potential
political fall-out of starting a program to which AFSCME was
opposed. On the other hand, he expressed agreement with
Roberts that his department should 'start to focus on human
resources things' and saw QWL as but one such activity that he
intended for Roberts to take on. (49)
Like other administrators, the Personnel Director viewed
Roberts as an expert on QWL and other human resources issues.
He himself had no background in personnel matters and had
taken the personnel job in order to weed out the previous
Mayor's political operatives from the new administration.
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Like Roberts, the Chief Policy Advisor and the Administrative
Services Director, the Personnel Director viewed the program's
basic purpose as establishing better worker-manager
cooperation, not union-management cooperation.
These rationales for and against QWL by union and
administration leaders indicate a lack of a clear and widely
shared agenda or purpose for QWL. They also indicate disparate
and partially conflicting interests and motivations in the
union-administration relationship and at most tenuous
agreement on common problems and priorities.
Most important, they indicate a lack of strong interest in
QWL. The Mayor's top administrators reportedly never informed
him of the program's existence during the entire study period,
much less during the initiation stage. They viewed QWL as a
voluntary tool for department heads to improve worker morale,
but department heads were not involved in initiating the
program. Although they acknowledged the legitimacy of union
participation in the program, administrators did not view the
program as an effort in union-administration cooperation at
all, but as a worker-manager cooperation program. The
administrators committed no money to the program at the outset
and they immediately assigned administration of the program to
a self-proclaimed expert, whose expertise they had no way of
assessing.
Both unions responded to the QWL overture by assessing
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whether their power to counter the Mayor's political
organization and/or to induce other changes in management
practices would be strengthened or weakened through QWL.
Neither assigned intrinsic value to the idea of cooperating
with the administration in general.
The following discussion will help to explain these
responses and agendas, by showing how they arise naturally
within and are supported by the City's task environment and
political structure.
(A) Tasks and Task Environment
In Chapter 1, it was argued that organizational behavior
is shaped, in part, by an organization's tasks and task
environment. That discussion focused on private sector
organizations and their task environments.
The task environment of a City administration differs from
that of a private sector organization in three respects that
are important for this analysis. First, no product market
mechanism automatically registers consumer satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with services provided by the administration.
If the administration does not take it upon itself to monitor
service delivery quality through surveys or other means,
citizens must either wait until election time or move out of
-98-
the community to make their dissatisfactions known. In the
interim, the administration may not feel compelled to provide
top quality services.
Second, aside from memory and trips to other communities,
citizens have little basis upon which to judge the relative
quality of the services they receive. Hence many intervening
factors, especially the image of the administration portrayed
in the media, help to determine whether consumers switch
mayors at the end of a term.
Finally and most important, unlike a private firm, which
provides one product for one market (or ten products for ten
markets, etc.), a mayor and his administration provide many
services for one or a few constituencies. Hence, to satisfy
his constituencies and win re-election, a mayor must determine
wbiab services are most important to the electorate and which
are less important. Put differently, a mayor must determine
which tasks to perform well for the task environment and which
ones need less attention.
In Boston, the electorate's primary demand is typically
cit for the efficient provision of high-quality bLaic
services. Despite complaints and exposes in the press,
mayoral candidates fo not make service improvements major
campaign planks. As a former City Councillor and mayoral
candidate told me: You can t get 20 people in a living room
to get excited about services.' (50) Rather, voters demand
jobs, housing, neighborhood development and recently, fiscal
stability.
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Moreover, the nature of the electorate itself leads mayors
to adopt strategies that may undermine the efficient provision
of quality services. The City of Boston, unlike New York,
Philadelphia, Chicago and other big cities, is politically
fragmented. No established groups organize and represent
broad-based interests. (51) (See Howitt, 1977 and Lombardo,
1979). Hence, to be elected, a mayoral candidate must
establish his own rmQecal coalition of supporters. Given the
ethnic and socio-economic diversity of the city and tenacity
of parochial neighborhood loyalties, this requires the
establishment of neighborhood networks and, optimally, as much
personal contact between candidate and citizen as possible.
(52) (See Lombardo, 1979)
Since sustained personal contact between candidates and
neighborhoods is impossible, establishing viable neighborhood
networks requires a strong campaign organization. As Lombardo
(1979) and local journalists and commentators have often
noted, campaign workers generally require concrete
reimbursements for their work, the source of which is
patronage appointments. For this reason, once a person has
been elected, he gains resources to front a more or less
permanent campaign organization which is difficult to counter.
Once in office, a Mayor must continue to build his
electoral coalition, since it is based on A o-rsonal following
and can crumble if not nurtured. Mayors use several
mechanisms to continually re-new their links with
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neighborhoods. One is neighborhood housing, revitalization
and economic development projects, which were a focus of the
early Collins, White and Flynn administrations, as indicated
above in the description of the Chief Policy Advisor's role in
the Flynn administration.
Patronage employment serves as another effective
neighborhood linking mechanism. Mayors practice two different
types of patronage. One type is what one might call 'legal
patronage.' This refers to the roughly 3,000 persons who are
formally classified as mayoral appointees, and thus not
covered by the same appointment rules as permanent civil
servants. A second type of patronage is that which
contravenes the spirit or letter of civil service provisions.
It takes a variety of forms, including the establishment of
positions within line service departments which are classified
as outside of the civil service system, but whose duties are
similar to those of civil service jobs; use of technical
competence criteria as a loophole to hire outside of the
formal promotional appointment process; and the mis-use of
provisional appointments. (53)
A third linking mechanism is what Howitt (1977) calls
government innovations.' These are citizen participation and
community control structures, such as the Little City Halls
program under Kevin White, which handled information requests
and other transactions with citizens in city neighborhoods
during the 1970's, the Federally-funded Model Cities program,
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and the Community Schools program. (Nordlinger, 1972). As
described previously, one of the primary roles of the Mayor's
Chief Policy Advisor in the Flynn administration was to
develop such government innovations. Neighborhood Spring
clean-ups and the development of Neighborhood Councils (in a
couple of neighborhoods) counted among some of his more
substantive innovations, as of January 1986. (See Altshuler,
1970; Zimmerman, 1972; Mollenkopf, 1983, for analyses of the
politics of such innovations).
These strategies do not require high-quality service
provision or close labor-management collaboration. Indeed,
they may undermine both service delivery quality and labor-
management relations. As many workers, union officials and
even some managers and administrators indicated to me,
patronage appointments are demoralizing to career civil
servants, especially when the political appointee is perceived
as technically incompetent, and even more especially so when
the political appointee is both technically incompetent and is
in a supervisory or managerial position. Since, in most
departments, only the line supervisor and manager positions
pay well enough to constitute a reward for political work,
these are the positions most likely to be filled with
patronage appointees. As I observed during the two-year study
period, the practice of patronage contributes to workplace
conflicts and sour attitudes, which in turn undermine work
quality and promote turnover among skilled and/or ambitious
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employees who do not wish to do pol.itical work to advance.
Moreover, the operational emphasis on neighborhood links
tends to preclude attention to internal service departments
and internal management procedures generally, even compared to
other strong mayor cities, like Philadelphia. (See Howitt,
1977) Such neglect was apparently a serious problem in the
White administration, particularly during his last two terms
(1976 - 1984), when he responded to fiscal stress by cutting
funding for internal service departments, such as Personnel,
Labor Relations and Real Property (as a percentage of total
spending) and curtailed capital planning. Equipment
maintenance and supplies budgets for individual departments
were also cut. (BgQtgn-in-Icaomitiga, 1984; 'Boston Facts and
Figures,' 1985). Accompanied by layoffs and apparent
increases in patronage appointments, these budget cuts
undermined employee morale and perceived service quality.
The responses to Roberts' QUL overture by AFSCME, Labor
Relations officials and to some extent, SEIU officials,
reflected a primary concern with internal management and
service issues, such as payroll procedures, equipment
maintenance, building maintenance and many personnel
management practices. Yet, as late as December 1985, the
Administrative Services Director stated that these issues
could only be taken care of on a 'catch as catch can basis.'
(54) Throughout the entire study period, managers, union
officials, workers and even some administrators, often
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complained about the 'crisis management" style of the
administration and lack of sustained attention to internal
systems issues.
In short, the City's task environment does not appear to
support the introduction or the long-term viability of QWL in
basic service departments, because it does not support a
sustained focus by the administration on gegiding
high-quality basic services that might require frequent
collaboration among workers and managers.
(B) Political Structure
The discussion in Chapter 1 showed that political
structure is also an important determinant of an
organization's routine behavior, as well as its conduciveness
to QWL structures; where worker and manager power is more
equal, cooperative relations are more likely. The political
structure of a city is far more open and complex than that of
a private organization. The Mayor shares power and influence
with several entities. Some have formal decisionmaking
authority; others simply have the power to shape the opinions
of decision makers and voters. These entities include the
City Council, the State Legislature and State regulatory
agencies, the Federal government and its regulatory agencies,*
----------------------------------------------------------
*The role of the Federal government will no.t be considered
here, since such an analysis would shed little additional
light on the issue of City political structure.
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various local watchdog groups, the media and unions. Each
must be examined with respect to its possible relevance for
labor-management relations and QWL. As the discussion will
show, only a couple of these entities have the power to
influence personnel practices or the manner in which services
are delivered and the implications of that power for the
introduction and stability of QWL are not positive.
Although City Council monitors the performance of City
agencies and approves the budget, it has no authority over
administrative practices or the conduct of labor-management
relations. It can and does occasionally hold hearings to
discuss agency performance, but it can take no lawful action,
other than to reduce funding for an agency (it does not have
line item veto powers). Both SEIU and AFSCME officials stated
that the Council had no power to help them in any way. As one
official put it: 'The Council never saved a job.' (55)
Council's point of leverage with the administration is its
power to veto housing, development and State home rule
legislation initiated by the Mayor, as well as funds from
outside sources (eg., the State, Federal government). Yet
Councillors usually do not use this leverage to change service
delivery processes. They use it to obtain preferential
treatment for their constituents from City agencies and, most
of all, to
supporters.
can neutral
obtain patronage appointments in the City for
(See Lombardo, 1979). In short, a skillfull
ize the Council's power. (56)
their
Mayor
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The State exercises considerably more power in City
affairs than the Council does. The Legislature must approve
all sources of City revenue (taxes, fees, etc.) and provides
about one-third of the City's yearly revenues in direct aid.
Yet this has little direct bearing on the organization of
service delivery or labor-management relations, although the
administration's attempts to maintain smooth relations with
the State, by expediting legislator requests for constituent
services and providing patronage appointments for supporters
of State officials, do have disruptive effects on workplace
relations. (57) (See also Lombardo, 1979)
Of more consequence, at least in theory, is the State's
formal regulatory role in the City employment relationship and
in the work of some City departments. Both the 103-year old
Civil Service system and the municipal collective bargaining
system were created by and are regulated by the State. Yet
the State's role in the latter arena is largely limited to
adjudication of contract disputes or violations that are not
resolvable at the local level.
The State-City Civil Service System, which administers the
processes through which employees are hired, promoted,
demoted, transferred, terminated and given raises, is regarded
by administrators, managers, workers, union officials and
outside observers as incapable of discharging this
responsibility with any semblance of adequacy. (58) Moreover,
union officials charge and some managers acknowledge, that the
-106-
cumbersomeness of the system's rules and regylations both
induces managers to circumvent them and makes it almost
impossible for workers and unions to document such management
actions. (59) (See also Appendix C) A system such as this
does not promote consistency and perceived fairness in
labor-management relations, much less the collaborative
relations supposedly characteristic of QWL.
In addition to the City Council and State, several
watchdog organizations monitor the conduct of the
administration. The Boston Finance Commission is a State-
mandated watchdog that conducts periodic investigations of the
City's financial management practices. Most of these
investigations do not directly affect personnel or employment
relations, however. (60) The Boston Municipal Research
Bureau is a business- sponsored watchdog that is widely
regarded as influential in decisions of the State Legislature
and financial institutions on questions of financial support
for the City. Although most of its work focuses on financial
management policies and practices, it also monitors department
employment levels and employee absenteeism statistics,
criticizing increases and applauding decreases.
The power of these two watchdogs pales in comparison with
that of Ibe-BQmtQGlIbe and Ibe-BQmtQn_Hecald daily papers.
Indeed, it is only through the media that the watchdogs and
even the City Council have the power to influence Mayoral
behavior. The media also do their own investigative reporting
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of administrative practices and the newspapers conduct
occasional surveys of citizen satisfaction with service
delivery quality.
In a politically fragmented city such as Boston, in which
a Mayor's personal following and personal image in the eyes of
the electorate can make the difference between re-election and
defeat, the power of the press cannot be taken lightly. Both
Flynn and his predecessor devoted considerable time to actions
designed to maintain a positive image citywide. (61)
According to a reliable informant, one of the top
administrators described previously 'spends half of his time
on the press; trying to get them to change a story or not
print a story." Likewise, the Personnel Director stated at
one point: 'Ib-B 5QstQ1Qbe sets the agenda. Or actually,
the administration sets the agenda and follows it, but the
QQbe sidetracks it or changes it. When they write something,
you jump.' (62)
The implications of the power of the media for labor-
management relations and QWL are ambiguous. On the one hand,
the diligence of the press at monitoring service quality
appears to induce the administration to devote some attention
to basic services, when and to the extent that thr press makes
specific services an issue. For example, a breakdown in the
police response system during the study period that was
(incorrectly) blamed on the 911 operators, resulted in
sustained criticism in the press and the appointment of a
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blue-ribbon committee to solve the problem. Since the QWL
program was in operation in the 911 unit at the time, the
blue-ribbon committee adopted the QWL group's recommendations
for reform in the unit. Hence one could say that the press
helped to support labor-management cooperation. (63)
Moreover, the press's frequent criticisms of patronage can
be regarded as a positive influence on labor-management
relations, since patronage has baleful effects on worker
morale, as discussed above. (On the other hand,
severalAssessing Department workers told me that they found it
demoralizing to be labelled a lazy political hack by the
press, just because they were initially hired through
political connections, since they believed they were also
qualified for their jobs and worked hard).
Finally and most directly, an editor of Ib?-BQ51QQGlQbg
who favored QWL in Boston printed supportive op-ed articles in
January 1984, October 1984 and May 1986. Roberts claimed that
the first article made him and QWL more acceptable to top
administrators, but no else confirmed this. (64)
On the other hand, the overall effect of the media and the
Mayor's obsession with the maintenance of a positive image,
may be to distract the attention of the administration away
from service delivery and internal management issues. As
noted above, the lack of attention to internal systems
problems was a common source of aggravation among workers and
managers during the study period. As one frustrated manager
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put it: 'Why doesn't [Flynn] just go out and hire the best
city manager he can find in the country? Then [Flynn] can go
and ride the fire engines and do all that image stuff." (65)
Moreover, the fact that the administration tends to "jump"
when critical press accounts appear (as acknowledged by the
Personnel Director above), means that problems may not receive
the sustained attention they need to be resolved, but only
handwaving or symbolic responses. For example, it took the
administration over eight months to even begin implementing
the recommendations of the blue-ribbon committee on 911,
mentioned above. At one point, the Mayor decided to solve a
much-publicized problem of abandoned cars in a neighborhood by
publicly ordering the towing unit to remove the cars within 12
hours or look for employment elsewhere. The cars were removed
immediately, but accumulated again within a couple of months.
Finally, unions are a source of potential power with which
the Mayor must contend. Worker power was identified in
Chapter 1 as a key factor that shapes labor-management
relations, QWL and routine behavior in organizations. As that
discussion also indicated, the power of workers varies with
their place in the division of labor, conditions in the labor
market and the nature and extent of worker (or manager)
organization.
The miscellaneous employees, represented by AFSCME and
SEIU, are the least powerful of all major employee groups in
the City, as reflected, for example, in their average weekly
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wages shown in Table 3.3. Hence they present little or no
challenge to the administration's authority and have no
leverage with which to bring about more cooperative labor-
management relations.
The lack of power of the miscellaneous employees is
traceable to several sources. The majority of these workers
are semi-skilled clerical, technical and maintenance workers.
Most of their jobs are at the bottom to middle levels of the
skill hierarchy in most departments and require at most a high
school education to perform, although a substantial amount of
working knowledge may be required as well (See Kusterer, 1977
for a discussion of the importance of such skills). (66)
Their lack of power is also traceble to a lack of strong
union organization, which has many causes. First, municipal
workers lack the right to strike. Although work stoppages
occasionally occur despite the law, they are generally of very
brief duration and answered with injunctions. The no-strike
law appears to be at least a marginal deterrent to some
workers. For example, when in March 1985, the SEIU began
preparing for a work stoppage, some workers in City Hall,
where the union is particularly weak, expressed alarm that the
union might do something that was illegal, despite the fact
that they were upset with the administration for not
increasing their pay.
Second, the miscellaneous workers have no clear public
identity and no strong base of support in the public at
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TABLE 3.3
AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES BY UNION
1985
WAGE ($)
American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, Council 93..........
Service Employees
Boston Police
Federation of
International
International
Patrolmen's
Superior
Union, Local #285.......297
Association. ......... .467
(Police)
Association of
Officers..
Firefighters,
....... ... .606
Local #718 ... 533
Boston Teachers'
City Av erage..............................
Sources: 1985 - "Personnel Statistics Sheet,"
0003, by Administrative Services Dept., City
05/30/85,
of Boston.
UNION
.4...........457
No.
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large. In many ways, their identity is bound up with that of
the administration and they are frequently tarred with the
same brush as the latter in criticisms of service quality or
patronage levelled by the media. Moreover, the level of
financial support for City services which the State, City
Council and citizens are willing to provide, rests in part on
the perception that the administration is competent and
managing money honestly. Too much miscellaneous union
criticism of administration practices may ultimately undermine
workers' chances for wage raises, or undermine the union's own
lobbying of the Legislature on behalf of City financial aid
requests. Ironically, the administration can easily distance
itself from unions who make demands for wage increases,
claiming lack of ability to pay and, depending upon the
circumstances, picking up public support for responsible
financial management in the process. (67)
Third, many miscellaneous workers feel a primary
connection with their sponsors in the patronage system, the
person who helped them get their current job. This undermines
their willingness to work within the union framework. 'When
they have a problem,' says one union steward, 'they ask
themselves, 'should I go to my sponsor, or to the union?'"
(68). From what little I was able to observe, workers
generally go to their political sponsors, unless they believe
that the latter will not be effective in that instance.
Moreover, political sponsors and informal networks generally
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are more effective in securing a raise or promotion to a
higher title than the union is. This undermines the few
attempts that the unions make to develop worker loyalty in
City Hall and makes it more difficult to counteract patronage
in City employment practices.
Fourth, the representation structure of the miscellaneous
unions makes it difficult for them to find issues or
experiences which tie all members together, aside from pay and
benefits issues. Although AFSCME and SEIU represent primarily
non-professional, clerical, technical and clue-collar workers,
their jurisdictions include dozens of occupations in
departments throughout the entire City. According to Lombardo
(1979) and other observers, this is partly the result of the
continuing rivalry between the two unions, which began in the
1950's, and partly the result of astute jerrymandering by
Mayor White's labor lawyer in the late 1960's, who sought to
limit the power of the unions.
Fifth, relations between SEIU and AFSCME exacerbate their
weakness vis-a-viz the administration. With the exception of
their joint representation of some State workers -- an
arrangement that has often been fraught with conflict --
Council 93 and Local 285 have generally not cooperated with
each other or approached the administration as a coalition on
any issue. Since together they represent almost 40 percent of
the City's unionized workforce, a coalition might be able to
focus attention and make substantial headway on issues such as
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the use of computer technology, raise and promotion practices,
training and career development policies, and payroll
procedures; issues which were often mentioned by AFSCME and
SEIU officials and SEIU workers.
Yet SEIU and AFSCME leaders have seldom displayed
professional respect for each other; neither during the years
up to 1977, when SEIU was ruled by two men whom AFSCME
considered to be a disgrace to the labor movement, nor since
1981, since SEIU has elected leaders who offend AFSCME
sensibilities by adopting left-liberal political causes. SEIU
leaders, for their part, express little desire to mount new
initiatives to cooperate with the conservative leaders of
Council 93, although they state that they do collaborate with
the AFSCME Hospital local, with whom they share political
beliefs and strategies.
Police officers,' teachers' and firefighters' unions are
able to partially overcome these sources of weakness, for two
reasons: First, their members are craft workers; their jobs
have to date remained largely impervious to division into
discrete, centrally-coodinated tasks. In the language of Alan
Fox (1974), the jobs of these workers entail 'high trust' by
the public and officials who are directly responsible to the
public for the performance of police officers, teachers and
firefighters. For this reason, they receive a great deal of
training and socialization to the ethics and hierarchies of
their crafts. This tends to preclude the effective use of
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patronage in hiring and promotion practices, it makes internal
cohesiveness easier to achieve and it makes the authority of
non-member managers easier to oppose. (See Spero and
Capozzola, 1973)
Second, these workers provide services that are popular
with citizens and easily recognized as valuable. Unlike
miscellaneous employees, they are occasionally featured in the
daily newspapers for acts of heroism. Hence, they have a
distinctive identity in the public mind and, importantly, in
the minds of State legislators and City councillors, whom they
lobby successfully on many occasions. Because of their
distinctive identity, they are not tarred by the media with
the same brush as the administration and are able to prevail
upon the administration for wage increases and favorable work
ru1es.
Given the weakness of the miscellaneous employee unions,
there is only one rule that the administration must observe in
its dealings with them: "Keep them from making a stink" in
public that could embarrass the administration. (Lombardo,
1979) As the Administrative Services Director explained to me
in December 1985: 'Union input is not the issue; You want to
make sure they don't oppose you." (69) Lombardo's analysis
of union political behavior supports this view, finding that
candidates for municipal office do not need active
miscellaneous union mysp2cc, although it is desirable, as all
support is. What politicians need is for the unions not to
actively oppose them. (Lombardo, 1979)
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This means that there is no compelling reason for the
administration to collaborate with the miscellaneous employee
unions on most issues. Certainly there is no compelling
reason to enter into a QWL program in which the administration
ZbacCs 29WeC with unions. This was reflected in the views of
all administrators, as well as of Roberts, who stated that the
purpose of the QWL program was to develop a "more
participatory management style' and more assertive,
conscientious workers, not stronger unions. It was simply
'important that the unions don't oppose the program." (70)
The concern of the SEIU leaders with their union's lack of
power was a major impetus in their decision to join the QWL
program. Given their weakness vis-a-viz the administration
and mayor's political organization in City Hall, QWL could
only help to strengthen the union; it could not harm it.
CQQulusion
The City's task environment and political structure
support conflicting relations between the miscellaneous
employees and the administration, not cooperative ones. Hence,
it is little wonder that the stimulus for QWL came from an
external advocate, who brought a program that was funded by
the Federal government.
The responses of key administrators and union officials to
this overture reflected their disparate interests and agendas.
Their only source of unity was a "sense of shared [democratic
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socialist] ideology,' as the Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor put
it, which they saw as possibly compatible with QWL. This
ideology was accompanied by a vague faith on the part of
Roberts and the Policy Advisor, that bottom-up worker
initiatives could be a factor in, or leverage, in Roberts'
view, a fundamental transformation of the service delivery
system.
The responses of other key administrators were based more
on the notion that workers' morale and work habits needed
improvement and might improve, if they were given the chance
to identify and discuss shopfloor problems with managers in
their departments. Most did not perceive QWL as an initiative
that would require their own time or active support. Indeed,
they initiated the program on behalf of department managers
who knew nothing about it.
Neither the SEIU nor the AFSCME leadership saw QWL this
way. AFSCME viewed QUL as at best an insincere and
ineffective attempt by the administration to address problems
of concern to workers, and at worst as a waste of their own
time and a destabilizing force in the union. SEIU officials
saw QWL primarily as an organizing tool in departments where
they had a weak presence. In a sense, they also initiated the
program on behalf of others who knew nothing about it; the
rank and file in City Hall whom the leaders wanted to
organize.
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It is safe to say that no party and particularly not the
administration, displayed a very clear conception of what QWL
was and what it should do. Yet their conceptions and agendas
for QWL made it clear that QWL would not be a Citywide program
with strong executive leadership, but a series of department-
level QWL programs that the administration supported, or
tolerated. Whether QWL could thrive under these conditions,
whether the contexts of any departments would prove conducive
to QWL and whether QWL would be accepted, in the first place,
by the workers and managers for whom it was intended, remained
to be seen.
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CHAPTER 3 - NOTES
1) Roberts, LMCP Director, November 1984.
2) Roberts, LMCP Director, November 1984 and January 1986.
3) Roberts, LMCP Director, November 1984, March 1985 and
January 1986.
4) Acting Director, Office of Labor Relations, February 1985
and January 1986.
5) Director of Administrative Services, April 1984, as
reported by Roberts, May 1984.
6) Training and Process Consultant, January 1986.
7) AFSCME Council 93 official, August 1985 and SEIU Local 285
official, February 1985.
8) 'Bud' Rogers, former labor relations staff writer for Ibe-
BQtQon_1Qba, June 1985. See also Lombardo, N.: IbgEQlitial_
b 1979, pp.
9) SEIU organizer, June 1985; Office of Labor Relations
official, February 1985; former Office of Labor Relations
official, July 1985; AFSCME Council 93 officials, March 1984
and August 1985.
10) AFSCME Council 93 official, August 1985.
Within this top-down framework, AFSCME representatives are
regarded by both past and present Office of Labor Relations
officials (as well as outside observers and the one department
manager whom I asked about this) as being very responsive to
their members' needs and attentive to details, maintaining
close and frequent contact with the Office of Labor Relations,
as well as lines of communication with department heads. I
have no data from rank and file members with which to support
or refute this view, but several SEIU leaders disputed it,
claiming that AFSCME leaders do not represent their members
well.
11) AFSCME Council 93 official, August 1985.
12) AFSCME Council 93 official, August 1985.
13) Director, Office of Labor Relations, November 1984.
14) AFSCME Council 93 official, August 1985.
15) President, SEIU Local 285, March and November 1984;
February 1985.
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16) President, SEIU Local #285, April 1984, November 1984 and
December 1985. SEIU official, April 1985 and June 1985.
17) Lombardo, 1979; Ib__BotQQbe, 1975 - 1976; Internal
union documents, SEIU Local #285, 1975-1977; AFSCME Council 93
official, August 1985; Former Director, Office of Labor
Relations, July 1985; Acting Director, Office of Labor
Relations, February 1985; 'Bud' Rogers, op. cit., June 1985;
SEIU Local #285 officials, April - July, 1985.
18) Ibe_BQtQQlQQbe, 1976; SEIU internal union documents.
19) The major conflict between the President and the militants
appears to have been a five-day strike, instigated by the
Hospital militants in July 1980, over wages and alleged
political intimidation of workers by the Mayor's campaign
organization. This work stoppage, according to some of the
Hospital militants, was not authorized by the President and he
supported it only after it was a fait accompli.
20) Professor of Labor Relations, University of Massachusetts,
May 1985; Office of Labor Relations officials, November 1984,
August 1985; SEIU officials, April 1984, November 1984, April
1986, March 1985.
21) Office of Labor Relations officials, August 1985,
September 1985.
22) SEIU official, March 1985 and April 1986; SEIU
staffworker, November 1984.
23) Assessing workers and Police Operations civilians,
November 1984, August 1985, December 1985.
24) By the end of the study period, however, they stated that
the program might be more effective in places like the
Hospital, where they already had a strong organization.
25) President, SEIU Local #285, December 1985.
26) President, SEIU Local #285, January 1985 and June 1985.
27) President, SEIU Local #285, January 1985 and June 1985.
28) Roberts essay: 'Searching for Public Sector Excellence,'
May 1984 and interview, January 1986.
29) Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor, November 1984.
30) Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor, November 1984.
-121-
C
Roberts essay:
1984.
Mayor's Chief
Mayor's Chief
Mayor's Chief
Mayor's Chief
Mayor's Chief
Mayor's Chief
Roberts essay:
1984, informal
HAPTER 3 - NOTES
'Searching for
Policy Advisor,
Policy Advisor,
Policy Advisor,
Policy Advisor,
Policy Advisor,
Policy Advisor,
'Searching for
interview, May
, Continued
Public Sector
November 1984.
December 1985.
November 1984.
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1984.
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39) Director of Administrative
1985.
40) Director of Administrative
1985.
41) Director of Administrative
1985.
42) Director of Administrative
1985; Roberts, March 1986.
43) Director of Administrative
1985.
44) President, SEIU Local #285
45) SEIU officials, November 1
46) Director, Office of Labor
47) Director, Office of Labor
48) Director, Office of Labor
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50) Interview with former City
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where elections are non-partisan. The statewide union
structure is also weak and fragmented. Although business
groups, such as 'The Vault' (The Coordinating Committee) and
the Mass High Technology Council exercise great influence over
City finances and development policies, they are generally not
a presence in City electoral politics. Other groups, such as
Mass Fair Share and the Citizens for Limited Taxation are
active at the state level, and even to some extent at the
local level, in the case of Fair Share, but as single issue
groups, not multi-issue political entities.
52) Lombardo (1979) maintains that this holds true for City
Council and Boston seats in the State Legislature as well.
53) See Appendix C for a discussion of these loopholes in the
Civil Service employment system.
54) Director of Administrative Services Department, December
1985.
55) AFSCME Council 93 official, August 1985 and SEIU Local
#285 official at various points during the.study period.
56) Former Boston City Councillor, August 1985.
57) I was personally acquainted with two such patronage
appointments and witnessed their disruptive effects on work
relations.
58) A State Civil Service Commission attorney and State
Personnel Department officials acknowledged, in July 1985,
that problems existed in the system, but stated that it was
improving. (See Appendix C).
59) Bos oiIaition, 1984; Retirement Board manager, June
1985. State Personnel Department officials asserted that the
system was 'self-policing,' in interviews conducted in July
1985.
60) The Finance Commission's investigation of the 'no show
jobs' held by SEIU Local 285 officials in 1976 eventually led
to the ouster of these officials and an end to the Mayor's
practice of awarding such jobs. See note 17 above.
61) See Higgins' Sl cuSune, 1984, discussions of
these symbolic acts during the White administration.
62) Director, Personnel Division, May 1985.
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63) "Draft Report,' Committee on 911, October 1985.
64) Roberts essay: 'Searching for Public Sector Excellence,'
May 1984.
65) See note 61.
66) SEIU officials, April 1984 and November 1984.
67) Discussion with Michael Piore, MIT Professor of Labor
Economics, April 1985. See also Aronson and Schwartz, 1981,
Chapter 15 and Schick and Couturier, 1977.
68) SEIU Local #285 official, October 1985 and April 1986.
69) Director of Administrative Services, December 1985.
70) Roberts, Program Director, April and May 1984; November
1984.
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CHAPTER 4
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONS
IN THE ASSESSING DEPARTMENT
IQtcQductiQn
This chapter discusses the implementation and operation of
the Boston Labor-Management Cooperation program in the
Assessing Department. The introductory section of the chapter
describes the program structure and some general features of
the program implementation process; the remainder of the
chapter focuses on the Assessing Department.
(A) Program Structure
The design of the Boston Labor-Management Cooperation
program conformed to the parallel hierarchy form commonly used
in QWL programs. (See diagram in Figure 4.1)
The top tier in the program's hierarchy, called the
Citywide Labor-Management Oversight Committee, consisted of
ten voting members: The Director of Administrative Services,
the Supervisor of Personnel, the Director of the Office of
Labor Relations, the Budget Director, the Mayor's Chief Policy
Advisor, the SEIU President and four union designees - The
City Hall and Police Department Business Representatives and
two shop stewards. The primary functions of the Oversight
Committee were to plan for and direct the expansion of the
program into various departments and serve as trouble shooter
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FIGURE 4.1
BOSTON LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION PROGRAM
COMMITTEE HIERARCHY
I----------------------------------------------- I
Citywide Labor-Management Oversight Committeei
TL. f ----------- - -- - -
--------- /--- T--
i Departmentwide Committeei
---------- ---------i
i Worksite I lWorksite I
Group Ii Group
Departmentwide Committee[
Worksite i Worksite
Group I Group
-L L---------- i
Note: Worksite Groups were to be the most frequent source of
initiatives, with higher level committees providing approvals
and assistance in implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------
Source: 'City of Boston Labor - Management Cooperation
Program, A Grant Proposal, Submitted May 11, 1984, To The
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,' p. 16
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when the program ran into snags at the department levels.
A Departmentwide Committee was to be established in each
participating department, consisting of equal numbers of
middle and top managers, and worker/union representatives.
The Departmentwide Committees were to meet at least once per
month, to receive reports from Worksite Groups, to approve or
reject their initiatives and facilitate their problem-solving
efforts. The Committees were also to 'engage in active
problem-solving efforts when problems taken up by the Worksite
Groups cannot be adequately addressed at the worksite level.'
(1)
Worksite Groups of 6 - 12 persons each were to constitute
the bottom tier of the hierarchy. Each Worksite Group was to
be comprised of primarily non-supervisory employees, but, in
an effort to overcome the often-cited problem of line
supervisor resistance to worker initiatives, line supervisors
were to be included in the groups. (See Klein, 1984) The
groups were to meet weekly to discuss and 'solve problems that
arise in the work situation and devise ways to accomplish
tasks more effectively, efficiently and enjoyably.' (2)
The program documents called for the problem-solving
process to begin with agenda formation, problem definition and
then problem-solving in the Worksite Group, followed by
discussions and approvals from each level of authority above
the Worksite Group, so that initiatives would have the support
of the middle by the time they reached the Departmentwide
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Committee level.
In addition to Roberts, the Program Director, the program
was to have a staff of one full-time committee facilitator
chosen by the administration with union approval and one
half-time committee facilitator chosen by the SEIU with
administration approval, as well as the half-time services of
a Personnel Division clerical worker. In addition, an outside
training and advisory consultant was to be hired. By the end
of November 1984, these persons had been hired by the Citywide
Oversight Committee and had begun working with Roberts to
implement the program.
(B) Implementation Strategy
In Chapter 3, it was pointed out that key administration
decision makers, who became the members of the Citywide
Oversight Committee, conceived of the QWL program as mostly a
tool to help department heads improve morale and services.
The program would have to 'earn its spurs with department
heads,' as the Policy Advisor put it, if it was to have a role
in the City. This meant that the decision to implement and
continue participating in the program would rest solely with
department heads, rather than being directed or coordinated
from the top of the administration or from the Citywide
Oversight Committee.
Moreover, since top administrators viewed Roberts as an
expert, 'the one who's studied all this stuff,' as one put it,
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they left him with almost the entire responsibility of
defining the program's purpose and of organizing support among
department heads. The Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor and Labor
Relations Director helped him identify departments with large
concentrations of SEIU workers and made a few introductory
phone calls, but the task of convincing department heads of
the value of QWL was left to Roberts.
Roberts' criteria for program site selection were not
extensive, since he believed that QWL was a conflict
resolution tool and a social desideratum that could be
implemented in almost any organizational setting. QWL success
would hinge on the quality of program committee facilitation,
not on pre-existing characteristics of organizational
settings. As he acknowledged in January 1986:
"At first we thought it would be good to have one blue
collar and one white collar department [to assess the
differential effects of participation on employee
attitudes and behavior], so we looked at Public Works [as
the blue collar department]. But since [the department
head] was out of town for a couple of weeks, we picked
[other departments]. It could have gone either way,
really.' (3)
Once Roberts had identified a few departments whose
managers were interested in QWL, the Citywide Oversight
Committee was asked to make a formal decision to implement the
program there. The SEIU representatives preferred Police
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Operations, because they believed that civilians in the
Operations Unit (who are SEIU members) had shown a potential
for union activism. Administrators on the Oversight Committee
preferred the Assessing Department, since some believed that
the department had many morale problems. The Committee agreed
to implement the program in both departments and by October
1984, the selection process had been completed.
The discussion in Chapter 1 indicated that QWL was more
likely to take root in a setting where tasks change frequently
or require substantial collaboration among highly skilled
workers and managers, and/or where workers (or other parties)
have sufficient power to induce management to solicit worker
input into decisionmaking. The contextual features which
characterize the Assessing Department are quite different from
these ideals, however. Indeed, the context hardly seems to be
conducive to close collaboration between workers and managers
or among various management levels. Department tasks are
largely determined by State policy and overseen by the State.
These tasks involve the provision of a uniform product (a tax
bill) to a large population, which necessitates a large staff,
most of whose duties are divided into narrow tasks that are
directed from the top of the organization. Changes in
workplans and procedures are typically directed by top
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managers who are mayoral appointees and who may have little or
no technical background in assessing. This creates resentment
among middle managers, supervisors and workers, who have
little power to openly resist directives from the top.
(A) Tasks and the Task Environment
The Assessing Department's task is to administer the
City's property taxes. This requires the production of a
biannual tax bill for every property owner in the City. This
task is divided into three primary functions:
i) A legal record maintenance function, which entails the
maintenance of an accurate description of all real and taxable
personal property in the City and a record of its ownership.
As of 1985, the city had over 140,000 real estate parcels,
many of which change hands frequently or are subdivided for
condominium conversions.
ii) A aluatiQn function, through which the value of real
property for taxation purposes is determined.
iii) A ta c isanc function, through which tax bills
are prepared and sent out, abatement applications are
processed, and questions and complaints are addressed.
As of November 1985, the department employed 176 persons
to carry out these and various ancillary functions. The
structure of the department is depicted in Figure 4.2. As the
figure shows, the Department has a five-level hierarchy. The
top two levels constitute the senior staff, who are mayoral
FIGURE 4.2
CITY OF BOSTON ASSESSING DEPARTMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
COMMISSIONER
DIRECTOR, DIRECTOR, CHAIRMAN,
ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONS BOARD OF
& FINANCE REVIEW
I-4
Source: 
-Assessing Department Employee Guide," Fall 1985
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appointees. Both of the major divisions in the department,
Operations and Administration/Finance, have a director and
deputy director, who oversee various units. Each unit has a
head and the larger units also have line supervisors, all of
whom are non-union, management employees. At the bottom level
are non-managerial employees, most of whom are SEIU members.
The department's legal record maintenance and valuation
functions are housed in the Operations Division. The legal
function is performed by the (IBM) Data Management Unit, whose
30 employees collect, process and keypunch ownership and
parcel data and prepare tax bills after valuation data has
been added. Five workers copy title and parcel data by hand
from County deed books onto formatted tables. These tables
are sent to five keypunchers, who type the changes into the
IBM computer. Several workers perform various tasks necessary
to print out the data and check keypunch accuracy. Five ward
clerks copy title change data from IBM printouts and valuation
data from VAX printouts by hand, onto the department's
permanent historical file card for each parcel in the city.
Five engineers and assistants (members of AFSCME Council 93)
handle technical problems associated with parcel subdivisions
and other changes.
Routine property valuation data (collected in response to
building rehabilitation permits, etc.) is collected by 25
assessors in the Commercial, Residential and Personal Property
Units. (These workers are members of AFSCME Council 93 and
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were not included in the QWL program or this study). Mass
ce-valuation data (described below), is collected through an
outside contractor.
The 30-person (VAX) Information Systems Unit includes five
computer programmers who develop software to process valuation
data and generate reports, and fifteen data keypunchers and
checkers, who enter valuation data into the VAX computer. Two
line supervisors, a unit head and a deputy unit head oversee
the work.
The taxpayer assistance function is housed in the
Administration and Finance Division's 20-person TPA/Social
Services Unit. Eight taxpayer assistants handle taxpayer
inquiries by phone, mail and at the unit's service counter,
using information stored in the computer or on the
department's historical record files.
The Social Services part of the unit is staffed by four
workers who process real estate tax abatement applications.
They interview applicants and, if the applicant is eligible,
recommend an approval of the application to the Associate
Commissioner. Three other workers answer questions and
process applications for abatement of the motor excise and
personal property taxes, most of which are filed by taxpayers
in person. Two supervisors oversee the unit.
The work of the Taxpayer Assistance Unit is particularly
hectic during the 60 days following each of the biannual tax
bill mailings, but slows down considerably after that,
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allowing workers to spend more time on filing and research
tasks and to work at a leisurely pace.
Prior to 1979, the Assessing Department's structure was
simpler and most of its tasks were performed manually, by
about 100 assessors, clerical workers, managers, civil
engineers and attorneys. To calculate valuations, for
example, assessors used mostly construction/rehabilitation
permits and spot inspections. This method of computing
valuation permitted abuses, however. As early as the 1950's,
assessors were criticized by the Boston Finance Commission,
City Council and media, for taking bribes to reduce
valuations, for showing favoritism to politically sensitive
neighborhoods and for general arbitrariness in their work. As
activity in the Boston housing market and downtown office
construction dramatically increased in the 1970's, criticisms
of Boston assessing practices increased also. (4)
In 1979, a court order required the Assessing Department
to conduct, thenceforth, a complete revaluation of all real
property every three years and to use objective formulas to
estimate values for the years in between. The State
Department of Revenue was ordered to closely monitor the
entire valuation process and certify the tax rate before bills
could be sent to taxpayers. The Assessing Department was not
prepared to conduct this massive property revaluation,
however. It lacked adequate staff to inspect each property in
the City to collect the needed data, its IBM computer system
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(which was used to maintain property ownership files) lacked
the software required for mass appraisal/valuation tasks, and
the department lacked computer programmers who could develop
software to process the valuation data.
The Mayor decided to establish an Office of Property
Equalization, as a separate mayoral agency, to conduct the
revaluation. The OPE, as it was called, was staffed with 100
computer programmers, keypunchers and taxpayer assistants. In
1981, the OPE acquired a Digital VAX computer and hired a
vendor to develop mass revaluation software and gather data
for the revaluation on each piece of real estate in the city.
(5) In the Summer of 1983, the OPE was dissolved and its
tasks, computer and personnel were moved into the Assessing
Department. This increased the latter's size from 100 to 220
employees, added two new levels of hierarchy, routinized many
tasks, created some new, ancillary tasks and created headaches
for managers and workers.
From the Summer of 1983 through the entire QWL program
operations period, the Department struggled with the burden of
integrating the old Assessing Department with the Office of
Property Equalization, while trying to carry out the normal
work of the assessing process and conduct a second mass
revaluation of all property, as required by the State.
Although the jobs of most individual workers had been
simplified through the merger, the department had become far
more complex and more difficult to run. This was exacerbated
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by the department's location in five different offices in
three different buildings, due primarily to lack of space in
City Hall. Since most of the department's functions and units
are interdependent, physical dispersion made coordination of
activities a difficult problem. A bottleneck or unexpected
action in one unit often disrupted the work of other units.
More important, the use of two computer systems, VAX and
IBM, to produce one final product, the tax bill, created
substantial coordination problems and work redundancies. The
flow chart in Figure 4.3 gives an indication of some of the
complexity of the process.
The second mass revaluation of all City property created a
very heavy workload. This work was complicated by the
computer coordination problems and the use of an outside
contractor to provide valuation software and organize the mass
field data collection process. Throughout the revaluation
process, inspectors for the State Department of Revenue
frequently requested reports or spot checks of certain pieces
of the product, which disrupted work schedules.
This is not the sort of task context that can easily
utilize bottom-up initiative, although one might imagine that
such input would be beneficial to all concerned, if there were
a vehicle to organize it. As Storper and Walker (1984) point
out, some amount of worker input into workplace 'decisions or
at least mutually respectful relations between labor and
management might prevail even in task settings of this sort,
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if workers have a. collective power base, such as a strong
union. This was not the case in the Assessing Department,
however, as the next section will show.
(B) Political Structure and Routine Work Relations
As the foregoing discussion indicated, the Massachusetts
State Department of Revenue exercises considerable control
over the tasks and work products of the Assessing Department.
The State must certify the City's tax rate each year. It can,
at any time, order the City to recollect or re-process all or
part of the data used to calculate property taxes. The
Department of Revenue also trains and certifies assessors in
the Assessing Department.
Various departments within the City also influence the
internal affairs of the Assessing Department. The City Budget
Director has substantial control over the department's budget.
According to Assessing managers, they had neither input into
nor, on many occasions, forewarnings of the Budget Director's
decisions to cut department funds. (The Budget Director and
Administrative Services Director asserted that they 'gave
Assessing everything they wanted," however). (6)
The Management Information Systems Division controls the
Assessing Department's use of the IBM computer. The Personnel
Division administers most of the paperwork required for formal
hirings, promotions, terminations, etc., which takes a great
deal of time. (See Appendix C for a discussion of the
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cumbersomeness of the Civil Service hiring process). The
Mayor's political organization also exerts influence on
department hirings, promotions and, according to some
Assessing workers and managers, terminations. Since the
department's senior managers are mayoral appointees, they are
presumably under some pressure to accept political referrals
for jobs. (See below)
Within the Assessing Department, formal decision making
power is concentrated in the senior managers, who are mayoral
appointees. (See Organizational Chart, Figure 4.2). Although
middle managers (unit heads and line supervisors) have civil
service classifications, they have no formal power with which
to counter the decisions and directives of senior managers.
During the study period, middle managers complained to me that
they lacked the power to determine work planning schedules or
the overall workflow process in their own units. They had no
input into decisions regarding contracting out of software
development for the revaluation project, monitoring of the
quality of data collected by revaluation field workers, or the
number of workers in their own units. Senior managers
transferred workers into and out of their units with little or
no notice and, according to one, strong-armed them into
accepting political appointees. (7) Throughout the study
period, unit heads also complained that most senior managers
refused to consider their production problems or needs for
more staff. Faced with deadlines he could not meet and lack
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of staff, one unit head decided to "steal people from other
units who didn't realize how far behind they were.' (8)
Several middle managers also complained that hiring and
firing of both senior and middle managers was based on
political considerations, rather than technical competence and
that this led to poor planning and technical mistakes.
Several stated that they themselves could have neither
influence nor job security if they didn't 'go out drinking
with [senior management].' (9)
Line supervisors are classified as non-union, management
employees. They monitor worker performance of some tasks and
adherence to workplace rules, as well as keep track of the
unit's or work group's total production. But for the most
part, supervisors act as conduits for decisions made by senior
or middle managers; often they stand by while middle and
senior managers go to workers themselves with directives.
Some supervisors initially buck this system and attempt to
build a more pro-active role for themselves. Resistance by
middle and senior managers soon convinces them that they are
out of line, however. One supervisor told me both at the
beginning and end of the study period: 'My talents aren't
being used here...My boss won't tell me anything [about the
work]...They could eliminate this job.' (10) Another, after
several attempts to make changes in work scheduling and
working conditions in his unit provoked personal abuse by a
senior manager, finally decided to 'just go along to get
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along, like everybody else,' as he put it. (11)
Workers, particularly SEIU clerical and technical workers,
have little or no say in determining which tasks they will
perform from one day to the next, much less control over the
work process or workplace conditions. An estimated one-half
of the SEIU workers in the department at the time the study
period began had little security in their jobs, since they
were working in positions for which they had only provisional
civil service status. This meant that they could be demoted
to their permanent, lower-paid civil service rating at any
time. (See Appendix C for a more detailed discussion of the
problems with the State-City Civil Service system).
As described in Chapter 3, the SEIU traditionally has been
weak in City Hall departments like Assessing. Indeed, prior
to the QWL program, neither of the union's two shop stewards
in the department was regarded by workers or union officials
as effective. Moreover, most workers did not regard the
union's City Hall representative or the union as a whole as
responsive or effective. Some workers claimed that they
hardly knew that they had a union; many asked me to help them
solve problems that were normal duties for a union steward.
SEIU officials, however, claimed that the Assessing workers
were afraid to file formal grievances of management actions.
(See the discussion in Chapter 3).
The politics of the Assessing Department are well
illustrated by the manner in which the City responded to the
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1979 court order requiring the mass revaluation of all real
property in the City. As mentioned above, the Mayor did not
reorganize the Assessing Department or retrain its workers,
but instead organized a new, mayoral department, the OPE,
that was exempt from collective bargaining and civil service
rules. The OPE was widely considered to be an extension of
the Mayor's political organization and its work brought
discredit to the administration.
Since OPE reported to the Mayor, only the Mayor could
ensure that its work was coordinated with that of the
Assessing Department. But as one manager remembered: 'There
was no cooperation between the two departments when they were
separate because their directors were at war. I was running
back and forth all the time; it was terrible.' (12) After
the decision to merge OPE with the Assessing Department was
made, 'they just put them together, with no planning,'
according to one manager. (13)
Assessing workers were apparently not informed about the
merger and in some cases, perhaps, were misinformed:
'Towards the end [1982 - 1983], we kept losing people
[because of staff cutbacks due to fiscal stress], but the
tax bill had to get out... [In July, 1983] they brought in
all these kids from OPE [to do taxpayer assistance
functions]. They weren't given any training, just put up
there cold. At the time, we thought it was a load off,
but [management] never said, 'This is going to be the
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future, would you like it?' ... 'I asked [the Associate
Commissioner], is this going to be a permanent thing?
'Oh, within six months, half of them will be gone,' he
said. No way.' (14)
In addition to the merger process, the results of the
merger were dissatisfying to many workers. According to
workers in the Old Assessing Department:
'Our job was a very full and interesting job...[but
gradually, through the merger] each little [job task] was
nibbled away... The job has been diminished, though it
requires more time now because it all comes from different
places. ...I don't particularly care for my job. I like
the variety we did have. Now it's monotonous; same thing
all the time." .... 'I have no function right now. I tear
papers apart and whatever has to be done... I used to
enjoy coming to work in the morning. Now it is an effort
just to get on the bus...Everything has been taken away
from us.'(15)
For some workers, the merger also entailed a demotion from
the positions they had occupied but for which they had not
been able to take a civil service test, down to their
permanent civil service rating (see Appendix C): 'When we
combined I got the shaft and what saved me was the fact that I
was permanent civil service and I went back to Ca lower level
job].' (16)
These workers watched with alarm while department
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functions were slowly computerized, but they themselves were
not given training to work with the computer. As they watched
the new management fire many workers and pressure others to
leave voluntarily, many came to believe that management's
intention was to gradually push them out of the department.
The Commissioner acknowledged to me that he did not intend to
train many of the older Assessing workers for computer work,
but insisted: 'I will not put those people on the street.'
(17)
Many Office of Property Equalization workers also
experienced the merger as a come-down from a previously more
rewarding job. As one taxpayer assistant said:
'We had a unique relationship in OPE. We were all
appointees ... we weren't in the union and we had a good
rapport with the people we were with. ... I remember
working weekends for OPE and it never bothered me...The
money was less than I'm making now.' 'At OPE, we had
real responsibility,' said another. 'We planned public
hearings and set up the sites...Even though OPE has been
characterized as political hacks, we really felt we were
serving the public.'(18)
When the merger came, some taxpayer assistants were
reportedly promised salary increases that never materialized.
They were also led to believe, they claimed, that they could
continue their community outreach activities and special
research projects, but by November 1984, these activities had
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been cut back and they were given little support to conduct
research:
'We believed we'd really turn Assessing into a
professional department,' said one taxpayer assistant.
'CBut] when we were transferred we became dumt alecha.
Same pay, but they really degraded us to lower jobs.'...
'They think we're slugs.' (19)
Keypunchers at OPE took a cut in pay and job
classification status when they became Assessing workers:
'They told us we had to take the R-6 rating because that
was the closest thing to our job descriptions. They said
we could take a civil service test to get an upgrade to
our old [non-Civil Service] titles in OPE, but we never,
got to take the second part of the test.' (20)
The merger also created mutual resentments between workers
from the two agencies, which managers often referred to as the
'Assessing-OPE split.' As far as Old Assessing workers were
concerned, the 'snooty kids from OPE' represented everything
that was wrong with the new department -- those who put in
long years of devoted service to the department were not
recognized for their contributions and were not trained to
take on new functions in the department. Other people, who
knew less about the actual content of the assessing process
were brought in at higher pay, to be trained, in some cases,
by the older workers. (21) OPE workers resented the fact that
they were resented by the Old Assessing workers and a few
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attempted to distance themselves from 'that civil servant
mentality.' (22)
Several workers also alleged and the SEIU President
acknowledged, that the union did not play an active role
during the merger. As one worker stated: 'When we spoke to
the union, they said you have to file a grievance about
changes in job conditions within one week...,' i.e., you're
too late.
Given these conflictual labor-management relations and
feelings of bitterness on the part of workers, one might
imagine that routine work relations would be fraught with
conflict. Yet, to a large extent, this was not the case.
Work relations among workers and between workers and
supervisors were fairly cooperative, as one might expect to
find in a more stable bureaucratic organization.
As the interview and survey data reported in Table 4.1
indicates, workers expected each other to cooperate with
everyone to help get the work done, to be sociable and to do
one's assigned job. In the few cases when a co-worker failed
to follow such expectations, a simple one-on-one discussion
was usually sufficient to resolve the problem. When such
discussions failed to produce the desired behavior changes,
however, workers resorted to social exclusion or backstabbing
as disciplinary mechanisms.
Perceived relations between line supervisors and workers
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TABLE 4.1
ASSESSING DEPARTMENT
ROUTINE WORK RELATIONS AMONG WORKERS
------------------ ----------------------------------------
(1) What do workers in your work area or unit expect of each
other? (Open-ehded interview question, November, 1984).
N = 15 worker interviews; 21 responses
Cooperate with everyone to help get the work done. 57%
Be friendly and sociable 29%
Do your job as it is defined in your job description. 14%
----------------------------------------------------------
(2) Do workers usually follow each other's expectations?
(Paper and pencil survey question, December, 1985)
N = 49 workers
Yes, Always 78%
About half of the time 18%
No, usually not 4%
----------------------------------------------
(3) What happens when workers do not follow each other's
expectations?
(Survey question, November, 1984 and December, 1985).
1984: N = 47 worker and supervisor surveys; 54 responses*
1985: N = 59 worker and supervisor surveys and responses
12Q4 1205
A co-worker discusses it with the
person and they work it out together 46% 58%
The offending person is socially
excluded and becomes an outsider 18% 14%
The offending person is harrassed
or stabbed in the back 15% 7%
A group of workers gets together and
everyone helps to straighten it out 13% 8%
The offending person is yelled at by
his or her co-workers 7% 7%
Other 0 7%
----------------------------------------------
(4) Do workers treat each other fairly
7  
(Survey question,
November, 1984) N = 71 worker surveys; 78 responses*
Yes, fairly 81%
No, but there's no particular pattern of discrimination 8%
Other types of unfairness (racial, gender, etc.) 11%
*-is- adscodrsone-omie.-e-otntTa.-----------------------------
* First and second responses combined. See footnote, Table 4.2
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were similarly cooperative, as reported in Table 4.2.
Supervisors expected workers to do their assigned tasks as
best they could and to cooperate with everyone to get the work
done. Workers expected supervisors to carry their share of
the workload and to answer their questions. Workers generally
followed supervisors' expectations, because they perceived
supervisors as competent to handle their tasks and as being
paid to do so. When a supervisor-worker infraction occurred,
a one-on-one discussion was the preferred conflict-resolution
mechanism.
In short, despite deep resentments caused by the merger
and continuing rationalization of department functions,
routine relations among workers and between workers and
supervisors were cooperative and, in many cases, amiable.
What accounts for this?
First, although the merger narrowed and de-skilled many
taxpayer assistance and direct production jobs, it also
expanded the number of ancillary tasks, such as computer
programming, computer training and special research. Workers
in these jobs found them to be challenging and interesting and
to allow for some autonomy in execution. (See Table 4.3)
Moreover, workers in the taxpayer assistance unit and those
who had had contact with taxpayers or field inspections
previously, stated that they enjoyed serving the public and
having the opportunity to help people. This is illustrated in
Table 4.3, which shows responses to the survey question: "What
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TABLE 4.2
ASSESSING DEPARTMENT
ROUTINE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND LINE SUPERVISORS
-----------------------------------------------------------
(1) What do supervisors expect of workers?
(Open-ended interview question, November, 1984)
N = 15 worker and 4 supervisor interviews; 21 responses
Do your job as it is defined in your job description. 43%
Do the best and most professional job you can. 14%
Cooperate with everyone to get the work done. 14%
Do anything s/he asks, even if it's not in the descrip. 9%
Figure things out on your own and don't bother him/her. 9%
Make the supervisor look good to his/her superiors. 9%
-----------------------------------------------------------
(2) Do workers usually follow supervisors' expectations?
(Survey question, November, 1984 and December, 1985)
1984: N = 74 workers, supervisors and middle managers
1985: N = 76 workers, superv.isors and middle managers
1284 1285
Yes, Always 81% 84%
About half of the time 16% 16%
No, usually not 3% 0
-----------------------------------------------------------
(3) Why do workers follow supervisors' expectations?
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984) N = 54
worker, supervisor, middle manager surveys; 82 responses*
Supervisors are paid to make decisions and give orders 31%
Supervisors know the job best and what needs to be done 31%
Supervisors treat workers OK, so workers should do what
supervisors want them to. 15%
Supervisors will get you fired or make your life
miserable if you don't do what they want. 13
Other 9%
-----------------------------------------------------------
(4) What happens when a worker does not do what a supervisor
expects? (Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984)
N = 56 worker, supervisor and middle manager surveys; 60
responses.
The supervisor discusses it with the person and
they work it out together 55%
The supervisor yells at the person 15%
The supervisor gives the person a formal, written
reprimand 8%
The supervisor discusses it with the whole group and
everyone helps to straighten things out 7%
Other 15%
TABLE 4.2, Continued
--------v----------------------------------------------------
(5) What do workers do,-when they disagree with their supervisor?
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984 and
December, 1985) 1984: N = 55 worker, supervisor, middle
manager surveys; 60 responses.* 1985: N = 73 worker,
supervisor and middle manager surveys and responses.
1284 1285
They discuss it with him or her and
work it out 45% 48%
They do what the supervisor wants as
best they can 23% 32%
They do what the supervisor wants just
enough to get by 17% 14%
They tell the supervisor but get no
response 8% 3%
They just refuse to do what the
supervisor wants 7% 1%
----------------------------------------------------------
(6) What do workers expect of supervisors?
(Open-ended interview question, November, 1984)
N = 15 workers and 4 supervisors
Be responsive; answer their questions, etc.
Let them do their work; don't interfere.
Be an authority; give clear directions.
Carry your weight; do your fair share.
----------------------------------------------------------
(7) Do supervisors treat workers fairly?
(Survey multiple choice question, November, 1984)
N = 67 workers, supervisor and middle manager surveys; 78
responses*
Yes, fairly 64%
No, they play favorites 15%
No, they don't pay attention to what is going on 4%
No, their behavior is based on politics 5%
No, they discriminate by race or sex gender 9%
Other 3%
--------------- -------------------------------------------
(8) Do workers treat supervisors fairly?
(Survey multiple choice question, November, 1984)
N = 77 worker, supervisor and middle manager surveys; 83
responses*
Yes, fairly 76%
No, they try to do little work 16%
Other 8%
----------------------------------------------------------
* Survey respondents were asked to choose two of six possible
responses and to prioritize their choices with a 1 or 2. Since
almost one-half of the respondents on the 1984 survey did not
prioritize, but simply checked two responses, their two choices
were combined in this report.
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do you like most about your tasks?'
Second, although some workers were left with no clear task
definition as a result of the merger, most production jobs
were even more clearly and narrowly defined than they had been
previously. Hence, for most workers, there was little need
for discussions with co-workers and/or line supervisors as to
what needed to be done or how it would be done.
Third, the merger did not combine workers from the
Assessing Department and OPE into single units. Hence, for
the most part, relations among workers and supervisors could
proceed as they always had, unaffected by resentments of the
merger. Over the years, bonds of friendship and cameraderie
had developed among many workers and supervisors within
units. One indication of these bonds is the responses to the
survey question: "What do you like most about your unit?,'
which are provided in Table 4.3. Another indication is the
fact that workers almost always used the pronouns 'we' or
'us,' rather than 'me' or 'I,' when describing the effects of
the merger or other management actions on workers.
The taxpayer assistance unit was the one exception to this
rule, since here young workers from OPE were combined with
older workers from Assessing. Although they had different
tasks, these two groups occupied the same 4,000 square feet of
space. Assessing workers resented the higher pay of OPE
workers. They called the OPE group 'the thorn between the two
roses and, as late as December 1985, stated that 'we don't
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TABLE 4.3
ASSESSING DEPARTMENT
WORKER AND SUPERVISOR ATTITUDES ABOUT THEIR JOBS
AND ABOUT THE WORKPLACE IN GENERAL
(1) Job Satisfaction
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984 and
December, 1985;
KEY: 1 = Very Satisfied; 2 = Somewhat Satisfied;
3 = Not Satisfied at All; Averages are reported here.
1284 1285
Satisfaction with the job in general 1.9 (N=82) 1.9 (N=68)
Satisfaction with pay 2.5 (N=77) 2.3 (N=70)
Satisf. with promotion opportunities 2.1 (N=78) 2.3 (N=69)
Satisfaction with employment security 2.3 (N=77) 2.0 (N=71)
(2) What people like most about their tasks
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984)
N = 79 worker and supervisor surveys; 137 responses*
My tasks are challenging and interesting 32%
I can organize and do the work the way I think best 25%
I like serving the public 20%
My work load is good; I can handle what I'm asked to do 14%
Other 9%
(3) What people like least about their tasks
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984)
N = 74 worker and supervisor surveys; 98 responses*
My work load is bad; I'm asked to do more than I can do 27%
Nothing; I like everything about my tasks. 24%
My tasks are boring or repetitious 21%
I cannot organize and do the work the way I think best 10%
Other 18%
(4) What people like most about their work area or unit
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984)
N = 73 worker and supervisor surveys; 130 responses*
Co-workers respect and appreciate me 28%
People cooperate and share the load 20%
Supervisors or managers respect and appreciate me 18%
I get to talk to other workers and make friends 18%
Other 16%
*First and second responses combined. See footnote, Table 4.2.
-153-
need these OPE people.' (23)
Fourth, since workers had no authority and supervisors had
little, it made little sense to become embroiled in arguments
that could only make worklife unpleasant without solving
problems. When repeated one-on-one discussions failed to
resolve a conflict (among workers or between workers and
supervisors), the last recourse was social exclusion and
sometimes, backstabbing.
In short, workers and supervisors maintained amiable and
functionally cooperative relations as they went about their
routines. As one supervisor described its: 'I just go along
to get along, like everybody else.' (24) Little though was
given to middle or senior managers, except when the latter
appeared in the worksites or sent demands for changes in
procedures, personnel or work rules. By and large, workes and
supervisors regarded these as ill-considered intrusions and
when possible, they resisted them. For example, they
attempted to undermine senior management's unilaterally
imposed production quotas and in some units, routinely
violated the rigid 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM working hours policy.
R2QDQem~o~dd-OgQ damfocQWL
The Assessing Department's tasks, political structure and
worker - manager conflicts were reflected in disparate and,
for the most part, incompatible agendas for QWL on the part of
managers and workers.
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(A) Management Goals and Responses to QWL
Soon after taking office in January 1984, Flynn appointed
an Assessing Commissioner. This Commissioner had no prior
experience with assessing or with the City government, but
acknowledged that he viewed himself as a 'white knight" who
could 'turn this place around" and then move on to bigger
challenges in the public or private sector. (25) Over the
course of the study period, he was appointed to prestigious
task forces and committees and included in Bstgn gazine'
list of people to watch in 1986. His agenda for the
department consisted of essentially four components, each of
which reflects the features of the department's task
environment and political structure discussed above:
First and foremost, he needed to conduct a mass property
revaluation which was satisfactory to the State Department of
Revenue. Everything else was secondary. As he put it:
"Without the revalCuation], there's no you, there's no me,
there's no City and there's no QWL... We've got a guy sitting
here [from the State] looking over our shoulders.' (26)
Secondly, as a former PR director with another public
agency, he demonstrated and expressed a strong desire to
improve the image of the department in the eyes of the general
public and business community. During February and March
1985, local newspapers published interviews with the
Commissioner, in which he criticized the department's
performance prior to his arrival, and claimed to be
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'professionalizing' and firing many people or convincing them
to leave 'because they were being asked to do a day's work.'
Four months later, a local business weekly published a report
based upon the work of one of the department's senior
managers, which claimed that the Commissioner had totally
revamped the tax valuation and abatement processes. This won
praise from the business community. (27) He also attended to
the details of building an image. At one point, for instance,
he instructed a worker to review the tax assessments of news
reporters and other media officials for accuracy.
Thirdly, the Commissioner wanted to complete the merger
process by further rationalizing operations. In the long
term, this meant acquiring valuation software for the City's
IBM computer, so that the department could do away with the
Digital VAX. (Such a transition would have to await readiness
by the City's Management Information Systems Department, which
manages the IBM system). It also meant computerizing many of
the legal record maintenance functions which were still done
by hand. In the short term, rationalization meant trimming
the staff, developing production quotas for hourly workers and
further developing job tasks to optimize specialization of
function and managerial flexibility in task assignments.
Between January 1984 and November 1985, the Commissioner
trimmed the staff from 220 to 176 full-time employees and
instituted production quotas for some hourly workers. During
1984, the department experienced a forty percent staff
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turnover rate.
The Commissioner expressed no desire to accomplish these
goals through QWL or any other sort of labor-management
cooperation program. Decisions regarding planning, task
assignments and the execution of tasks were to remain soley
within the hands of upper management, although this was never
stated clearly. When I asked the Commissioner about this
after the program had in operation for several months, he
stated:
'Sure, we can discuss Cthe number of pieces of a given
product we're going to produce in a given day]. But if I
say it's going to be 25 Cpieces], it's still going to be
25 [after the discussion]." (28)
When Roberts approached the Commissioner in the late
Summer of 1984 about implementing the QWL program, however,
the latter expressed great enthusiasm for the idea. He had
been planning to start a "human resources program' at some
point, he stated, that would include a department newsletter
and worker commendation awards. He stated a belief that QWL
could fit into this kind of program by affording workers a
chance to express their dissatisfactions with the merger and
overcome, thereby, the 'Assessing - OPE split.' (29) Yet he
expressed no ideas as to the kinds of issues that would
surface in the program and when asked in November 1984,
stated:
'A lot of times, the things that upset bureaucrats are the
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little things, like where their desks are... It's good to
have [the Budget Director] on the [Citywide] Oversight
Committee, because maybe a couple hundred dollars to buy
things like portable walls would make them happier.' (30)
Roberts admitted later: "[In the beginning, the Commissioner
and I] never discussed the details of what [the program] might
do." (31)
(B) Worker Goals and Responses to QWL
SEIU workers and (non-union) line supervisors reacted to
the QWL idea with a considerable amount of ambivalence and
apprehension, reflecting their experiences of the merger and
relationship with senior management, but also their desires
for changes in the department. The figures below show their
responses to survey questions administered in November 1984,
on their views about the program.
Q. Is the LMCP a good idea? 55 yes; 3 n
Q. Would you like to participate by being
All IBM VAX
(legal) (valuation)
Yes 26 3 8
No 30 4 3
Don't know 22 10 3
o; 26 do not know
in a Worksite Group?
TPA/SS
(assistance)
2
4
6
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Workers from the Old Assessing Department were extremely
reluctant to join the program: 'We already base a worksite
group here,' said one. 'What we need is a raise.' The SEIU
President told them that, through the program, the workers
might attract more attention to themselves and thereby better
their chances for getting a raise. (32)
Other workers from the Old Assessing Department, chiefly
those in the IBM Data Management Unit, expressed skepticism
that top management would do anything to improve things: 'It
won 't do any good. You'll never change them.' Some of these
workers viewed the initial research interviews as their
vehicle to 'tell them we want fair treatment," but they were
not about to volunteer for face-to-face encounters with
management. (33)
Workers who had previously worked in the Office of
Property Equalization also expressed skepticism. According to
one worker in the taxpayer assistance unit, his co-workers at
first all refused to participate: 'At first I was the only one
willing to do it Cout of a belief in socialism and worker
control]. I said [to the others], If you refuse, they'll tell
you you had your chance to get what you wanted and you turned
it down.' (34)
Some workers were afraid of reprisals if they disagreed
with management. One taxpayer assistant stated that if he
joined the program, he would end up speaking his mind, which
"might cost me my job' and 'I've got a family to take care
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of... I'd be too afraid."(35)
At several points during the first three or four months of
the program, Old Assessing Department workers in particular,
often expressed the fear that they might be disciplined for
provoking a conflict with management, despite repeated
statements by program staff that no worker could be laid off
or discharged for anything he or she said in a meeting. As
late as January 1986, several workers still stated in
interviews that they did not believe that the QWL program had
afforded them security from management reprisals.
Only one group, the VAX Information Systems Unit
keypunchers expressed a desire to join the program. Many of
these workers had been hired in the previous six months and
did not appear to fear management reprisals.
Many workers in this group and others who accepted the
program, also regarded it as 'management's idea;' something
that management wanted, and they used this as a defensive
tactic. For example, when two VAX keypunchers with only
provisional status were fired in January, 1985 for what their
co-workers considered to be unjust cause, the group threatened
to boycott the program training session until the workers were
given a hearing.
The workers' agendas for QWL reflected their tremendous
dissatisfactions with senior management policies, as depicted
in Table 4.4. This table shows that, in response to an
open-ended survey question asking "What would you most like to
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TABLE 4.4
ASSESSING DEPARTMENT
WORKER DESIRES FOR CHANGE
---------------------------------------------------------
(1) If you could change anything, what would you most like to
change? (Open-ended survey question, November, 1984 and
December, 1985). 1984: N = 65 surveys. 1985: N = 49 surveys
1284 1285
Pay and/or promotion systems should
be made more fair 22% 24%
Workflow planning and/or task
assignments 18% 29%
Improve communications between
workers/supervisors and upper management 17% 16%
Improve the office climate and
attitudes generally 12% 12%
Improve training and competence of
department personnel 6% 6%
Improve the quality of communication
between supervisors and workers 5% 4%
Improve communications and fairness
among workers 3% 0
Improve safety/cleanliness of work area 5% 0
Other 12% 9%
----------------------------------------------------------
(2) What people like least about their work area or unit
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984)
N = 71 worker and supervisor surveys; 105 responses*
Working conditions are dirty and/or unsafe 37%
Nothing; I like everything about it 15%
Supervisors or managers do not respect or appreciate me 14%
Other (poor planning, workflow scheduling, training) 25%
Workers do not respect or appreciate me 9%
----------------------------------------------------------
(3) Are jiob hirings and promotions done fairly?
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984 and
December, 1985) 1984: N = 77 worker and supervisor
surveys; 96 responses.* 1985: N = 72 worker and supervisor
surveys; 82 responses.*
1214 12 12
No, it's based on politics 34% 32%
No, but there's no particular
pattern of discrimination 27% 27%
Yes, fairly 24% 26%
No, it's based on sex discrimination 3% 1%
No, it's based on race discrimination 6% 10%
Other 6% 5%
----------------------------------------------------------
* First and second responses combined. See footnote, Table 4.2
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change?," workers and line supervisors identified issues which
would directly involve decisions by senior management: Pay,
promotions, training and job evaluation procedures, scheduling
workflow and task assignments, and better communication
generally between their level and senior managers.
This is not to say that workers and supervisors did not
perceive there to be any problems at the level of their
particular units. Responses to the multiple choice survey
question 'What do you like least about your unit?," show that
there were many housekeeping issues, such as dirty floors,
dangerous wires, poor air circulation and asbestos covered
ceilings, which aggravated workers. Although these problems
could ultimately be solved only through actions of other
departments, they became the primary focus of worksite group
activity.
In summary, the tasks, task environment and political
structure of the Assessing Department do not support highly
cooperative relations between managers and workers.
Department functions are largely determined by state policy
and overseen by the state. These functions involve the
provision of a uniform product to a large population, which
necessitates a large staff, most of whose duties are divided
into narrow tasks that are coordinated at the top of the
organ i zat ion.
A one-time jolt from the organization's environment led to
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a major reorganization of work processes, but the nature of
this jolt did not induce greater collaboration in production
processes. Rather, the reverse is the case, as the service
population became larger and the product more standardized
after 1979.
These changes created dissatisfaction and conflict among
workers and exacerbated the cleavage between top and bottom,
which arises from the top-down decision making structure and
from the lack of an effective union voice representing worker
interests at the senior management level.
Within this context of worker-manager distrust, fear and
conflict, workers have sustained sufficiently cooperative
relations among their immediate peers and a general tactic of
going along to get along, so that open conflict can be
avoided. Personal friendships and, for some, the enjoyment of
serving the public, make worklife tolerable and sometimes
enjoyable.
Hence, it is easy to see why many workers stated that the
QWL program was a good idea, but why they themselves were
reluctant to participate. They saw plenty of things that
were wrong with the department, but they perceived most of
these problems as the result of conscious management policy.
Since senior management's daily activities convinced them that
management had no interest in changing those policies, many
workers could not see how a QWL program would suddenly bring
changes.
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On the other hand, the SEIU President and QWL program
staff actively solicited worker involvement in the program.
By early December 1984, they had enough volunteers to
constitute one Worksite Group in each of the three large units
with a preponderance of SEIU members: IBM Data Management, VAX
Information Systems, and Taxpayer Assistance. Moreover,
during the initial two-day, worker-manager training session in
January 1985, Assessing senior managers stated that 'We are
deeply committed to this program, as part of our human
resources initiatives.' Roberts encouraged the workers to
take the initiative, saying 'This is your program,' despite
the fact that funds to implement initiatives were limited. By
the time the program began, most participants stated that the
program was worth a try. (36)
The structure of the Boston Labor Management Program in
Assessing consisted of three Worksite Groups and a
Departmentwide Committee. One Worksite Group was organized in
each of the major functional units with a preponderance of
SEIU workers: IBM Data Management, VAX Information Systems
(keypunchers and ancillary workers) and Taxpayer Assistance
(TPA/Social Services). The organization of Worksite Groups by
functional unit, rather than say, across units or by issue,
reflected the program ideology of focusing on the point of
production, as well as Roberts' agenda of developing shopfloor
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groups into self- managing worker teams.
Each Worksite Group met for one hour per week. The
Assessing Departmentwide Committee met for 90 minutes, once
per month for the first six months and thereafter twice per
month, until the program stopped in mid-August. Each group
elected a chair and recorder.
Both facilitators were present at each Worksite Group
meeting. Both they and Roberts facilitated Departmentwide
Committee meetings. In keeping with Roberts' goal of making
QWL committees permanent structures which would transform the
City's service delivery system, facilitators used a light
touch in steering the groups. They limited their
interventions to teaching participants how to conduct meetings
so that everyone participated, how to identify issues for
discussion and how to make decisions through consensus,
rather than majority rule.
As the following description of the program process in
each of the Worksite Groups and Departmentwide Committee
indicates, however, the committees did not become
self-managing worker teams. Instead, the deep conflicts
between labor and management described above, continually rose
to the surface and ultimately undermined the program. Table
4.5 provides a chronology of the program implementation and
operation processes in the Assessing Department.
(i) IbeLBWocsi _Gcyp: The IBM Data Management Unit
handles the legal ownership maintenance function in the
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TABLE 4.5
PROGRAM OPERATIONS IN THE ASSESSING DEPARTMENT
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS
8ygyat_1284: Roberts, the LMC Program Director, discusses the
LMC Program with the Assessing Department Commissioner.
QctQbgc-1284: The Citywide Labor-Management Oversight
Committee chooses the Assessing Department and Police
Operations Unit as pilot sites for program implementation.
Noyembec-124: Departmentwide Committees are constituted in
the Assessing Department and Police Department.
A twelve-hour 'Kick - Off Retreat" is held at the Harvard
Business School for members of the Citywide Oversight
Committee and Departmentwide Committees in the Assessing
Department and Police Operations Unit. The participants
review and modify a document drafted by the program staff to
express the labor- management Cooperation Program's
philosophy: 'Commitment Toward Cooperation."
Qecembac_1224: Worksite Groups are constituted in the
Assessing Department and Police Operations Unit.
Jacuacy_1285: A two-day training session is held at Boston
College for all program participants, but attended mostly by
members of the Assessing and Police Departmentwide Committees
and Worksite Groups.
Worksite Groups and Departmentwide Committees begin meeting
regularly.
Macab-125: Interviews by the Assessing Commissioner that are
interpreted as degrading to Assessing workers appear in Ibe-
Iab and Ibitian-SciencEitoc and provoke bitter
exchanges at Assessing Departmentwide Committee meetings.
A petition to sweep the floors and take care of other
housekeeping chores is circulated by the IBM Worksite Group in
the Assessing Department, but then confiscated by a manager,
exacerbating tensions between workers and managers and between
the program director and facilitators.
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TABLE 4.5, Continued
6ecil_1285: The Taxpayer Assistance Worksite Group presents
its flex-time plan to the Assessing Departmentwide Committee
for approval. The plan is approved by a senior manager a
couple of weeks later.
Jyng_128: Program participants in the Assessing Department
attend a one-day retreat at the Kennedy School of Government
to learn from past problems and refine the labor-management
cooperation process.
ougut12a5: Roberts, the Program Director, fires the full-
time facilitator. The SEIU leadership calls a moratorium on
all further program meetings until a hearing on the matter can
be held by the Citywide Labor-Management Oversight Committee.
No hearing is ever held, however.
Novembec-1285: The Director of the Administrative Services
Department and the President of the SEIU Local 285 reach
agreement on a solution to the LMC Program staff conflict.
Qacmbgc_12a5: The Labor - Management Cooperation Program is
officially restarted.
Assessing Department Managers state publicly that the program
cannot resume in that department until April 1986, due to the
department's heavy workload. Privately, some managers state a
desire to leave the program permanently.
A2cil_12Q5: The Assessing Department publicly announces that
it will not re-join the LMC Program.
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assessing process. It is the oldest intact unit in the
department; its current tasks and computer technology were
developed in the early 1970's. The IBM Worksite Group
included two title abstractors who work at the County
Registry, copying ownership changes from County deed books by
hand; two ward clerks, who record title changes and other data
by hand onto the department's permanent historical file for
each parcel in the city; two IBM computer keypunchers; and two
line supervisors. All were women over the age of 45 who had
been with the department for at least 10 years and who felt
particularly jaded about the merger.
This group was not able to accomplish very much. Most of
its members wanted a wage classification upgrade and/or a
return to the broader tasks that they had enjoyed before the
merger. Failing that, they wanted training on the computer
for the new jobs, so that they would be assured of their place
and value in the department. For several weeks, stories of
unfair treatment by management and tearful pleadings for
fairness dominated the discussion in this group. Some of the
worker participants sincerely believed that the purpose of the
QWL program was for them to tell their stories to the QWL
facilitators, who would then, they hoped, see to it that their
grievances were redressed.
The facilitators urged the group to develop concrete
proposals for the kinds of training they wanted, or to agree
on one small problem and devise a detailed solution to it.
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But at least half of the members 'just didn't get it," as one
put it later. They were not prepared to plan or take action;
they simply wanted management to treat them well. Moreover,
age-old disputes among some participants often rose to the
surface and derailed productive discussions.
At the urging of the facilitators, the IBM group
reluctantly turned its attention to housekeeping issues and
finally decided to circulate a petition among all members of
the department, requesting that the floors be swept, washed
and waxed on a regular basis. The petition was addressed to a
senior manager whom the group assumed would deliver the
petition to the head of the Real Property Department (which
handles housekeeping issues).
This manager confiscated the petition before it had been
circulated very far. Roberts became alarmed that the Worksite
Group had precipitated a conflict with senior management and
gave the chairperson of the group what she and others
considered to be a reprimand for dealing with senior
management in such an 'adversary way' (i.e., by circulating a
petition rather than developing a detailed proposal and
inviting the senior manager to discuss it with them). This
upset the group, particularly since Roberts identified himself
as a manager; the women could not understand why management,
who had initiated the porgram, was now berating them for
developing an initiative. One member resigned immediately.
The floors wece inspected by the Real Property Department,
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in response to a request from the above-mentioned manager.
For a few months, they were washed regularly and the
facilitators presented this as a victory for the group. Yet
the management reaction and another dispute between the
group's chairperson and the Commissioner took their toll: By
April 1985, the group began to fall apart and stopped meeting
regularly.
At about this time, the Unit Head instituted daily
production quotas which the workers could not understand and
which they found distressing. This contributed to their
feelings of powerlessness and despair. Although the group
struggled along for a while, it made only one small
improvement in the format of a data table used by title
abstractors and finally disintegrated in June. Table 4.6
lists the group's accomplishments.
ii) Ib-X-lfcmioaeW kit-nQu was
comprised of keypunchers and keypunch checkers, five of whom
had recently been hired. All in the latter group were under
the age of 30; the others were over 50. In addition, the Unit
Head and Deputy Unit Head also attended meetings.
None of these workers expressed a desire to remain in
their boring, $200 per week jobs for long. Many set their
sights on a job in the private sector. Turnover among the
younger workers was 75 percent during 1985.
Yet this was a socially cohesive group, most of whom
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TABLE 4.6
ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE
IBM DATA MANAGEMENT WORKSITE GROUP, 1985
ISSUE ADDRESSED ACTION TAKEN
1) Maintaining Work Area
A) Wash floors throughout
department
B) Electrical system in
Registry of Deeds
January-March
February-May
Floors washed
March 31
System partially
repaired in April
2) Physical Working Conditions
A) Purchase/rent water
coolers withdrawn by
Budget Department action
3) Workflow Management/ScheduLing
A) Revise Registry of Deeds
data forms
B) New title abstracting
procedure developed by
management is too difficult
C) Staffing/Overtime schedule
4) Job Duties, Pay, Career Ladders
A) Retraining/cross-training for
new computer jobs
B) Establish career Ladders
C) Job audits
June None
January-May New form developed
by May
None
NoneMay
January-June
January-June
January-June
None within LMCP,
but Human Resouces
Program in Fall
1986, established
cross-training
committee
None within LMCP,
but Citywide effort
& Assessing's Employee
Mobility Committee
started in 1985
None within LMCP,
but audits began in
January 1986.
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worked together and whose work atmosphere was generally
cheery. As mentioned above, they threatened to boycott the
QWL training sessions after two of their members were fired
without a hearing. The group's supervisor, who encouraged
mutual worker help and took a personal interest in each
worker, was well respected. Its three older members (one of
whom became a union steward as the program began), were
trusted and respected by the younger workers.
Largely because of the leadership exercised by these older
workers and their follow-up of issues between meetings, the
VAX group achieved some important health and safety
improvements, such as the removal of dangerous wires and
carpets that transmitted electric shocks, rearrangement of
desks and occasional washing of the floors. They put in
numerous calls to the Real Property Department and at one
point threatened to call OSHA if the wires were not removed.
When the program stopped in August, the group was beginning to
address the issue of VDT safety and had brought in union
experts to discuss it.
Yet this group's progress was also limited by broader
factors beyond its control. Relations with manager, the
deputy unit head, which were tense when the program began,
steadily deteriorated as the mass property revaluation process
continued. The manager often gave them large keypunch jobs to
complete on short notice and changed projects midway through
completion. This, along with malfunctions in the VAX computer
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system and bugs in the programs they used, destroyed their
work rhythm and added frustration to the monotony of their
tasks.
The group made frequent attempts, both through the QWL
program and informally, to gain input into workflow scheduling
and the design of computer programs, but these were staunchly
resisted by the deputy unit head and ignored by the unit
head. When the deputy unilaterally instituted a daily
production quota system, the workers resisted, thus further
increasing the tension.
For her part, the deputy unit head said she was being
pressured by both workers and senior managers. The latter
dictated production schedules which she believed could not be
fulfilled on time and made major changes in the schedule on
short notice, sometimes, apparently, in response to State
inspection requests. Her requests to senior management for
input into the planning process and for more staff were
ignored, she claimed, until the mass property revaluation was
way behind schedule.
On the other hand, she perceived the QWL program as
inciting workers to make demands of her which she could not
fulfill and as wasting valuable keypunch time to do it:
'If they want something, they can come to me and ask for
it. I don't know why they have to go into that room every
week and just sit around and try to think up things they
want to change. ... [The union steward] is becoming a real
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Norma Rae; always reading union books and everything on
work time. I'm losing over 50 hours of production time a
month because of this program.' (37)
The Unit Head and QWL facilitators attempted to convince
the deputy (and the workers) that she should not take group
initiatives personally, but should help the group identify
ways to solve the problems and let the workers take the
initiative to solve them. Yet even on simpler issues, such as
painting the keypunch room, this approach did not work. When
the group decided to tackle this issue and a worker showed up
in the office of a senior manager to discuss the group's
intentions, the manager criticized the deputy for not handling
the issue herself, through the usual chain of command. After
this incident, the Departmentwide Committee determined that
workers wece allowed to contact this manager on housekeeping
issues, but by this point, the deputy had come to dislike the
program and the pressures it created for her. (See Schlesinger
1984, for a discussion of these sorts of problems in QWL
programs).
The VAX Worksite Group also wanted a wage classification
upgrade in the short-run and training for better-paid, more
interesting jobs in the department in the longer-run. Like
the IBM group described previously, they were unable to do
much about these issues except to bring them before the
Departmentwide Committee (as discussed below). Table 4.7
provides a list of accomplishments by the VAX Worksite Group.
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TABLE 4.7
ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE
VAX INFORMATION SYSTEMS WORKSITE GROUP
ISSUE ADDRESSED ACTION TAKEN
1) Maintaining Work Area
A) Remove rugs
B) Paint walls
C) Remove garbage; wash
and sweep floors
January
January
January-June
Removed in January
Painted in March
March*
2) Physical Working Conditions
A) Remove ceiling asbestos
B) Rearrange computer terminal
wires
C) Install personal lockers
D) Purchase/rent water coolers
E) VDT health/safety problems
3) Workflow Management/Scheduling
A) Manager's production quotas
seen as unreasonable
B) More staff needed
C) Workers want more imput
into production flow
and scheduling decisions
May-June
January-April
January
June-July
June-August
January
January-March
February-July
None
Wires rearranged in
April
None
Decision in July
None in LMC Program
Management refused
to alter quotas in
January
None within LMCP
None
* Floors were washed and swept once but were not maintained, so
the issue surfaced again later.
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TABLE 4.7 (CONTINUED)
ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE
VAX INFORMATION SYSTEMS WORKSITE GROUP
ISSUE ADDRESSED ACTION TAKEN
D) Workers want overtime instead
of contracting out, or at
least input into work product
of contractor
March-April Worker participates in
selecting contractor
in April
4) Job Duties, Pay, Career Ladders
A) Cross-training
B) Career Ladders
C) Job audits
January-August
January-August
January-August
Some workers get
word processor
training as of May
None within LMCP,
but Assessing's Employee
Mobility Committee and
Citywide effort started
in 1985
None within LMCP,
but audits began in
January 1986
5) Regulatory Procedures
A) Sick leave and absenteeism
monitoring notices seen as
threatening and degrading
B) Manager cancelled all phone
priveleges unilaterally
January-February
March
Unclear
Unit head in IBM
group settles issue
with manager in
March
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iii) IbIazarec8 istne±ocIPA/~caescs
WQksitQCQy2, was comprised of five young workers and one
supervisor from TPA, all of whom, except for the supervisor,
had worked for OPE; and two older workers from Social Services
who had been with the department for over ten years.
This group never achieved the cameraderie of the VAX
group, primarily the Old Assessing workers in the group
resented the OPE workers for their higher pay and for the
merger in general.
There were philosophical differences group members as
well. OPE workers and particularly the group's chairman,
believed that the purpose of the QWL program was for them to
take control of the shopfloor, to unilaterally enact
initiatives which would assist them in running a professional
unit. They resented the notion that QWL might be 'just a
suggestion box,' as the chairman sometimes put it. Old
Assessing Department workers called the chairman's rhetoric
'too radical' and expressed a fear of management reprisals if
the program went on for long with so much conflict. By March
1985, they began to complain that the group was weighted too
heavily in favor of OPE. These tensions made it difficult for
the group to achieve agreement on even mundane issues.
Both OPE and Old Assessing workers resented the unit
supervisor on the committee. In the Worksite Group, he
browbeat workers to become more active, but then demoralized
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them by insisting that every proposal be well planned and
sensitive to any possible senior management concerns with
production and accountability.
Yet, thanks in part to his leadership, the group developed
an elaborate flex-time proposal that allowed three workers to
begin work at 8:00 AM, rather than at 9:00. The group also
rearranged their desks, improved air circulation, purchased a
refrigerator and had one of their restrooms cleaned.
The issue of most concern to the group was the perceived
lack of salary equity within the unit. Members also wanted
more recognition as professionals, more training in State
assessing law and procedures, better coordination with units
whose work affected theirs and a more cooperative relationship
with senior management in managing the affairs of the unit.
These issues could not be addressed within the Worksite Group.
The training and salary issues were brought to the
Departmentwide Committee, as discussed below. Over the course
of the study period, however, the group's relationship with
senior management became worse rather than better, as the
latter reportedly 'useCd the unit] as a dumping ground for
people they're trying to get rid of,' unilaterally introduced
unpopular and unwieldy performance measuring devices and gave
direct orders to workers to complete research and other
assignments, which disrupted their other work and contradicted
supervisors' expectations. By the end of the study period,
morale in this unit appeared to have sunk lower than any other
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unit in the program. Table 4.8 lists the accomplishments of
this group. (38)
iv) Ib erd consisted of
five workers: One representative from each Worksite Group; one
VAX computer programmer; and one representative of clerical
workers who worked in another building separate from most of
the department. It also included the Commissioner and two
senior managers (the Chairwoman of the Board of Review and the
Director of the Administration/Finance Division), as well as
the head of the IBM Data Management Unit.
Each of the three Worksite Groups brought their most
important issues to the Departmentwide Committee -- Issues of
pay equity, computer training for better jobs, fairness in
promotion to better jobs, and recognition and training as
professionals for the jobs they currently held. For several
reasons, however, it took the Committee until August to sort
out these issues and begin to develop a rational process for
addressing them. Until then, each of the monthly meetings
ended in confusion and often bitterness between workers and
managers.
First, as described in detail above, relations between
workers and senior managers were not very harmonious to begin
with. Between Departmentwide Committee meetings, events often
took place which increased labor-management tension, which
would then be brought to the Departmentwide Committee
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TABLE 4.8
ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE
TAXPAYER ASSISTANCE WORKSITE GROUP
ISSUE ADDRESSED ACTION TAKEN
1) Maintaining Work Area
A) Clean/maintain restrooms
B) Wash/sweep floors
January & August
January
Cleaned in August
Swept in March
2) Physical Working Conditions
A) Desk/portable wall Layouts
B) Heating/AC/Ventilation
C) Purchase/rent water coolers
3) Workflow Management/Scheduling
A) Counter assignments/lunches
B) Personnel shifted in and
out of unit by senior
management unilaterally
C) Communication from other
units on actions, plans
D) Flextime
January Changed by group
in January
January, May, July
June-August
January
February
January-April
January-May
Occasional Improvement
by Real Property
Department
Group decision to buy
refrigerator in
August
Supervisor makes new
schedule in January
Senior manager
rescinds such move
in February
None in LMCP
Approved by senior
manager in May
4) Job Duties, Pay, Career Ladders
A) Training & Cross-Training
B) Career development
January-August
January, June-July
Some assessing courses
approved in Spring & a
few begin training on
word processor
None within LMCP,
but citywide effort &
Assessing's Job Mobility
Committee started in 1985
5) Regulatory Procedures
A) Office donations/collections
for birthdays, etc.
January-February Discussion ends in
February with no
resolution
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meetings. The aforementioned newspaper articles which extolled
the Commissioner for making people 'do a day's work' caused
tremendous tension just as the program was beginning. This
was exacerbated by the fact that, for the first few months,
the Commissioner failed to attend most meetings for very long.
The harsh and defensive reactions of one senior manager to
Worksite Group initiatives (as described above) contributed to
the acrimonious climate.
Second, certain program operational features exacerbated
these problems. In the official program documents, the role
and functions of the departmentwide committee had been roughly
defined as facilitating Worksite Group processes and
reconciling particular worksite claims with departmentwide
interests. Yet most Committee members were not sure or not in
agreement about these functions. Indeed, even the
facilitators were confused about the Committee's roles and the
power of management within the Committee. When asked by the
Commissioner at the first meeting what the Committee was
supposed to do, Roberts had no ready reply.
This led to conflicts between those who thought that power
rested with the Worksite Groups and that the Committee was a
rubber stamp or technical assistant, those who thought that
power rested with the Committee (as the formal program
documents envisioned), and the majority of workers and
managers who conceived of the Committee as the place for
management to listen and respond to worker requests. These
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conflicting conceptions muddied many discussions.
A case in point is the aforementioned flex-time initiative
of the Taxpayer Assistance Worksite Group. By the time the
group had developed a proposal which addressed the unit
supervisor's concerns with any possible senior management
objections -- almost six weeks -- the group was demoralized
that it was taking so long just to get permission for a couple
of people to come to work an hour earlier. As the Worksite
Group prepared to submit its proposal to the Departmentwide
Committee, the chairman insisted: "If the Committee doesn't
accept this, we're going right to the [Citywide] Oversight
Committee. And if they don't accept it, they can take this
program!" (39)
Accordingly, the chairman presented the group's proposal
to the Departmentwide Committee in a tense atmosphere. When
the Administration Division Director stated that he had
problems with the proposal that he would have to study, the
Worksite Group chairman became upset. The Division Director
approved the proposal within the next couple of weeks, but
felt that he had been pushed into doing so. As a result,
neither he nor other managers wanted to discuss flex-time at
subsequent meetings and the issue was not raised again, much
to the chagrin of other workers who wanted to introduce
formal* flex-time arrangements in their units.
* as opposed to the informal, surreptitious arrangements
which existed.
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Departmentwide Committee minutes were not widely
disseminated or always clearly written. Some workers gave
conflicting or contradictory interpretations to their Worksite
Groups as to what was happening at Committee meetings.
According to senior managers, workers also failed to keep them
abreast of Worksite Group activities, either by delivering
copies of group minutes to them or verbal reports of group
activities.
The 90-minute Departmentwide Committee meetings were often
poorly organized. The two worker members who did not
represent Worksite Groups were often confused about the issues
being raised and discussed, but efforts to establish a weekly
lunchtime caucus of all of the worker representatives
foundered on personality problems and management disapproval
of program activities beyond the Worksite Group and
Departmentwide Committee meetings.
Although both facilitators and Roberts attended each
Committee meeting and all three intervened in group processes,
the staff offered little leadership or direction, believing
that leadership and direction would develop in the Committee
if they simply maintained a participatory process. This
facilitation style, as well as increasingly visible conflicts
between the facilitators and Roberts, added to the tension and
slow progress of some meetings.
The third problem with the Departmentwide Committee was
that each group of workers had different experiences from the
-183-
Assessing - OPE merger and different aspirations; hence their
substantive concerns and priorities on the issues of training,
pay equity, promotional fairness and their relationships with
management tended to differ and were presented differently, so
it was not easy to develop just one course of action. This
was exacerbated by the fact that workers did not present these
desires as well laid-out proposals and management did not
respond in a positive and encouraging manner.
The problem was even more complex than this, however. As
mentioned above, the Commissioner had his Qwn agenda of
developing a human resources program for the workers, which
ultimately came to include provisions for training and
employee mobility. In March 1985, he formed a management
committee to develop such a program because he believed that
workers 'can't handle' that kind of planning work. (40)
Roberts served on the Commissioner's Human Resources
Committee as a working member, but did not encourage the
Commissioner to include a worker on the committee; he told me
later that the Commissioner would not have accepted such a
suggestion. The most Roberts was able to do, he said, was to
persuade the Commissioner to allow workers to develop their
own ideas about career ladders, training and promotions, to be
incorporated into the Commissioner's overall plan.
Yet this was communicated at Departmentwide Committee
meetings in what workers and the two facilitators regarded as
very ambiguous terms. At one point during the confusion of an
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early April meeting, Roberts offered the following as
clarification: 'What Cthe Commissioner] is saying is 'Go ahead
and work on your plans [for career ladders and training,
etc.]. Maybe they will be included in the overall plan that
we're developing on the human resources committee and maybe
they won't. It all depends.''(41)
No concrete framework was developed by the Departmentwide
Committee to guide such complex work by the workers, however
and none was suggested. Although most worker members of the
Committee were upset that 'management is working on career
ladders without us," as they put it, they and the facilitators
decided that unless management provided information about the
current and probable future structure of the department, as
well as a clearer mandate as to what plans they were to
produce, they could not work on any plans for career ladders.
Workers continued to bring up the issue at subsequent
meetings, however.
Early in August, the outside consultant developed a
framework to help the Departmentwide Committee design a
process for developing career ladders, cross-training and job
descriptions, that would possibly integrate the many agendas
of department members into a single, rational process of labor
- management decision making. According to the full-time
facilitator, however, neither she nor Roberts really
understood what to do with the framework before presenting it
to the Departmentwide Committee. The Committee had just begun
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to work with this framework when the QWL program stopped
meeting in August.
The fourth major problem with the work of the
Departmentwide Committee, was that the fate of the issue of
most importance to workers, pay equity, was formally in the
hands of another department, Personnel, which administers the
civil service classification and compensation system. In
order for the Assessing Department to formally respond to
allegations of inequitable pay classifications as a result of
the merger, the Personnel Division's Classification and
Compensation unit had to conduct an audit of many of the jobs
in the department.
Although the Assessing Commissioner filed a request with
Personnel for job audits early in 1985 and kept promising
workers that the audits would start in six months, Personnel
was not prepared to even begin the lengthy audit process until
January 1986. In the meantime, the Assessing Department used
informal classification upgrades to increase the pay of
certain workers, which mollified those who received the
upgrades, but reinforced the general perception by workers and
middle managers that senior management was arbitrary or
politically-motivated in its personnel practices. (42)
Other issues also required the cooperation of other
departments. As noted in the discussion of Worksite Groups
above, all groups addressed issues of cleanliness and safety,
since they were sources of aggravation and appeared to be easy
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to accomplish. After the initial, aforementioned conflicts
between Worksite Groups and the senior manager over
housekeeping processes had been settled, it was determined
that this manager would maintain an elaborate record of all
outstanding housekeeping problems, the resolution of which he
would coordinate with the Real Property Department.
Yet the status of this record was only reported back to
the Departmentwide Committee once and workers ignored, or
forgot about its existence. By July 1985, Worksite Groups
were again contacting the Real Property Department directly to
make maintenance requests. By December, several workers
reported to me that basic maintenance (trash disposal, floor
sweeping, etc.) had deteriorated again.
(A) Management Views
From August 15 through November 1985, no program committee
meetings were held, due to a moratorium called by the union.
When the program was re-started, Assessing management declined
to have the department participate until March, citing a heavy
workload due to the mass property revaluation, which by that
point was several months behind schedule. Privately, senior
managers expressed great frustration with the program and
skepticism that it would be reformed in a way that would
address their concerns. By April 1986, the department had
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officially quit the program.
Senior managers expressed several deep concerns about the
program. First, 'the program has no groundrules,' as one put
it. They thought that workers would use the program to
construct detailed, clear proposals to accomplish specific,
narrow objectives. Instead, 'a lot of people used this
program to just bitch and moan,' meaning that the barrage of
complaints and underlying tensions which surfaced at every
Departmentwide Committee meeting were not, in their view, a
desirable form of worker involvement. (43)
Second and relatedly, they felt that the Department
Committee meetings had been 'obsessed with process,' rather
than focused on concrete objectives. They considered this to
be a waste of precious time, both theirs and the workers,'
given the tight schedule imposed by the State for completion
of the mass revaluation. They faulted the program staff, in
particular, for showing 'no appreciation of the way this
department works or understanding of our deadlines,' since
they perceived the staff as having allowed the program to
degenerate into the obsession with process and the distraction
of some workers during work hours. (44)
Third, they expressed exasperation with other departments,
such as Personnel, for failing to conduct a timely
classification and compensation study* of the department, Real
*In January 1986, the Personnel Division began the long-
awaited classification study.
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Property, for failing to respond adequately to requests for
maintenance improvements, and the Director of Administrative
Services, for failing to provide more support on these and
related issues. They also expressed frustration with the
Budget Director, whose austerity measures reflected, in their
view, a lack of sensitivity to the Department's need to finish
the revaluation and produce a timely tax bill.
They did not believe that the QWL program was set up in
such a way as to address these concerns, since, in their view,
it did not afford department managers adequate access to
decision making on these issues. Moreover, one senior manager
told me they feared that if the department remained in the
program under the current structure, workers might have better
access to the Budget Director's ear than they, since he was a
member of the Citywide Oversight Committee.
By November 1985, the Commissioner and another senior
manager had developed a Human Resources Program which the
Commissioner believed was better suited to his goals for
worker involvement than QWL. The program consisted primarily
of three components, an 'Employee Mobility Program,' a
"Seminar Program' and a department newsletter. The seminars
were one-day, off-site affairs on topics such as purchasing
real estate and personal career development. The purpose of
the Employee Mobility Program was to allow workers to try out
various jobs in the department for a month at a time, to see
if they would like that kind of work, should an opening
-189-
arise. The Commissioner stated privately that he hoped this
program would be a substitute for the QWL program. Publicly,
he claimed that he had designed the Human Resources Program in
cesgooe to problems identified by workers in the QWL
meetings. He stated that the Human Resources Program was
proof that he had made QWL a success in his department.
(B) Views of the SEIU Leadership
Throughout the course of the QWL program, both the SEIU
President and SEIU QWL facilitator frequently charged that
Assessing managers were failing to live up to the cooperative
principles of the QWL program and demonstrating that they
wanted to control the entire process. For evidence, they
cited what they considered to be management's unresponsive
behavior at Department Committee meetings, harsh treatment of
workers on routine work and personnel issues and the
Commissioner's penchant for personal publicity. Indeed, they
even stated a belief that a conflict among program staff was
caused in part by the Commissioner.
In short, the SEIU leaders did not express the view that
the QWL program had been successful in the Assessing
Department. By the end of the study period, however, they had
achieved part of their goal of identifying leadership in the
department and developing stewards, who, at the insistence of
the SEIU President, had been appointed to the Commissioner's
Human Resources committees. Through these new stewards, the
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President stated, the union could at least monitor
management's contract compliance better than it could prior to
the program. (45)
(C) Views of Workers and Line Supervisors
Perceptions of workers and supervisors about the QWL
program as of the end of December 1985, were mixed. As Table
4.9 shows, both participants and non-participants gave the
program, on average, a mediocre 'Okay' rating, but the
responses were distributed somewhat evenly between 'good' and
'terrible,' indicating a mix of sentiments.
Asked in an open-ended survey question to cite the
program's biggest accomplishment or most positive effect, over
40 percent of the respondents stated that the program had
achieved nothing. Others cited increased communication
between workers and managers, housekeeping improvements and
the flex-time plan as substantive accomplishments.
Likewise, a polarization of sentiments was evident in
answers to the survey question 'Would you like to participate
in the program now?' Over one-third of those who had
participated in the program stated that they would like to
participate, while almost one-half stated that they would not
like to. Only 18 percent of those who had already
participated expressed uncertainty, as opposed 40 percent of
non-participants who did so.
With the exception of the IBM workers, few participants
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TABLE 4.9
ASSESSING DEPARTMENT
WORKER AND SUPERVISOR ATTITUDES ABOUT
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION PROGRAM
AFTER ONE YEAR
(1) Did you participate in the Labor-Management Cooperation
Program? (Survey, December, 1985) N = 72 responses
Yes 31%
No 69%
(2) How would you rate the program? (Multiple choice survey
question, December, 1985) N = 41 worker and supervisor
surveys and responses.
Terrific 0
Good 20%
Okay 51%
Bad 15%
Terrible 15%
(3) If you joined the program, but stopped participating before
August, 1985, explain why. (Open-ended survey question,
December, 1985). N = 7 worker responses
The program was a waste of time; it did nothing 57%
There were management reprisals against workers 14%
Other 29%
(4) Would you like to participate in the program now? (Survey
question, November, 1984 and December, 1985)
1984: N = 78 worker and supervisor responses. 1985: N = 64
worker and supervisor responses.
12a4 12K
Yes 33% 27%
Not sure 28% 33%
No 38% 41%
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TABLE 4.9, Continued
(5) What are the program's biggest accomplishments to date?
(Open-ended question, December, 1985) N = 26 worker and
supervisor responses
None 42%
Communication/listening/airing problems 23%
Various housekeeping improvements 12%
The flex-time plan in Taxpayer Assistance 12%
The re-starting of the program 8%
Other 4%
(6) How much effort should the SEIU devote to programs such as
the Labor-Management Cooperation Program? (Multiple choice
survey question, December, 1985). N = 51 worker and
supervisor surveys and responses
A lot of effort 43%
A- fair amount of effort 43%
Not much effort 6%
No effort at all 8%
(7) What issues should the union focus on? (open-ended survey
question, December, 1985). N = 28 worker and supervisor
surveys; 30 responses.
Fairness in promotions/establishing career ladders 20%
Salary raises/position classification upgrades 28%
Workplace fairness in general 24%
More union responsiveness to workers in general 16%
Improved training 8%
More worker input into workflow planning 4%
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left the program while it was in progress, except to leave the
department. Of those who did leave, four out of seven stated
that the program was accomplishing nothing and was a waste of
their time. One cited management reprisals as a reason for
quitting.
When I asked a few workers how QWL meetings which took
place on 'company time' could be a waste of tbeic time, their
responses were similar to that of one IBM worker: 'I don't
need those meetings to get away from my work. If I need to
take a break, I can do so. There's no sense to sitting in a
room and just arguing if it's not going to accomplish
anything.' Others stated that going to a meeting simply put
them behind in their work, or created a heavier burden for
co-workers, which they considered to be unfair. (46)
Among those participants who stated a desire to continue
participating in the program, there were no common demographic
characteristics (but note that the total number of respondents
on this question was quite low). Those individuals who had
taken leadership roles in worksite groups at the beginning of
the program (five persons, three of whom were still in the
department by the end of the study period), still expressed a
desire to participate in the program. Hence, as Witte (1980)
found in his analysis of worker desires for or against
participation, the experience of participation itself does not
necessarily increase individuals' desires for more
participation.
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In addition to attitudes about the program, the second
survey also repeated questions about workplace relations, job
satisfaction and the things that respondents most wanted to
see changed in the workplace. These responses were almost
mirror images of those in the first survey, illustrating the
general feeling that life had not changed much during the
course of the program. (See Tables 4.1 and 4.5, above)
The ten workers whom I interviewed and conversed with in
December 1985 indicated feelings of bitterness toward senior
management in general. Some stated, for example, that they
did not trust management's intentions in the upcoming job
audits (which began in January, 1986) although this had been
one of their major requests in the program. 'We're going to
try to get over on them,' said one. 'We think they're going to
use [the audits] to get rid of some more people.' (47)
Yet, almost all survey respondents expressed a desire that
the union continue efforts such as the LMC program in the
department, as indicated in Table 4.9.
CQnclusion
On the basis of this analysis of QWL in the Assessing
Department, one must conclude that the department was not a
conducive setting for a grassroots-based QWL program, despite
the initial enthusiasm expressed for it by senior managers.
Its tasks and political structure created tremendous tension
and distrust between labor and management. These tensions
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were particularly acute during the process of computerization
and reduction in personnel that began prior to program
implementation and continued while the program was in
progress. For this reason, worker and manager goals for the
department and for the QWL program were disparate.
The QWL program was unable to overcome or reconcile these
conflicts. Its facilitators and program director were unable
to project and establish goals and 'groundrules' for the
program which were clear and agreeable to all. Their attempts
to implement an open and participatory conflict-resolution
structure under these conditions were swamped by the tensions
and customary decision making style of the organization.
On the other hand, one cannot deny the improvements in
shopfloor conditions or the conduct of a comprehensive job
audit. Although one might well argue that these are very
basic items which should be taken care of as a matter of
course, it is unlikely that they would have been addressed in
this setting, without the QWL program.
Moreover, the union was able to achieve its goal of
identifying leadership and establishing better contacts with
the rank and file. By the end of the study period, management
had found a form of worker involvement with which it felt
comfortable and which it believed would promote worker
satisfaction.
In short, the QWL program was not a total failure in the
Assessing Department, but as the department's departure from
the program indicates, QWL could not take root there.
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CHAPTER 5
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONS
IN THE POLICE OPERATIONS UNIT
IntIcQduction
This chapter discusses the implementation and operation of
the Boston Labor-Management Cooperation Program in the Police
Operations unit. First, the tasks and political context of
the Police Department and Operations Unit are described. The
next sections describe the responses of workers and managers
to QWL and the first year of program operations in the unit.
The last section of the chapter discusses the views of workers
and managers about the program after one year.
Neither the tasks nor the political structure of the
Police Operations Unit seem particularly conducive to the
long-term stability of QWL. The unit's tasks are routine
(albeit stressful) and becoming more so over time, with
increasing automation; hence there is little need for
problem-solving in the workplace, let alone worker-manager
collaboration in problem-solving. Politically, the Operations
unit has little power in the Police Department. Civilians,
moreover, who comprise over 50 percent of the Operations unit
staff, are widely regarded by uniformed personnel as 'second
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class citizens. ' (1) These factors support conflict-ridden
routine relations among workers and supervisors, as well as
feelings of pessimism and apathy about life at work.
(A) Tasks and the Task Environment
The primary purpose of the 2,300 member Boston Police
Department is to preserve law and order. Its constituencies
are citywide and its tasks are regulated and/or influenced by
a variety of state and Federal statutes, agencies and
professional organizations. The Department's activities
receive frequent media attention, as well as occasional
criticism by the City Council's Committee on Public Safety and
occasional inquiries conducted by the Boston Finance
Commission.
As Fogelson (1977) describes, the importance of the
policing function has made it the focus of reform movements
over the past century. These movements have sought, overall,
to make police more responsive to the law, more sensitive to
the needs and concerns of particular social groups who had
little influence in shaping the law and more efficient in the
execution of these goals.
The development of a centralized operations coordinating
unit located at Police Headquarters is the product of the most
recent wave of reform in policing, which hit Boston in the
early 1970's. Increased citizen concern with inner-city crime
during that period and since then, prompted increases in
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police department budgets and the introduction of more
efficient procedures. At the same time, the closing of
neighborhood stations and the partial replacement of foot
patrols and two-person cars with one-person cars during the
1970's and 1980's, as well as citizen concern with police
response time, increased the importance of accurate and timely
communications within the department citywide. The Operations
Unit was developed to fill this need.
The Operations Unit occupies a 15,000 square foot area on
the top floor of Police Department Headquarters. Because of
its vital role in the department communications process, the
Operations unit is called 'the nerve center of the
department.' After 5:00 PM, it is the nerve center of the
City, since all other City offices are closed.
The core of the Operations unit is the emergency police
dispatch system. It consists of six to twelve civilian
telephone operators who take emergency calls to the 911
number, ask a standard set of questions of each caller, assign
a priority rating of 1, 2, or 3 to the call, depending upon
the nature and level of emergency, and pass the relevant
information to eight police dispatchers, who distribute the
calls to police in vehicles. Each 911 operator position has
a terminal connected to the Police Department's IBM computer.
The terminal's screen displays a 17-line program into which
the operator types the information taken from emergency
callers. After punching in the information, the operator
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files it in the computer and it appears on the screens of the
uniformed dispatchers in another section of the unit. Over
the course of the study period, additional automation was
introduced or planned for the 911 function. In January 1985,
a new phone system was installed, which keeps track of the
number of calls taken by an operator, the time spent on each
call and the amount of time the operator spends away from the
terminal. By July 1986, the department was planning to
introduce an Enhanced 911 System, which automatically traces a
call to its location and provides the information on the
operator's screen.
The 911 system operates 24 hours per day, seven days per
week. Over 3,000 911 calls are taken each day, about 50
percent of which require some type of police or ambulance
attention. All calls to the 911 number are automatically tape
recorded. This provides the unit a means of checking its own
performance and a means of checking citizen complaints
regarding police response time or gathering data for crime
investigations.
In addition to the 911 operators and police dispatchers,
additional tasks have gradually been added to the unit since
1971, as the Police Department has become more centralized.
Six civilian positions serve internal department communication
functions and one maintains contact with State and Federal
communications systems. The internal communications positions
take and process stolen car and missing person reports from
-203-
district police stations and serve as information back-up for
officers in the street, running background checks on persons
and cars through various computerized files. Other ancillary
positions include a call screening operator, who takes reports
from victims of crimes which require no immediate police
attention; a general police information operator; and a unit
clerk, whose duties include taking daily absenteeism reports
for the entire department, keeping a log of Operations unit
personnel assignments and monitoring police radio channels.
The Operations unit is overseen by a lieutenant, who is
assisted by two civilian clerical workers. Routine
supervision is handled by two or three duty sergeants or
lieutenants. The latter are not working supervisors, for the
most part. Since the tasks of the unit are fairly routine,
their job is basically to 'just keep it running,' as one put
it. (2) This requires the performance of a variety of tasks,
including answering occasional questions from civilian
operators about the priority rating to be assigned to a
particular call; occasionally deciding which top priority
calls to respond to when all available officers are attending
to other calls; conducting research on citizen complaints or
in response to information requests from superiors; and random
monitoring of patrol officers through the latter's use of
their radios. Supervisors also perform various personnel
management functions in the unit, including keeping shifts
adequately staffed and making civilian task, seating and lunch
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assignments for each shift, monitoring civilian operators' use
of standard questions when taking a call and disciplining
workers for infractions of workrules.
During the study period, the size of the Operations unit
fluctuated between 130 and 150 persons, but generally
consisted of about 65 dispatchers and supervisors and 65-90
operators and ancillary workers. The 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM
shift, which is the largest, usually had a staff of 20 - 25
civilians, three supervisors and eight - ten dispatchers.
(B) Political Structure and Routine Work Relations
The Police Department has more autonomy vis-a-viz the City
administration than the Assessing Department and other
departments located at City Hall (Police Headquarters is
located about one mile from City Hall). Middle and senior
managers, for example, state that they feel little or no
political pressure from the administration, which they claim
is quite different from the situation at City Hall. (3) The
Police Department's relative autonomy is due, in part at
least, to its history as a State-regulated institution --
until 1962, the State appointed Boston Police Commissioners.
Even today, mayors appoint commissioners for five year terms
that extend into the next mayor's term. The department's
relative autonomy from the administration is also due to its
high visibility in the City Council and press. When Mayor
Flynn appointed his jogging partner as Police Commissioner and
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some his campaign workers to managerial positions in the
department, the press and Council accused him of attempting to
politicize the Police Department; a criticism that is
generally not made of similar appointments in other
departments. Nevertheless, the department's budget is
approved by the City Council like that of any other line
agency and the department's Labor Relations Division and
Personnel Division must process their paperwork through the
City Hall Office of Labor Relations and Personnel Division.(4)
Within the complex hierarchy of the Police Department
itself, the Operations unit occupies a position of low
standing. All procedures in the unit (eg., for handling
emergency calls, reporting in sick, etc.) are determined by
the Superintendant of Field Services or by the Superintendant
in Chief who runs the department on a day-to-day basis. (See
Figure 5.1) All requests by the unit for expenditures,
changes in procedures, training, etc., must be approved by
these upper levels in the hierarchy, as well as other
divisions that may be affected (eg., budget, personnel,
information systems, the Police Academy).
Evidence of the unit's low status in the department is
abundant. Other units in the department frequently transfer
civilian operators into their units with the Superintendant's
acquiescence. During 1984 and part of 1985, the
Superintendant did not replace workers who left the unit until
the number had dropped to less than 65 -- 25 below the number
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authorized in the Police Department budget. Since 1980 or so,
civilians received no formal training from the Police Academy.
They were simply told to sit with an experienced worker for a
couple of weeks. (5)
Throughout the study period and apparently for quite a
long time before that, the work area was not well maintained.
Water from the roof dripped on computer terminals and the unit
was not cleaned or fumigated to remove fleas. Some of the
computer equipment was not serviced and other equipment, such
as headphones for the new 911 phone system, was not provided
in sufficient numbers, so that operators had to cradle
receivers with their chin and shoulder while typing
information into the computer. Moreover, the 911 computer
program would only accept street names that were accurately
spelled and it was not updated to accept street name changes.
Operators often had to search around for one of the tattered
street manuals in the unit before they could enter a call into
the computer, which wasted time and caused stress. These
problems were of great concern to workers, as reflected in
Table 5.1. (See also Table 5.5 below)
The Unit Head was also concerned about the unit's problems
and appeared, throughout the study period, to be trying hard
to have them solved. Yet he frequently complained that he had
no power with the 'higher-ups,' as he called them and had to
take 'maybe' as answers to his requests for improvements.
This is remarkable, since the Operations Unit Head who
-208-
TABLE 5.1
POLICE OPERATIONS UNIT
WHAT WORKERS LIKE LEAST ABOUT THE WORK AREA
---------------------------------------------------------
What workers like least about their work area or unit.
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984)
N = 43 surveys; 66 responses.*
Working conditions are dirty and/or unsafe 41%
Supervisors or managers do not respect or appreciate me 18%
Workers do not respect or appreciate me 8%
Poor scheduling of personnel and tasks 9%
Nothing; I like everything about my unit 5%
Other 20%
-----------------------------------------------------------
* Survey respondents were asked to choose two of six possible
responses and to prioritize their choices with a 1 or 2. Since
almost one-half of the respondents on the 1984 survey did not
prioritize, but simply checked two responses, their two choices
were combined in this report.
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initiated the QWL program in November 1984, became
Superintendant in Chief in February 1985, when a new Police
Commissioner was appointed by the Mayor. Despite the
Superintendant's espoused agenda for the unit and for QWL, he
soon lost touch with both. Civilian workers often grumbled
that he had forgotten them once becoming Superintendant. When
I asked him about various Operations issues at the end of the
study period, such as training, a classification upgrade for
civilian workers and new operator headphones, he was not sure
of their status.
Two factors appear to account for the unit's low standing
in the department. First, its tasks are routine and its work
is predictable, although a failure to follow the presecribed
routines can bring public criticism and disgrace to the
department. Compared to the more uncertain environment of the
patrol officer, Police management apparently considered the
911 function to be so predictable and easy to perform that for
the first few years, they staffed the unit with 'problem
cops,' officers who were deemed no longer fit for street duty
because of age, infirmity or instability. Commissioner
DiGrazia (1972-1976) introduced low-paid civilians into these
and other jobs not requiring sworn officers to save labor
costs, but this hardly enhanced the unit's status, since
civilians are generally considered by officers to be
second-class citizens. As long as the unit is not embarrassing
the department in the public eye, its desires for resources
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can apparently be ignored. (6)
Weakness of the SEIU in the Police Department also
contributes to lack of clout of the civilian units, such as
Operations. The highest civilian non-managerial job
classification in the department until July 1986 was R-9, base
pay for which was $245 per week, before taxes. Attempts by
civilian Operations unit workers to secure a classification
upgrade in 1981 were unsuccessful, which was due, in part,
they claimed, to lack of support from the SEIU. Moreover,
Operations unit workers claimed that they received little or
no attention from the union's Police Department
representative. During the study period, workers on the
evening and night shifts occasionally asked me if I was their
union representative and a couple expressed surprise to hear
that they were represented by a union. Some of the more
informed workers claimed that they disagreed with the union
leadership's left-of-center political stands and endorsement
of Flynn's liberal, black opponent in the 1983 mayoral race.
They asserted that the union should get them a raise and get
out of politics, or leave them alone entirely. (7)
The internal politics of the Operations unit reflect its
routine tasks, low standing in the department and the second
class status of civilian workers. All formal decisionmaking
and control of the unit emanates from the Unit Head and
supervisors. Most civilians have no formal authority,
although civilian clerical workers perform a few tasks that
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require decision making. As noted above, the uniformed
supervisors control even civilian seating assignments and
trips to the restroom.
Supervisors do not relish their jobs and many openly admit
that they do not like working in the Operations Unit at all.
'I'm a street man; I don't belong up here,' is a typical
refrain. Yet, most of these officers are over the age of 50
and they recognize that they will not see street duty again.
Nor do they relish working with civilians, the majority of
whom are women and/or under 30 years of age: 'Cops like to be
with their own kind,' they say. 'These kids are OK, but...'
(8)
For this reason and because the work is routine and
supervisor and worker duties do not overlap very much, the
extent and nature of formal and informal supervisor- civilian
contact varies, depending upon personal styles. Some
supervisors take a very formal and militaristic approach to
running the unit, demanding that workers keep quiet on the job
and meting out a great deal of discipline in the form of
written reprimands. This was the style of the Unit Head who
initiated the QWL program. His predecessor reportedly
prohibited workers from even reading on the job while waiting
for calls. (9)
The majority of supervisors are reportedly far more
relaxed and lenient. They perceive the civilian operator jobs
as dead-end and feel sorry for the workers who stay in them,
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believing that 'they're in a rut,' as some put it. They make
liberal use of commendation days (days off for good service or
working overtime) and allow a few workers to leave early when
there are few calls, since, as one said: 'I have nothing else
to offer them.' On the night shifts in particular, they joke
with workers and use formal discipline sparingly. (10)
In general, supervisors do not expect a great deal from
civilians: 'Just don't come in shitfaced, is all I expect,'
said one. 'Just answer the phone, really. There's nothing much
to it,' said another. 'Come in, show up for work,' said
another. (11) From what I could gather, supervisors perceive
their relationships with civilians to be fairly smooth and
routine, as the survey responses in Table 5.2 show. They
perceive that workers follow their expectations, for the most
part and believe that they themselves are responsive to
workers' technical questions, requests to get particular
tasks, take longer than the 30 minutes allotted for lunch
break, or go home early when there is little work.
Many civilian workers experience their jobs and their
relationships with supervisors differently, however. Most
workers take the civilian operator job for one of two
reasons: At least half of the workers take the job as a
second household income; many workers on the 4:00 PM shift are
mothers with young children. A few take the job as a means of
paying their way through school and some take it for lack of
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TABLE 5.2
POLICE OPERATIONS UNIT
SUPERVISOR PERCEPTIONS OF WORKER-SUPERVISOR RELATIONS
-----------------------------------------------------------
(1) What do supervisors expect of workers? (Open-ended interview
question, November, 1984) N = 5 interviews; 8 responses
Do your job as it is defined in your job description 37%
Cooperate with others to get the work done 13%
Show up for work on time & report to me when
leaving your post for any reason 25%
Have a good attitude; be courteous to the public 25%
-----------------------------------------------------------
(2) Do workers generally follow supervisors' expectations?
(Multiple choice survey question, November 1984 and
December, 1985). 1984: N = 5 surveys. 1985: N = 3 surveys
1284 1285
Yes, always 100% 100%
About half of the time 0 0
No, usually not 0 0
-----------------------------------------------------------
(3) What happens when workers disagree with a supervisor?
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1985 and
December, 1985). 1984: N = 5 surveys. 1985: N = 3 surveys
1284 1285
They discuss it with him or her and
work it out 100% 33%
They refuse to do what the supervisor
wants 0 0
They do what the supervisor wants as
best they can 0 0
They do what the supervisor wants
enough to get by 0 67%
-----------------------------------------------------------
(4) What do workers expect of supervisors? (Open-ended interview
question, November, 1984). N = 5 supervisor interviews; 10
responses.
Know all of the jobs and give advice when needed 30%
Be fair and consistent in discipline and in giving
days off 30%
Respond to workers' requests for time off, etc. 20%
Run an amiable place; be easy 20%
-----------------------------------------------------------
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any career plan. The other half, as of November 1984, took
the job as a first step into a career as police officers or in
related professions. Since eligibility for the Police Academy
ends at age 32, several workers stayed in the unit for ten
years or more, hoping that their names would come to the top
of the police trainee list before they became ineligible.
Almost all civilian operators find the 911 operator job
exciting at first. It brings them into direct contact with
and allows them to really help people in need, as reported in
Table 5.3. Yet the actual percentage of emergency calls is
quite low. Less than half of the 3,000 calls taken per day
require police attention; the other half are crank calls or
non-police information calls. Of the calls which are
legitimate 911 calls, less than 225 are priority #1 calls,
i.e., crime in progress, fire, life-threatening situation, or
assault report. Hence, as reflected in Table 5.3, the novelty
soon wears off and the job becomes drudgery. Periods of
non-stop calls, followed by periods with almost no calls,
create stress; this is exacerbated by verbal abuse from
agitated callers and by the fact that 911 operators are
allowed only 30 minutes of official break time per eight-hour
shift.
Workers who have mastered the 911 job are sometimes
assigned to the 'backroom,' which is where the internal
department communications positions are located, or to one of
the ancillary jobs in the unit. The backroom lines are much
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TABLE 5.3
POLICE OPERATIONS UNIT
ATTITUDES OF CIVILIAN OPERATORS ABOUT THEIR JOBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
(1) Job Satisfaction of civilian workers
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984 and
December, 1985)
KEY: 1 = Very Satisfied; 2 = Somewhat Satisfied
3 = Not Satisfied At All. Averages are reported here.
12a4 (N) 12Q5 (N)
Satisfaction with the job in general 2.0 (46) 2.0 (39)
Satisfaction with pay 2.8 (45) 2.6 (39)
Satisf. with promotion opportunities 2.8 (44) 2.7 (36)
Satisfaction with employment security 2.2 (39) 2.0 (38)
(2) What workers like most about their tasks. (Multiple choice
survey question, November, 1984) N = 45 surveys; 85
responses.*
I like serving the public; helping people 45%
My tasks are challenging and interesting 28%
I can organize and do the work the way I think best 9%
My work load is good; I can handle what I'm asked to do 7%
Other 11%
(3) What workers like least about their tasks. (Multiple choice
survey question, November, 1984) N = 41 surveys;
65 responses.*
My tasks are boring or repetitious 26%
My work load is bad; I'm asked to do more than I can 25%
I cannot organize and do the work the way I think best 12%
Nothing; I like everything about my tasks 12%
I do not like dealing with the public 9%
Other 2%
*First and second responses combined. See footnote Table 5.1.
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busier than the 911 lines. This heavy workload creates
stress, which is compounded by verbal abuse from police
officers on the other end of the line. (12)
Many civilians perceived relations between themselves and
supervisors to be dissatisfying as well, as indicated in Table
5.4. In contrast to the supervisor perceptions reported in
Table 5.2, some workers, especially those who aspired to a law
enforcement career or who had learned all of the jobs in the
unit, claimed that supervisors expected workers to 'know
everything, even without training' but, for their own part,
were often unable or unwilling to answer their questions on
police procedures and displayed no understanding of, or
interest in learning the computer system and solving technical
problems. Even the Unit Head who initiated QWL, according to
some workers: 'Always turns your questions back on you.' Some
supervisors readily admitted that they had little or no
understanding of the computer system or of the details of some
civilian jobs. (13)
Some workers also took exception to supervisors'
inconsistent personnel management practices, which had the net
effect of being both strict and ineffective, as shown in Table
5.4. They claimed that supervisors played favorites in making
task assignments and distributing other benefits, such as
commendation days and permission to leave early. They also
claimed that many workers did not obey the supervisors and
managed to avoid taking their fair share of 911 calls. Since
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TABLE 5.4
POLICE OPERATIONS UNIT
WORKER PERCEPTIONS OF WORKER-SUPERVISOR RELATIONS
-----------------------------------------------------------
(1) What do supervisors expect of workers?
(Open-ended interview question, November, 1984)
N = 13 worker interviews; 20 responses.
Do your job as it is defined in your job description 60%
Cooperate with others to get the work done 5%
Show up for work and come on time 20%
Know everything, even without training 10%
Do whatever they say 5%
-----------------------------------------------------------
(2) Do workers follow supervisors' expectations?
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984 and
December, 1985). 1984: N = 44 surveys. 1985: N = 38 surveys.
12a4 1285
Yes, always 64% 55%
About half the time 32% 37%
No, usually not 4% 8%
-----------------------------------------------------------
(3) What happens when workers do not follow supervisors'
expectations? (Multiple choice survey question, November,
1984). N = 35 worker surveys; 41 responses.*
The supervisor writes the person up or gives
him or her a formal reprimand 49%
The supervisor yells at the person 19%
The supervisor discusses it with the person and
they work it out 15%
The supervisor tries to have the worker fired 5%
Other (includ.ing 'nothing') 12%
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TABLE 5.4, Continued
--- ----------------------------------------------------------
(4) What happens when workers disagree with a supervisor?
(Multiple choice survey question, November, 1984 and
December, 1985). 1984: N = 35 worker surveys; 38 responses*
1985: N = 36 worker surveys and responses.
They discuss it with him or her
and work it out 13% 19%
They just refuse to do what the
supervisor wants 0 8%
They do what the supervisor wants
just enough to get by 34% 33%
They do what the supervisor wants
as best they can 29% 14%
They tell the supervisor but get
no response 24% 22%
--- ----------------------------------------------------------
(5) What do workers expect of supervisors? (Open-ended interview
question, November, 1984). N = 8 worker interviews and
8 responses.
Care about the work and give good technical advice 37%
Be fair and consistent in discipline and in giving
days off 37%
Back workers up when citizens complain about service 13%
Be friendly and easy in running the work place 13%
*de,----------------------------------------------------------
* First and second responses combined. See footnote, Table 5.1
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the unit was shortstaffed in 1984 and most of 1985, this issue
was particularly salient for many workers.
The lack of formal training for civilian operators also
provoked conflicts between operators and supervisors. New
operators were trained by observing experienced operators for
several days. Although workers and supervisors alike admitted
that this was not an adequate procedure, workers claimed that
they were often unfairly berated by police dispatchers and
supervisors for not taking enough information from a caller or
for handling callers improperly. (14)
The combination of disparate worker aspirations, largely
routine but stressful tasks, inadequate staffing and training,
a poorly maintained work environment and perceived
unresponsiveness or arbitrariness by supervisors, was
reflected in relations among workers as well. As Table 5.5
indicates, workers generally expected each other to cooperate
to get the work done, to do one's fair share and, to a lesser
extent, have consideration for others when requesting days off
and be friendly. Yet many workers were not perceived as
following these expectations, but as spending a lot of time in
the restroom, strolling about the unit, or trying to "kiss up
to' supervisors for early release from work or other perks.
At first, offendors are 'yelled at.' "C'mon, plug in,"
was a typical refrain. Sometimes a one-on-one discussion also
took place. Operations workers eventually handled
recalcitrant co-workers through social exclusion, however,
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TABLE 5.5
POLICE OPERATIONS UNIT
ROUTINE WORK RELATIONS AMONG CIVILIAN WORKERS
(1) What do workers in your unit or work area expect of each
other? (Open-ended interview question, November, 1984)
N = 13 interviews; 19 responses.
Do your fair share and cooperate with everyone
to help get the work done 47%
Do your job as it is defined in your job description 37%
Be friendly 11%
Keep the place clean 5%
(2) Do workers usually follow each other's expectations?
(Multiple choice survey question, December, 1985)
N = 39 worker surveys
Yes, Always 33%
About half of the time 54%
No, usually not 13%
(3) What happens when workers do not follow each other's
expectations? (Multiple choice survey question, November,
1984 and December, 1985). 1984: N = 31 worker surveys; 39
responses.* 1985: N = 34 worker surveys and responses.
12Q4 1285
The offending person is socially
excluded and becomes an outsider 33% 29%
The offending person is yelled at
by his or her co-workers 23% 3%
A co-worker discusses it with the
person and they work it out together 20% 9%
The offending person is harrassed
or stabbed in the back 15% 50%
A group of workers gets together and
everyone helps.to straighten it out 3% 3%
Other 5% 6%
* First and second responses combined. See footnote, Table 5.1.
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since they had no power to enforce expectations of their
co-workers.
Although social exclusion was used as a disciplinary
device among workers in both the Assessing Department and
Police Operations Unit, it was far more prevalent in the
latter. Available data suggests at least two reasons for
this. First, since supervisors followed no consistent
procedures for making job assignments and dispensing perks,
the distribution of assignments created jealousy among
workers. (15)
The second reason for the prevalence of social exclusion
as a disciplinary technique among workers is that, despite the
large volume of calls, there is a sufficient amount of dead
time on each shift, especially for 911 operators on the night
shifts, so that workers had time for socializing. Since
performance of most of the jobs themselves requires little
worker interaction, socializing and personalities generally,
become important determinants of relations among workers.
Younger workers often socialize after work, so bonds and
antipathies have several roots. The result is a worker
culture based on cliques. The cliques are more or less
exclusive and internally cohesive, depending upon various
factors, but their existence is palpable.
Although cliques and friendships make life on the job
tolerable for many workers, only 12 out of 45, or 27 percent,
stated in November, 1984 that they would like to continue
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working in the unit for long. Indeed, out of 63 civiliam
operators on the job in November 1984, 19 had left by December
1985. (The total number of civiliams had increased to 93 by
December 1985.) Yet for civilians who wish to continue
working in the Police Department, very few opportunities for
career advancement or pay increases exist. (16)
Some workers remain in the unit in spite of their
dissatisfactions, hoping that things might get better someday,
but doing little or nothing to make changes. Some,
particularly the dozen or so who still desire a career in
policing and know the technical functions and tasks of the
unit well, become activists. These workers filed the
unsuccessful mass compensation grade appeal described above.
They also tried to organize a 4-3 workweek schedule in the
Summer of 1984; it was approved by the Unit Head, but
foundered on the opposition of other workers.
The Police Operations Unit's tasks, political structure
and conflictual routine relations were reflected in the
responses to and agendas for QWL of managers and workers.
(A) Management Goals and Responses to QWL
New unit heads in the Operations unit are appointed by the
Commissioner once every two or three years. From 1983 to
February 1985, the Unit Head was a reform-minded manager who
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was widely regarded as a 'mover and shaker.' His espoused
goal was to 'professionalize' the unit, in accordance with his
philosophy of professional police work. This philosophy
included a rigid code of worker discipline and strict
obedience of superiors' commands. It also included
comprehensive, formal training of workers, payment of high
wages to "get the best caliber of person," the institution of
civilian trainers, use of the latest technology and
maintenance of good work equipment. (17)
During his term, the Unit Head claimed to have reduced the
number of citizen complaints over 911 service (which includes
complaints about police response time) from 300 per year to
less than 60, through liberal use of suspensions, firings,
threats and reprimands of workers. He purchased a new 911
phone system (without consulting workers), which he liked for
its worker monitoring system, but which workers found
unwieldy. Because of his demonstrated penchant for discipline
and control, he was known to the workers as a 'jerk,'
'psychopath," but to some as a 'fair guy.' Privately, he told
me a few times: 'I'm sure everyone thinks I'm a prick.' (18)
Despite his success at disciplining workers, the Unit Head
was unable to get formal training or wage classification
upgrades for civilian operators and, throughout 1984, unable
to convince his superiors to replace civilian workers who left
the unit. Hence, when he learned that Roberts was looking for
pilot sites for the QWL program, he suggested the Operations
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unit. He stated that the program might be able to help him
get the staff increases, training and wage upgrades that he
had not been able to get through his own efforts. He stated
that he was sure that workers would ask for these things and
that, in any case, there would be no challenges to his
authority. He also expressed confidence that the workers
would be able to organize and prepare sophisticated
initiatives on these matters, citing as evidence the elaborate
four-day workweek proposal that several workers had attempted
to put through a few months previously. (19)
In addition to the Unit Head, the Director of Police Labor
Relations was also instrumental in bringing the QWL program
into the Police Department. He expressed the view that a new
organizational culture based on labor-management cooperative
decision making was essential if the department and the City
generally, was to function well. Over the course of the study
period, he reportedly encouraged other senior managers to take
the program seriously. (20)
(B) Worker and Supervisor Goals and Responses to QWL
Civilian Operations workers and supervisors responded
somewhat more positively to the QWL program idea than did
their Assessing counterparts, as indicated in their responses
to the November 1984 survey questions below:
Q. Is the LMCP a good idea? 39 yes; 1 no; 15 do not know
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Q. Would you like to participate by being in a Worksite Group?
24 yes; 10 no; 20 do not know
Unlike Assessing workers, civilian operators did not voice
fear of management reprisals as a reason for not wanting to,
or being unsure about participating in the QWL program,
although in interviews conducted in November 1984, a couple
expressed their general dislike of their Unit Head's harsh
disciplinary practices. Instead, workers gave the following
reasons for reticence about participating:
First, workers had heard very little about the program
prior to the survey.
Second, some workers were skeptical that QWL, or even the
SEIU, was the right vehicle to address their concerns. As
explained above, many workers felt that the union should get
out of politics and get them a raise, or leave them alone
entirely. Even the activists who volunteered for the program
demonstrated their discontent with the union and management,
by organizing for a walk-out of the QWL training sessions in
January 1985. The SEIU President convinced them at the last
minute that they had a better chance of getting a raise if
they stayed in the QWL program.
Third, some of those who had previously attempted to
organize the 4-3 workweek schedule were leery about attempting
any further initiatives with their co-workers.
Nevertheless, a critical mass of workers was willing to
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become involved with the QUL program. Even duty supervisors,
whose general tolerance was necessary for success and whose
participation on the Worksite Groups was desired, were
supportive or at least not opposed to the program.
In addition to a wage increase and/or chance for promotion
into a better paying, more rewarding job, important worker
objectives for the program, as indicated in Table 5.6,
included fairness in task assignments, formal training for
civilian operators, an increase in the staff, the institution
of civilian supervisors, and general improvements in the
quality of communications between supervisors and workers.
These responses show the tensions within the Operations unit
between uniformed and civilian personnel, as well as the
common sentiments of both parties that the lot of civilians
should be improved. In short, they indicate that in
Operations, as in Assessing, the initiatives of grassroots QWL
groups would require department-level and perhaps City level
action to be successful.
Choosing Worksite Groups for the Operations Unit was a
difficult task for the program staff. The existence of three
shifts raised the question of how many worksite groups there
should be and, if there were to be more than one, how their
activities would be coordinated. Although some argued for one
group on the day shift, with a representative from each of the
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TABLE 5.6
POLICE OPERATIONS UNIT
CIVILIAN WORKERS' AND UNIFORMED SUPERVISORS'
DESIRES FOR CHANGE
If you could change anything, what would you most like to
change? (Open-ended survey question, November, 1984 and
December, 1985). 1984: N = 49 worker and supervisor surveys
and responses. 1985: N = 36 worker and supervisor surveys
and responses
12Q4 12Q5
Pay and/or promotion systems should
be made more fair 29% 17%
Workflow planning and/or task
assignments 14% 12%
Improve the office climate and
attitudes generally 0 20%
Improve training and competence of
unit personnel 14% 29%
Improve the quality of communication
between supervisors and workers 4% 11%
Hire more people 24% 0
Institute civilian supervisors 10% 0
Improve communications and fairness
among workers 0 6%
Other 5% 5%
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night shifts, the SEIU leadership argued that anyone who
wanted to participate should be given the opportunity to do
so, so there was a need for more than one group. A two-group
arrangement was chosen: One group would be comprised of
members from part of the 8:00 AM shift and the 12:00 AM shift
and one group would be comprised of the 4:00 PM shift and part
of the 8:00 AM shift.
In addition to the two Worksite Groups, a Police
Departmentwide Committee was constituted. It consisted
initially of four workers: One from each of the Worksite
Groups and one steward each from two other units with large
numbers of civilians. After the first three months, however,
only the representatives from the two Worksite Groups
continued to attend regularly. The Departmentwide Committee
was also to have four middle managers: The Operations Unit
Head, the Director of Police Labor Relations, the Director of
Police Personnel and one Operations Unit supervisor. After a
new Police Commissioner took office in February 1985, the
make-up of the Committee changed slightly; the supervisor
position went vacant and the Assistant to the Director of
Police Administrative Services began to attend. Table 5.7
provides a chronology of the program implementation and
operations process in the Police Operations Unit.
The Worksite Group structure of two groups from mixed
shifts proved to be very unstable. By April 1985, the groups
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TABLE 5.7
PROGRAM OPERATIONS IN THE POLICE OPERATIONS UNIT
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS
----------------------------------------------------------
g t--t c24: Roberts and the Head of the
Operations Unit discuss the QWL program.
QctQbec-1 2a4: The Citywide Labor-Management Oversight
Committee chooses the Police Operations unit and Assessing
Department as pilot sites for program implementation.
NQembec-1284: Departmentwide Committees are constituted in
the Police Department and Assessing Department.
A twelve-hour 'Kick - Off Retreat' is held at the Harvard
Business School for members of the Citywide Labor-Management
Oversight Committee and Departmentwide Committees in the
Police Department and Assessing Department. The participants
review and modify a document drafted by program staff to
express the Labor-Management Cooperation Program's philosophy:
'Commitment Toward Cooperation."
Qecembec-1284: Two Worksite Groups are constituted in the
Police Operations Unit; one comprised of workers from the
midnight and 8:00 AM shifts; one comprised of workers from the
8:00 AM and 4:00 PM shifts.
Januac:-125: A two-day training session is held at Boston
College for all program participants, but attended mostly by
members of the Departmentwide Committees and Worksite Groups.
Operations workers plan to walk out of the training sessions
to protest the fact that they have been working without a
contract since June 1984. At the last minute, the SEIU
President dissuades them from taking this action.
Worksite Groups and Departmentwide Committees in the Police
Operations Unit and Assessing Department begin meeting.
Ecbcyacy-12Q5: Police Commissioner Jordan resigns and Mayor
Flynn appoints Commissioner Roache as his successor. The Head
of the Operations Unit is promoted to Superintendant in Chief
and leaves the Labor-Management Cooperation Program's Police
Departmentwide Committee.
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TABLE 5.7
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS, Continued
----------------------------------------------------------
2cil_125: The 4:00 PM shift Worksite Group splits, due to
conflicts among group members over the 4-3 workweek proposal.
Some members of the group join the 8:00 AM shift group. A
small Worksite Group remains on the 4:00 PM shift.
A 911 worker representative from the 8:00 AM shift Worksite
Group tells the Police Departmentwide Committee that the
civilian staff shortage and poor training procedures have
reached a point of crisis. Managers on the Committee promise
to address the problem and within a few weeks, some new
workers are hired in the Operations Unit.
July_12: A woman is raped an beaten and a witness calls the
911 emergency three times, but police do not arrive on the
scene for over 30 minutes. This results in a scandal and a
series of critical hearings on the 911 system by the City
Council's Committee on Public Safety. Mayor Flynn appoints a
committee of nationally recognized experts on 911 to study
Boston's system and make recommendations.
agut-1285: Roberts, the Program Director, fires the
full-time facilitator and the SEIU leadership calls a
moratorium on all further program meetings until the issue is
discussed and resolved.
QOtQbec_12a5: The Committee On 911 submits recommendations to
the Flynn administration to improve the 911 emergency response
system and explicitly endorses the civilian training and
career ladder proposals of the 8:00 AM Shift Worksite Group.
NQembec_1285: The Director of the Administrative Services
Department and the President of the SEIU reach agreement on a
solution to the program staff conflict.
Deacmbcc_12a5: The Labor-Management Cooperation Program is
officially re-started.
Janwacy_126: A small 8:00 AM Shift Worksite Group and the
Police Departmentwide Committee resume meeting, albeit very
irregularly, making little or no progress on initiatives.
July_12f6: Mayor Flynn signs an executive order upgrading the
pay classification of civilian workers in the Police
Operations Unit.
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TABLE 5.7
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS, Continued
----------------------------------------------------------
Smetembec-1286: The Labor-Management Cooperation Program holds
a short conference for managers and workers from departments
throughout the City.
A Worksite Group is constituted in the Payroll Office of the
Police Department.
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had split into an 8:00 AM shift group, which was joined by a
few 12:00 AM workers and a small 4:00 PM shift group. Only
the 8:00 AM group was able to accomplish anything of
substance, however.
From the start, the 4:00 PM shift experienced several
problems: First, some basic requirements for successful
program operations were not met. Many meetings were casually
conducted and suffered from a lack of clear task orientation
on the part of workers. Indeed, the slow-moving,
quasi-informal atmosphere of the evening shift seemed to be
simply transported into the meeting room each week. Follow-
through on even minor group decisions, such as purchasing
cheap ashtrays using the unit's petty cash fund, was
inconsistent or non-existent. Although weekly minutes were
written and posted, communications between participants and
non-participants were poor. Some non-participants told me
they had no idea what went on in the meetings and did not see
the minutes.
Second and more important, the 4:00 PM group could not
carve out an agenda that was distinct from the 8:00 AM group.
Since the latter group was addressing issues which affected
the entire unit (such as the career ladder package and 4-3
workweek), the 4:00 group had to discuss them as well, but
could never take the lead on an issue.
Third, two antagonistic cliques were represented in the
group until the end of April and neither the chairman nor
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facilitators could overcome the conflict. The chairman
himself was an activist who worked on the 8:00 AM shift and
who had poor relations with the leaders of one of the cliques.
When the Worksite Groups were discussing a 4-3 workweek
proposal, the clique animosities on the 4:00 PM shift
exacerbated the already complex issues involved in changing
work patterns and days off. The facilitators urged the group
members to take responsibility for all of the workers on their
shifts and not to try to push through their ideas over the
opposition of others, but this advice was not heeded. Finally
the initiative was scuttled and the members of one clique left
the group. The chairman and other workers from the 8:00 AM
shift joined the 8:00 group. This left only five members of
the 4:00 group, two of whom soon departed when their work
hours changed.
Fourth, when the 4:00 group did finally identify two
distinct issues in June and July -- the lack of headsets for
911 operators and the lack of safe, legal parking for
nightshift workers -- they were not able to pursue them
through the Police Department and City Hall bureaucracies.
They were misinformed or told that various people were looking
into the issues, but they could not find anyone or even any
department to admit responsibility or knowledge of the status
of the issues. Even the Unit Head, who attended almost every
group meeting, could get no concrete answers on these issues
from his superiors. As late as January 1986, the 911
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operators reportedly still lacked headphones. The only issue
successfully addressed by this group was replacement of rough
toilet paper with softer paper. The issues addressed by this
group are listed in Table 5.8.
The 8:00 AM group took the lead on developing several
important initiatives for the unit: (1) Increasing staff
levels, which had fallen to dangerously low levels during
1984; (2) Instituting a 4-3 workweek which, as noted above,
foundered on the resistance of some persons on the 4:00 PM
shift; and (3) Developing a career ladder/training/job
classification upgrade package.
This group also experienced problems. Its efforts to
improve maintenance of the work area, for instance, had only
temporary effects, due to lack of cooperation from the
department responsible for maintenance and lack of persistent
worker follow-through. Yet the group also had several factors
working in its favor.
First, much of its was done by two dedicated and
knowledgeable activists, who spent substantial time both on
and off the job developing proposals, surveys and attending
meetings. They were respected and trusted by other members of
the worksite group as representatives at the Departmentwide
Committee meetings and enjoyed good relations with supervisors
and managers.
Neither these two leaders, nor other members of the 8:00
group, however, had strong support from the less active
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TABLE 5.8
ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE
4:00 PM SHIFT WORKSITE GROUP
ISSUE ADDRESSED ACTION TAKEN
1) Maintaining Work Area
A) Clean work area
B) Softer toilet paper
2) Physical Working Conditions
A) Poorly lit work area
B) New television for
lunchroom
C) Headsets for 911 operators
D) Parking for workers
January; August
January-February
January; March
January
June-August
June-August
New custodian hours set
by management in January
Approved in February;
New stock in May
None within Labor-
Management Cooperation
Program
Asked other unit; no
solution
Calls throughout Police
Department & City Hall;
Nothing as of
January, 1986
Informed department
committee; No solution
as of January, 1986
3) Workflow Management, Scheduling
A) Use of P.A. system by
civilians
B) Change day-off schedule
to cover weekends, etc.
C) Institute 4-3 workweek
D) Update computer file
with new street names;
get more hardcopies
January
February-April
February-April
June-August
January: Supervisors
promise support of
civilians in disputes
with police dispatchers
February: Survey of
Workers; No action by
group; New schedule
set by management in May
April: Group splits over
issue; no more discussion
None within Labor-
Management Cooperation
Program
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ISSUE
4) Job Duties, Pay, Career Ladders
A) Cross-training of 911
workers for "backroom"
civilian tasks
B) Revise & distribute 911
operators' manual
C) More training for 911
operators
D) Career Ladder
5) Regulatory Procedures
A) Smoking & Non-Smoking Areas
B) Make suggestion box
TABLE 5.8 (Continued)
ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE
4:00 PM SHIFT WORKSITE GROUP
ADDRESSED
January-February
January; March;
June
January
February-March
January-March;
June
March
ACTION TAKEN
Some training 
by workers,
Some training by workers,
January-February
None
None as of January, 1986
8:00 shift group &
department committee
develop package
Worker survey in
February; No action
None
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members of their shift or from other shifts. The latter
reportedly criticized the 8:00 group for 'making policy' for
the unit. Yet the critics reportedly refused to participate
or to observe group meetings.
The second factor working in favor of the 8:00 group was
that the Departmentwide Committee eventually played a
supportive role for the Worksite Group. This support was not
strong at first, however. Despite initial advocacy for the
program by the Police Labor Relations Director, the change in
Police Department administrations in February 1985 and the
reported lack of communication from City Hall administrators
about the program to the new Police Administration, led to
irregular meetings and a few conflicts about the program
itself, for the first few months.
In April, one of the 8:00 AM group leaders made an
impassioned speech at a Departmentwide Committee meeting,
claiming that shortstaffing and lack of formal training had
undermined the quality of 911 service to such an extent that
he himself would never call 911 in an emergency. The new
senior managers on the Committee responded by immediately
requesting job postings by the City Personnel Division and by
adding more civilian operators into the FY86 budget. By
December, there were 93 civilians in the unit. The managers
also began to work with the two worker leaders to refine the
Worksite Group's proposals to introduce up to twenty civilian
trainer and civilian supervisor positions, to upgrade the base
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pay of all operators and to provide formal training by the
Police Academy for operators.
Third, a 911 scandal in July 1985, created media and City
Council pressure on the administration to improve the
Operations unit. A woman was raped and beaten but police
assistance did not arrive for over 30 minutes, despite three
calls to 911 by a witness. As it turned out, the slow
response was due primarily to a shortage of police cars, but
the Council's Public Safety Committee and the media presented
the incident as a 911 operator foul-up.
A blue ribbon committee of nationally known 911 experts
was set up in August to study the problem. This committee
included a union steward who was one of the two 8:00 AM
worksite group leaders. Through the efforts of this worker,
the committee accepted the Worksite Group's career
ladder/training/ pay upgrade plan, as well as a proposal to
install an Enhanced 911 System, which automatically identifies
the location of 911 callers, and made them the body of its
recommendations to the Flynn administration in October 1985.
Program participants, both workers and managers, stated in
December 1985 that it may have taken months or years to get
the worksite group's plan approved by the City's Personnel and
Labor Relations divisions and by the State Civil Service
system review machinery, if not for the assistance of the blue
ribbon committee and media attention. As of July 1986, none
of the committee's recommendations had been implemented,
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although the base pay upgrade had reportedly been authorized
by the Mayor and the 8:00 AM shift group and Departmentwide
Committee had begun to discuss implementation of the Enhanced
911 System with telephone company officials. Table 5.9 lists
the issues addressed by the 8:00 AM shift Worksite Group.
EecetioQQ Qftb-QWLcg-ftcQQe-Yea
(A) Management Views
In December 1985, the Police Superintendant in Chief, the
Director of Police Administrative Services and his Assistant,
the Police Personnel Director and Police Labor Relations
Director all stated that, for the most part, the QWL program
had been a success in the Operations unit and that they were
committed to working with civilian operators to implement the
recommendations of the blue ribbon committee. They also
stated, however, that they had no power to influence the speed
of the City Hall and State review processes of those
recommendations and that they assumed approval would take some
time.
Half of these managers also stated that, although QWL was
a good idea, they had no plans to implement it in other units,
since it required too much of their time. One stated that the
program would only be viable if it focused specifically on
increasing worker productivity.
Two other managers also took issue with the program's
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TABLE 5.9
ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE
8:00 AM SHIFT WORKSITE GROUP, 1985
ISSUE ADDRESSED ACTION TAKEN
1) Maintaining Work Area
A) Clean work area
and restrooms
B) Softer toilet paper
C) Lunch/break room messy
& used by 'outsiders'
2) Physical Working Conditions
A) Improve vending machine
selections
B) Parking for workers
3) Workflow Management, ScheduLing*
A) Hire more civilian workers
B) Change day-off schedule
to cover weekends, etc.
C) Institute 4-3 workweek
D) Overtime compensation; day
off or money
4) Job Duties, Pay, Career Ladders
A) Cross-training of 911
workers for backroom
rotations
January; May
January-February
January
January
March
January-February;
ApriL-June
January-May
January-May
January-February
January-February;
June-JuLy
New custodian hours set
by management in January
Approved in February;
New stock in use by May
Management posts notice
to outsiders not to eat
in room
Notified vendor in
January
None as of January, 1986
May-July: Vacated positions
filled; July-January, 1986:
20 positions added
Survey of workers in
February; New schedule made
by management in May
None
Unclear; management policy
Some training in January,
stops by February because
some worker resistance
A.1) Compensation of worker
trainers
B) Supervisors should know
and do some civilian
operator tasks
May-July
January; April
None
None direct; career Ladder
package addresses issue
C) Career Ladder+, Wage March-January, 1986 New job descriptions by
Classification upgrade group and department
committee; Wage upgrade by
July, 1986
* These issue often overlapped in worksite group discussions
+ Initially proposed by manager at department committee meeting, 2/27
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strategic focus and operations. One expressed the view that
the sites had not been adequately assessed before being
selected for program participation and that it was foolish to
believe that a grassroots program could last for long in a
unit comprised of semi-skilled workers with high turnover. In
his opinion, only a unit comprised of professional workers,
such as police officers would be suitable for a permanent,
grassroots-based program, but he deemed current relations with
the Police Patrolmen's Association too fractious to permit
such an effort.
Another manager expressed great frustration with the
entire program administration process and particularly with
what he considered to be a total lack of communication or
guidance from administrators on the Citywide Oversight
Committee. He stated that the program could not thrive in the
department unless City administrators provided more support
and direction and he was not optimistic that such support
would materialize.
(B) Views of the Union
The SEIU leadership was generally pleased with the outcome
of the program in the Operations Unit. Although they became
frustrated with the administration in the Winter and Spring of
1986 for what they considered to be foot dragging on the
latter's part in implementing the job upgrade/training
package, they regarded the package as a great success. The
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estimated $25.00 per week raise that the base pay upgrade
would bring 'makes the whole program worth it,' said the
President. (21)
Moreover, the President praised the program for having
created better links between Operations workers and the union
leadership, stating that workers 'are calling this office a
lot more now." She also stated that workers "are more
aggressive now,' citing an increase in grievances filed in
December over working conditions. (22)
(C) Views of Workers and Supervisors
Perceptions of workers and supervisors about the QWL
program as of the end of December 1985, were mixed, much like
those of Assessing workers. As Table 5.10 shows, both
participants and non-participants gave the program an 'okay'
rating, on average, but the responses were distributed mostly
between 'good' and 'terrible.' Thirty-five percent stated
that the program had helped to increase communication and
discussion of problems in the unit, but the same number stated
that the program had accomplished nothing. Only four persons,
or 24 percent of the respondents, cited the increase in staff
or job upgrade and career plan as accomplishments, however.
Of those who left the program while it was in progress,
two said they did so because the program was accomplishing
nothing and two reported that they left because of conflict
with other workers. Many others left the worksite groups over
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TABLE 5.10
POLICE OPERATIONS UNIT
WORKER AND SUPERVISOR ATTITUDES ABOUT
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION PROGRAM
AFTER ONE YEAR
(1) Did you participate in the Labor-Management Cooperation
Program? (Survey, December, 1985). N = 41 surveys
Yes
No
24%
76%
(2) How would you rate the program? (Multiple choice survey
question, December, 1985). N = 24 surveys and responses.
Terrific
Good
Okay
Bad
Terrible
4%
21%
42%
12%
21%
(3) If you joined the program, but stopped participating before
August, 1985, explain why. (Open-ended survey question,
December, 1985). N = 7 surveys and responses.
The program was a waste of time; it did nothing
The program disrupted relations among workers
Other
29%
29%
43%
(4) Would you like to participate in the program now? (Survey
question, November, 1984 and December, 1985). 1984: N = 54
surveys and responses. 1985: N = 35 surveys and responses.
Yes
Not sure
1284
44%
37%
1225
40%
31%
29%No 19%
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TABLE 5.10, Continued
(5) What are the program's biggest accomplishments to date?
(Open-ended survey question, December, 1985). N = 17
surveys and responses.
None 35%
Communication, listening, airing problems 35%
Increased staff; career ladder; raises 24%
Various housekeeping improvements 6%
(6) How much effort should the SEIU devote to programs such as
the Labor-Management Cooperation Program? (Multiple choice
survey question, December, 1985). N = 22 surveys and
responses.
A lot of effort 50%
A fair amount of effort 32%
Not much effort 4%
No effort at all 14%
(7) What issues should the union focus on? (Open-ended survey
question, December, 1985). N = 15 surveys; 20 responses.
Wage raises; position classification upgrades 53%
More union responsiveness to workers in general 20%
Fairness in promotions; establishing career ladders 7%
Workplace fairness in general 7%
Increased staffing 7%
Improved training 7%
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the course of the program, but most did so because they were
transferring out of the unit or because their work hours
changed so that they could no longer attend meetings.
Asked whether or not they would like to participate in the
program now, worker responses overall showed a slight decline
in desire to participate over the previous year. Among those
who had participated, however, sentiments were extremely
polarized, with five indicating they would like to
participate, four indicating they would not like to and none
undecided. Those participants who still wanted to participate
were the activists from the 8:00 AM group. Only one
participant from the 4:00 group indicated a desire to
participate. Polarization was also evident in views as to
whether the union should continue to participate in programs
of this sort. Although the vast majority of respondents
stated that the union should participate, a sizable minority
stated that the union should not do so.
Two factors seem to account for these responses. First,
the lukewarm to negative assessments of program
accomplishments are attributable to the fact that no
improvements had been implemented as of December 1985.
Second, communications between the activist workers, who had
helped to organize the upgrade/training package and other
workers in the unit was almost non-existent. The old clique
antagonisms and a split between some of the activists and the
unit's many new and untrained workers, precluded discussions
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about the status of program initiatives.
These splits are reflected in the results of the survey of
work relations conducted in December 1985, which are included
in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, above. As these tables show, perceived
work relations, both among workers and between workers and
supervisors, were actually less cooperative in 1985 than they
had been in 1984. According to several workers, none of the
new civilian operators had been trained very well and because
so many were hired over such a short period of time, many were
being shown the ropes by workers who themselves had only six
months of experience on the job. Veteran workers deplored
what they considered to be poor handling of callers, but their
attempts to correct the new workers provoked conflicts. Most
of the supervisors had ceased to exercise strict discipline or
guidance and those who continued to do so were often ignored
by the new workers.
Between December 1985, when the program resumed following
a four-month moratorium and September 1986, Worksite Group
activity was at a much lower level than during the first eight
months. The 4:00 PM group did not meet at all. Only six to
eight operator activists attended meetings of the 8:00 AM
group regularly. Some stated that they did not want the new
workers to attend group meetings since "they're part of the
problem' with the unit. (23)
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CQoQusiQ
On the basis of this description of QWL in the Police
Operations unit, one must conclude that this was not a
particularly conducive setting for a grassroots-based QWL
program. Its routine tasks, low standing in the department's
decision making hierarchy, worker-supervisor conflicts and
cliques among workers, produced a politically fragmented unit,
whose members could not agree on how to use what little power
the program afforded.
Yet, the combination of several factors led to program
achievements in this unit. First, the existence of a few
leaders who were sufficiently frustrated, knowledgeable and
interested in improving the unit, was enough to generate
initiatives. They were opposed by many workers, but the
opposition was not coherent enough to undermine their
determination. Second, these leaders enjoyed good relations
with most supervisors and with the unit head; one leader
performed mostly ancillary tasks which brought him into
frequent working contact with supervisors. Moreover,
supervisors and the unit head supported the workers' agenda.
Third, senior department managers supported the workers'
agenda and helped to refine and implement it. This support
was due to two factors: (1) Advocacy by the Police Labor
Relations Director of the concept of QWL as a vehicle to
change worker-manager relations, and of the idea that
management must initially demonstrate its commitment to better
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relations by cooperating with reasonable worker initiatives;
(2) More important, pressure brought to bear on management by
the media and City Council to show improvement in the
Operations Unit helped to make the worker initiatives a higher
priority than they would otherwise have been and fostered the
development of a good working relationship between managers
and the two worker leaders.
Yet, despite the pressure exerted by the media, successful
worker initiatives and management support did not translate
into timely implementation of improvements. From November
1985 through June 1986, for instance, the training/upgrade
package was shunted between several offices: Police Personnel,
Police Administrative Services, City Personnel, City Labor
Relations, State Personnel and the Mayor's Office. Similar
problems with inter-unit and inter-departmental cooperation
undermined initiatives to get headsets, parking for night
shift workers and improved maintenance of the work area.
As of September 1986, it appeared that the QWL program
would continue to function on a low level in the Operations
Unit, at least until the upgrade/training package and Enhanced
911 System were implemented, thanks to continued interest by a
few activists and willingness by some managers to work with
them. Assuming that formal civilian trainer positions are
introduced and that formal cross-training and rotation of all
workers on all jobs takes place, it is possible that worker
cliques may begin to break down, increasing cohesiveness and
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cooperation in the unit generally.
Beyond that, however, the long-term future of QWL in the
Operations unit is unclear. As more parts of the 911 task are
automated, there may be fewer problems to solve and hence,
less need for Worksite Groups. More important, the unit's low
standing in the department hierarchy may render efforts to
achieve further improvements more time consuming and
frustrating than than they are worth to workers. The most
likely future for worker involvement, is that police aspirants
will continue to be active in pressing for improvements and
will attempt to maintain contact with senior managers to
further these goals. In other words, worker involvement may
take the form of traditional union steward activism, with
peripheral involvement by the rank and file.
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CHAPTER 5 - NOTES
1) Civilian managers and workers allege that uniformed
personnel treat civilian workers this way. One senior
civilian manager said: 'If this were India, it would be a
perfect example of a caste system. Civilians are second-class
citizens. They are not expected to be heard from very often.'
2) Police Operations Unit supervisors, November 1984
3) Police Department civilian managers, November 1984 and July
1985.
4) Managers in the Police Administrative Services, Personnel
and Labor Relations Divisions complained about the
cumbersomeness of these arrangements on a few occasions during
the Spring of 1985 and in December 1985 interviews.
5) Operations Unit Head and civilian workers, November 1984.
6) For an analysis of the civilianization of the Police
Department under Commissioner DiGrazia, see Albert, 1975.
7) Operations Unit workers, November 1984.
8) Operations Unit supervisors, November 1984.
9) Operations Unit workers and Unit Head, November 1984.
10) Operations Unit supervisors, November 1984 and August
1985.
11) Opeations Unit supervisors, November 1984.
12) Throughout the study period, civilian operators on the
backroom internal lines repeatedly charged that police
officers treated them poorly when calling for background
checks on individuals or to report or check the status of
stolen cars and missing persons.
13) Operations Unit civilian worker, November 1984 and
supervisor remarks during Worksite Group meetings throughout
1985.
14) Operations Unit civilian workers, November 1984, December
1985 and during Worksite Group meetings in 1985.
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CHAPTER 5 - NOTES, Continued
15) A case in point is the "backroom" internal communications
jobs. Adequate performance of these jobs requires great deal
of working knowledge of department procedures and of the
procedures of the backroom itself. Since there is no formal
training for the jobs, new workers are almost totally reliant
upon veterans to learn the ropes. Since the workload here is
quite heavy, there is little time to train new workers.
Moreover, since veterans have established norms of task
sharing that alter the official division of labor, untrained
newcomers often gum up the system. During the study period,
several workers complained that they had been treated so badly
during their first few days in the backroom that they asked
not to be assigned there again. Supervisors tried to honor
these requests, thus exacerbating the staff shortage problem
in the backroom and reinforcing the social divisions among
these workers.
16) All civilian jobs in the Operations Unit carried the same
R-9 classification until July 1986.- Few civilian clerk jobs
elewhere in the Police Department carried higher ratings.
17) Police Operations Unit Head, November 1984. See also
Fogelson (1977) for a description of militaristic philosophies
of police organization.
18) Police Operations Unit Head, November 1984.
19) ibid.
20) Police Labor Relations Director, November 1984.
21) President, SEIU LOcal 285, December 1985.
22) ibid.
23) Police Operations Unit workers, December 1985.
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CHAPTER 6
PROGRAM LEADERSHIP
IQtCQdytiQQ
Most studies of QWL claim that effective executive
leadership is one of the most important determinants of QWL
operational success. (Nadler, Hanlon, Lawler, 1980; Walton,
1975; See also Selznick, 1957). Effective leadership is
required to establish a program as a legitimate organizational
priority and to create meaningful incentives for organization
members to be open to change and adopt new behaviors.
Particularly in bureaucratic settings, where different
departments or units perform different functions which are
determined at the top levels of the organization, executive
leadership is required to guide the change process if any
change is to take place at all, so that the right departments
or individuals adopt new behaviors when needed.
By these criteria, executive leadership of the Boston QWL
program was ineffective. The Citywide Labor-Management
Oversight Committee -- the entity formally charged with
responsibility for program leadership -- played almost no
operational role whatsoever in the program. The
administrators on the Committee claimed that QWL was "Robert's
program' and that it was his responsibility to conduct the
program successfully. Yet, as each week went by, Roberts
alienated program participants. By the end of the study
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period, he was regarded as technically incompetent and/or
personally dislikable by almost everyone in the program who
knew him -- manager, worker and administrator alike.
It is difficult not to blame Roberts for many of the
program's problems. Yet the discussions in Chapters 4 and 5
showed that the interests and agendas of workers and managers
were either fundamentally incompatible to begin with, or
unattainable because of lack of responsiveness and timely
cooperation from other departments. Only strong mayoral or
top administrator leadership could have adjudicated these
worker-manager conflicts or secured the cooperation of
internal service departments to accomplish program
initiatives.
Yet strong executive leadership leadership was
incompatible with the administration's conception of QWL and
with the lack of strong interest by top administrators in
QWL. As noted in Chapter 3, the Mayor was not even informed
about the program during its first two years of existence. It
is this lack of interest and lack of a foundation of
cooperation and trust between the administration and the SEIU
which constituted the leadership void in the program and not
Roberts. This was amply illustrated by the fact that it took
the union and administration almost four months to re-start
the program after Roberts' firing of a group facilitator
brought the program to a halt and that it was primarily union
persistence that finally resolved the impasse. Indeed, the
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administration exhibited no leadership before, during, or for
a long time after this conflict. (1)
The discussion in this chapter will describe the
activities of the Labor-Management Oversight Committee,
Roberts' difficulties as program director and finally, the
administration's and union's responses to a program crisis
precipitated by Roberts' firing of a facilitator. Table 6.1
provides a chronology of important events in the
implementation of the program, focusing on leadership
activities.
QsecigbZComittee
The Oversight Committee was comprised of top level
executives from both Labor and Management. The management
side was represented by the Director of Administrative
Services, the Director of Personnel, the Director of the
Office of Labor Relations, the Budget Director, the Mayor's
Chief Policy Advisor and his assistant. The SEIU side was
represented by the President, the City Hall and Police
Department Business Representatives and two shop stewards.
Roberts was the executive director of the Committee.
According to the official program design documents, the
primary functions of the Oversight Committee were to plan for
and direct the implementation of the program into various
departments and to serve as a trouble-shooter when the program
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TABLE 6.1
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE
CITYWIDE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
LABOR - MANAGEMENT COOPERATION PROGRAM
---- ------------------------------------ 
------------------
82cil_12Q4: Roberts proposes that the City of Boston and
miscellaneous employee unions, AFSCME Council 93 and SEIU
Local #285 apply to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service for funding of a labor-management cooperation program,
May_124: The City of Boston designs a program structure and
applies. to the FMCS for funding of the Labor-Management
Cooperation Program for 18 months.
See2tmbec_1284: Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
funding is received. The Citywide Labor-Management Oversight
Committee is constituted and a memorandum of understanding
between the SEIU and Flynn administration is signed. The
memorandum officially acknowledges the program and provides
that either party may cease participating if it chooses to.
QctQbec_1284: The Citywide Labor-Management Oversight
Committee chooses the Assessing Department and Police
Operations Unit as pilot sites for the program. The Committee
also hires two program facilitators and a training and process
consultant.
NQembec_12a4: A twelve-hour, 'Kick-Off Retreat" is held at
the Harvard Business School for members of the Citywide
Oversight Committee and Departmentwide Committees in the
Assessing Department and Police Operations Unit. The
participants review and slightly modify a document drafted by
the program staff to express the Labor-Management Cooperation
Program's philosophy: 'Commitment Toward Cooperation.'
eacembec_124: Worksite Groups are constituted in the
Assessing Department and Police Operations Unit.
Janyacy_125: A two-day training session is held at Boston
College for all program participants, but attended mostly by
members of the Departmentwide Committees and Worksite Groups.
Worksite Groups and Departmentwide Committees begin meeting.
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TABLE 6.1
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS, Continued
---------------------------------------------------------
Eebcuacy_1285: The Citywide Labor-Management Oversight
Committee reviews the results of a study of routine workplace
relations in the Assessing Department and Police Operations
Unit.
Jne_12: The Citywide Labor-Management Oversight Committee
officially chooses the Retirement Board for participation in
the Labor-Management Cooperation Program. One Worksite Group
and one Departmentwide Committee is constituted in the
Retirement Board.
8yguzt_12a5: Roberts, the Program Director, fires the full-
time committee facilitator. The SEIU leadership calls a
moratorium on all further program meetings until a hearing on
the matter can be held by the Citywide Labor-Management
Oversight Committee. No hearing is ever held, however.
Nemb_1285: The Director of the Administrative Services
Department and the President of the SEIU Local #285 reach
agreement on a solution to the staff conflict, including
provisions for a new program co-director to be hired along
with Roberts and for a new program facilitator to be hired.
The Oversight Committee officially endorses this solution.
Qecembc_1285: The Labor-Management Cooperation Program is
officially re-started. A new Sub-Committee of the Oversight
Committee meets several times to work through unresolved
issues of the solution to the staff conflict.
Janyacy_12a6: Worksite Groups and Departmentwide Committees
resume meeting in the Retirement Board and Police Operations
Unit.
Eebcyacy_12a6: A critical, first-year evaluation of the
Labor-Management Cooperation Program is presented to the
program staff by the author of this study.
8eci1-126: The Assessing Department publicly announces that
it will not re-join the Program.
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TABLE 6.1
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS, Continued
Seelembec_12Q6: The Labor-Management Cooperation Program holds
a short conference for managers and workers from departments
throughout the City. The Mayor sends a letter to the
conference, professing his support of the Program.
Worksite Groups are constituted in the Payroll
Police Department and in the thirty-person Ren
Plans are made to implement the Program in the
Services Department also.
Office of the
t Equity Board.
Inspectional
The person appointed as Program Co-Director in November 1985
becomes sole Program Director. Roberts, the original
Director, is reportedly assigned a consulting role, with no
direct responsibility for program management. Nevertheless,
conflicts between Roberts and the Director over control of the
Program reportedly continue into November 1986.
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ran into snags at the Departmentwide Committee level. (2)
This was a vague job description. Directing
implementation and trouble-shooting could entail either a
pro-active role or a more passive role, depending upon one's
perspective. Few attempts were made by Committee members to
establish a clear role and set of tasks for the Committee,
however. By default, the Committee played a very passive
role. Indeed, but for its decisions to hire staff and
implement the program in Assessing and Police Operations in
the Fall of 1984 and its decision to expand the program into
the 32-member Retirement Board in May 1985, the Committee
played no direct role at all in program operations throughout
the study period.
From January through July, 1985, meetings were scheduled
about once every six weeks. Each meeting lasted 60-90
minutes. At the February meeting, I presented the results of
a study of workplace relations in Assessing and Police
Operations, which I had conducted in November. The next
scheduled meeting did not take place, as the administrator
members failed to attend. At the next few meetings, the
Committee discussed the idea of a program newsletter and TV
report on the program, as well as planning a program-wide
conference or picnic and lobbying U.S. Congress to continue to
fund the FMCS program. The July meeting was officially deemed
unnecessary and cancelled. After that, no further meetings of
the entire Committee were held until November 1985, due to a
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staff conflict and program moratorium.
Each meeting also included brief reports by the two
program facilitators on the status of Worksite Group
activities. Oversight Committee members would generally ask
for more details on specific issues, some administrators would
ask a few questions about worker morale in the groups, and the
meeting would move on to other topics.
On a few occasions, Roberts and the SEIU President raised
the question of whether the Oversight Committee should engage
in active problem-solving itself, on a Citywide level. The
issue of poor air circulation in City Hall, which had been
discussed by one Assessing worksite group, was bandied about
as a possible project, but then dropped. The problem of lack
of career ladders for workers was discussed and a career
ladder committee, separate from the QWL program, but including
Roberts, the SEIU President and the Labor Relations Director,
was constituted in the spring of 1985. The committee had
produced neither reports to the Citywide Oversight Committee
nor tangible products as of July 1986.
In the meantime, administrator attendance at Oversight
Committee meetings was spotty. The Director of Administrative
Services attended no meetings at all. The Budget Director and
Chief Policy Advisor seldom stayed for the entire meeting and
sometimes for as little as 10 minutes.
At the departmentwide and worksite group levels, there was
little cognizance of the Oversight Committee's existence, let
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alone knowledge of its activities. Oversight Committee
minutes were only distributed among Oversight Committee
members. At one point, an administrator expressed a desire to
visit a worksite group, but the visit reportedly never took
place. The idea of having the Mayor visit a worksite group
was also discussed, as a way of introducing the Mayor to QWL
and showing workers that they had his support. Tentative
plans for the visit were made, but never followed through. At
no point during the study period was the Mayor informed of the
program s existence, according to the Chief Policy Advisor and
Personnel Director. (3)
In the meantime, the program became bogged down in
Assessing and Police Operations. Some of the problems in
these two departments were directly caused by lack of
responsiveness by departments which provided services to
them. In Assessing, for instance, maintenance problems
festered or were resolved only temporarily by the Real
Property Department. The comprehensive employee job audit did
not take place until a year after the issue was first
identified and reported to the Personnel Department by
Assessing managers. Police Operations groups experienced
similar problems with their housekeeping initiatives. The 911
operator job upgrade initiative was shunted around from office
to office for several months (during 1986), its whereabouts
unknown to program participants. The unit's effort to get
headphones for operators fared similarly. Even within the
-261-
Police Department, coordination among units whose support was
necessary to complete worker initiatives was lacking. Some of
the department's new senior managers, however, claimed as late
as December 1985 to have received no communication from the
City administration about the program or the existence of the
Oversight Committee, from which they inferred that QWL was not
a priority.
In the Retirement Board, the first issue which workers
addressed when they began meeting in June 1985, was the
impending relocation of their office to another floor, which
was organized by the Real Property Department. Worker and
manager efforts to address their concerns about the move with
Real Property reportedly fell on deaf ears, however.
Other interdepartmental problems did not undermine QWL
initiatives directly, but disrupted workflow and work
relations and made the climate for QWL in Assessing and Police
Operations inhospitable. Workers and managers frequently
complained about the City's inefficient payroll procedures; it
reportedly took up to three months for some to get their first
paycheck and up to two months to be paid for overtime work.
Computers were poorly maintained and continually broke down in
the Assessing and Police Departments, or reached their
capacity limits in the middle of Assessing keypunch projects.
The Oversight Committee failed to consider or analyze
these interdepartmental issues, however. Nor did it attempt
to examine the work procedures, staffing plan or budgetary
-262-
level of the Real Property Department, to see whether it was
realistic to expect that Department to improve its performance
in the Assessing Department, to increase its budget or make
other arrangements for maintenance. The Oversight Committee
did not analyze the work of the Personnel Division. Had it
done so, it would have discovered that Personnel lacked
trained staff to conduct job audits in the Assessing
Department, contrary to the Assessing Commissioner's promises
to workers that the audits would soon begin.
Without leadership from the Oversight Committee, the QWL
problem-solving process became mired in the routine relations
and politics among departments. Responsiveness and
extra-ordinary cooperation do not characterize those
relations. As the Assessing Commissioner put it a few times:
'I can't do anything about Real Property.' Likewise, when
asked why it took over two months just to get an initial
response from the City Personnel Department to the Police
Operations job upgrade request, the Police Personnel Director
stated: 'I'm not going to push him. There's a lot of things I
need to get from the City. I have to maintain a relationship;
I can't jeopardize it just over one thing.' One 17-year
veteran middle manager summed up relations among departments
by saying: 'The expectation is, don't have expectations. 'You
say I said that? When did I say it? What do you have in
writing?'" (4)
In short, the Oversight Committee played no operational
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role in the QWL program. It did not coordinate the
problem-solving process among departments and did not
communicate any goals or incentives for the program to
department managers or workers. Hence it did not make QWL a
priority among department decision makers, or even effect
permanent changes in the practices of departments like Real
Property.
Ironically, while the program operational process was
floundering, the Oversight Committee focused, on the one hand,
on media exposure, conferences and national QWL program
funding and, on the other hand, on the micro-politics of
worksite groups. What accounts for this?
One explanation is that the program design was
inappropraite for the problems that workers wanted to solve.
Since initiatives were supposed to be neatly packaged by
Worksite Groups with middle management approval and then taken
to the departmentwide committees, receiving Oversight
Committee intervention only if they ran into snags, it took a
while before any snags became visible to the Committee. By
the time snags were apparent, workers were already frustrated
that nothing was being accomplished on their initiatives.
Yet even at this point, the Oversight Committee did not
actively intervene in, for example, the Assessing job
classification upgrade or Retirement Board re-location
issues. Moreover, it never attempted to think through
problem-solving processes during or before they took place at
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the Worksite Group level, by identifying major decision points
and anticipating necessary interventions. Why did the
Committee play such a passive, do-nothing role?
Administrators placed the bulk of the blame for the
program's problems on the staff. One stated in August 1985,
that the problem lay with the full-time facilitator, whose
reports to the Committee on worksite group activities were
devoid of details on the process and lacking in strategic
analysis, the administrator claimed.
Others blamed Roberts, the Executive Director of the
Oversight Committee, for failing to organize the work of the
Committee effectively and for wasting their time on
trivialities. 'There's no way I'm going to spend time in a
meeting talking about newsletters. If that's all it's going
to be, I'm not going to be there,' said one administrator. "I
was there out of guilt, not interest.' 'It pissed me off,'
said another, 'that the whole thing seemed geared to getting a
positive press release.' (5) Another said: 'I kept telling
[him] that I didn't have time to attend those meetings and
wanted to send a representative, but he was rigid about it, so
I just stopped coming.'
Asked why they had failed to voice any of these opinions
at Oversight Committee meetings, administrators responded that
they viewed QWL as 'Roberts' program.' He was 'the only one
who's studied all this stuff,' said one. 'I guess I just
believe in giving everyone their shot,' said another. 'For
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the first few months I just sat there,' said yet another. 'I
mean, what do I know; these people are all the experts.' (6)
These responses also indicate a low level of commitment on
the part of administrators to the program. Yet Roberts
clearly failed to organize what little commitment existed. As
one administrator stated: "It's the role of the program
director and staff to develop the issues and present them to
the Committee so we can make a decision.' (7) The outside
consultant to the program concurred: 'You don't use the time
of a Ctop administrator] for little issues... You call on him
once in a while for important things...' (8)
Roberts, however, perceived his actions differently. In
order to fully understand the leadership problem in the
program and the staff conflict which halted the entire program
for several months, an analysis of Roberts' position and
purposes is necessary.
BabQctI'Galsad-Qgii-Difficultiem
Roberts' goal was to transform the City service delivery
system to one characterized by worker self-management at the
bottom levels of departments and a more participatory
management style overall. The key component of that vision
was the QWL committees, particularly the Worksite Groups,
which, once instituted, would gradually bec'ome more cohesive
and take on more decision making responsibilities. This
ideological conception of QWL stood in stark contrast to the
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more instrumental purposes of workers and the union and to the
superficial and somewhat paternalistic conceptions of QWL by
administrators and senior department managers.
Roberts' primary operational objective was to get the
committees to meet; to make the participatory discussion
process happen. Assuming that the discussions were truly
participatory, which appropriate facilitation by the staff
would ensure, he believed participants would learn to be
cooperative and to use the committees to regulate the
workplace. (9)
As the program began, however, administrators failed to
attend training sessions and committee meetings and refused to
give Roberts their time to address operational issues.
Department managers failed to attend departmentwide committee
meetings. This convinced Roberts that management was "not very
committed to this thing.' (10) Yet he had no power to induce
management commitment to his concept of QWL, or to make them
attend meetings and discuss issues with workers. Indeed, as a
Deputy Director of Personnel for Human Resources, he had very
limited authority within the Personnel Division, much less
with other departments. Administrators expressed no concern
with his lack of power, since they thought of QWL as a service
to department heads, not a policy, but this was hardly
adequate for Roberts' ambitious purposes.
To inculcate his idea and practice of QWL in the City and
particularly with managers, Roberts eventually developed a
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strategy consisting of three components:
First, he badgered administrators and managers to attend
meetings and, in some cases, instructed them as to how they
should interact with workers in these meetings.
Second, he made, or attempted to make liberal use of the
media, as a way of convincing both participants and potential
participants, as well as parties whom he considered to be
influential in the service delivery process (eg., the City
Council), that QWL was a wonderful and successful innovation
which they should support. (11)
Third, he self-consciously and publicly cast himself in
the role of a manager, a member of the "management team," so
that he could approach managers and administrators as one of
their own, offering his consulting expertise and QWL, as tools
for developing a modern approach to human resources
management. As a Deputy Director of Personnel, of course, he
could hardly have presented himself as a worker and his formal
job description called for him to develop other human
resources initiatives in the City, such as a performance
appraisal program. Yet it is fair to say that Roberts
presented himself as a management partisan, someone who was
working foc management, to teach them participatory decision
making and to help them implement worker self-management in
the City. (12)
Roberts' strategy was partially successful. He was able
to induce Assessing managers to attend Departmentwide
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Committee meetings and to induce administrators to at least
make appearances at Oversight Committee meetings. He
convinced the head of the Retirement Board to join the program
in May 1985 and to have Roberts and the outside consultant
conduct a few training seminars for his middle managers. The
Assessing Commissioner asked Roberts to serve on his Human
Resources Committee. Roberts impressed almost everyone with
his zeal and commitment to the program and with his
self-proclaimed knowledge of QWL theory. (With the exception
of the SEIU President and outside consultant, no one claimed
to have any knowledge of QUL theory, beyond that conveyed by
Roberts).
Yet his strategy was ultimately unable to produce the
results he sought, or even to put the QWL program on a firm
footing. His perspectives and actions clashed with those of
other participants and precipitated several conflicts with the
staff and with the union.
First, Roberts' insistence upon administrator attendance
at Oversight Committee meetings and responsiveness to issues
he raised between meetings, alienated some and led them to
make only symbolic gestures of support. Even the union
President, who attended all meetings and devoted a great deal
of time to the program, stated in December 1985 that she had
no more desire to spend so much time hassling with Roberts
over various issues during the course of each week. His
apparent attempts to coach some department managers on how
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they should interact with workers in meetings alienated them,
they said and made them uncomfortable. (13)
Second, Roberts' focus on media led some administrators on
the Oversight Committee to believe that nothing important was
happening in the program and that Roberts was attempting to
"project before there is substance," as one put it. The
program facilitators, SEIU President and several
administrators and managers also believed that Roberts'
attempts to get media exposure for worksite groups were
disruptive to the work of the groups, as well as selfishly
motivated, as Roberts displayed his name prominently in
written PR for the program. (14)
Third, Roberts' focus at meetings on participatory
discussions, as well as his role as a management partisan, led
to what several administrators and managers considered to be
an 'obsession with process' to the detriment of concrete
problem-solving, as well as to what the consultant, union and
facilitators called an 'obsequiousness toward management.'
(15) For example, Roberts never presented the Oversight
Committee with an analysis of the decisions and actions that
various managers would have to take to bring lasting changes
in maintenance practices or job audits in the Assessing
Department, a job reclassification in Police Operations, or
discussion of the Retirement Board's concern about their
relocation. He told me later that he did not raise these
issues because he did not want to "embarrass management,' but
-270-
to my knowledge, he never conducted such an analysis, even for
his own private use. (16) Yet he privately applauded the
union President and facilitators when they expressed
exasperation at meetings that problems were festering because
of lack of responsiveness by managers.
By April 1985, senior managers in the Assessing Department
said they considered Roberts to be "utopian" and a
"goo-goo-ga-ga hippie from the 1960's," because of his
proposals to the Human Resources Committee to re-construct the
department based on principles of worker self-management. (17)
Senior managers in the Police Department considered Roberts'
offer to serve as their consultant on human resources issues
totally out of line and told him, as Roberts interpreted it,
to 'fuck off.' (18)
At the same time, Roberts' management partisanship in
Assessing and later in the Retirement Board, was a source of
great concern to the union President and QWL facilitators.
They opposed his reprimand of an Assessing worksite group
which had provoked conflict with a manager by circulating a
petition to clean the floors; they claimed that Roberts'
management status demoralized the group and undermined the
credibility of the facilitators.
They also opposed Roberts' membership on the Assessing
Commissioner's Human Resources Committee. Like the worker
representatives on the Assessing Departmentwide Committee, the
President and facilitators viewed this committee as
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contradictory to the puropse of QWL as they perceived it -- to
facilitate open discussion and cooperative decision making
between labor and management on issues identified by workers.
The Human Resources Committee dealt with the issues of primary
importance to workers -- career ladders, training and job
descriptions. Yet no workers were included on the committee
and management offered no reports on the committee's
progress. The fact that management was producing itz plan for
tbeic careers frustrated workers and upset the QWL
facilitators and union President. (19)
Unfortunately, Roberts' organizing difficulties were
equalled by a personal style which most program participants
and several other administrators and managers found
alienating. By the end of the study period, almost all
administrators, managers, and union officials I interviewed
offered negative remarks about his personal style and/or
technical competence. Moreover, of the six persons who worked
with him most frequently on the program, all stated that they
could not trust him to honestly report actions or statements
from one person to another.
Yet, despite Roberts' apparent inadequacies as a program
director, it is not Roberts' lack of leadership qualities per
se that undermined the program. Rather, it is the lack of
leadership exercised by the administration and lack of a clear
agenda and support for QWL that allowed Roberts to operate as
he did and for as long as he did in the program. This is
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further illustrated by the staff conflict that grew into a
major labor-management conflict in the program.
Given the manifold operational problems described in
Chapters 4 and 5 above, as well as the personality clashes
mentioned in this chapter, it should not be surprising that
the Boston Labor-Management Cooperation Program stumbled into
a life-threatening crisis only eight months after it had
begun.
The conflict centered around Roberts and the full-time
facilitator, who began to quarrel soon after the latter was
hired in November 1984. Roberts claimed that the facilitator
was incompetent and insubordinate. She claimed that he was
incompetent and autocratic. Their conflicts drained energy
from the staff and contributed to the tensions of program
committee meetings in the Assessing Department. In the Spring
of 1985, the outside consultant and SEIU President attempted
to resolve the difficulties. These attempts appeared to
improve relations somewhat, but on August 14, Roberts suddenly
informed the facilitator that he was relieving her of her
duties.
The union President and half-time facilitator were
outraged by Roberts' action and stated that it should have
been preceded by an open discussion of the full-time
facilitator's performance. Moreover, they stated that it was
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Roberts and not the full-time facilitator, who was the source
of problems in the program. Relations between Roberts and the
SEIU President had already become quite strained by this point
because of minor actions which upset the President, such as
Roberts' attempted surreptitious taping of meetings and
conversations for his own research and his perceived
management partisanship.
The union President called for a moratorium on program
meetings until a formal hearing could be held on the incident
at the next Oversight Committee meeting. Provisions for such
hearings had been made in November 1984 after a dispute
involving Roberts and the half-time facilitator. A hearing
was scheduled for the following week.
Roberts organized a meeting of the administration side of
the Oversight Committee for the morning prior to the scheduled
hearing. This meeting was attended, for the first time in
months, by the consultant and all administrators, including
the Director of Administrative Services, who had not attended
Oversight Committee meetings in a year. The focus of this
meeting was on damage control; how to mollify the union so the
program could continue. The prevailing view was that the
union had overstepped its bounds by questioning the right of a
manager to fire a non-union subordinate without progressive
discipline. Indeed, there was no attempt to discuss the
merits of the firing itself, the relationship between Roberts
and the facilitator or other aspects of the program which
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might have contributed to the conflict. The issue was
immediately cast as one of management rights versus union
demands.
The fact that the union had come to the defense of the
full-time facilitator was taken as evidence by some
administrators that the union had gained 'too much power' in
the program generally and had assumed 'control over [the
full-time facilitator].' (20) This charge had surface
validity, as the union side and, particularly the SEIU
President, had devoted considerable time to the program since
its inception, whereas administrators were at most
peripherally involved. Yet since the program itself had
little or no power, the charge that the union had gained 'too
much power' was specious. The charge showed, however, that
most administrators had little cognizance of the program's
purpose or problems and no desire to consider any merits of a
union's opposition to a manager's firing of a non-union
subordinate.
Despite the fact that a Labor-Management Oversight
Committee hearing had been scheduled for that afternoon, the
administrators cancelled it, stating that it would 'be a
shouting match...to roast Roberts.' Instead, two
administrators met with the union President and half-time
facilitator and worked out a compromise solution to the
crisis. The solution provided for the full-time facilitator
to be hired back under six months probation and for an effort
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to be made to work out the differences between her and
Roberts.
This solution was presented to a second meeting of the
administration side of the Oversight Committee in September,
which was also attended by Roberts and the consultant. It was
determined, however, that reinstatement of the facilitator was
unacceptable and that the Director of Administrative Services
would convey this to the union and attempt to work out
something else. (21)
In the meantime, no program committee meetings took
place. Each worksite group wrote a letter to the Oversight
Committee, denouncing Roberts' action and voicing support for
the full-time facilitator, whom they had come to trust and
respect. The representatives of the worksite groups wrote to
the Mayor at the end of August, asking for a speedy and fair
resolution of the crisis. Several workers and managers stated
both publicly and privately that they considered Roberts'
unilateral action to be a violation of the cooperative
principles of QWL.
Several more weeks went by, but the Administrative
Services Director failed to contact the union President.
Early in October, the President contacted the Director,
suggesting that the SEIU and administration initiate a general
discussion about the program's problems and leave open, for
the time being, the issue of the facilitator's firing.
Nothing came of the President's overture, however, so at the
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end of October, she threatened to withdraw from the program,
unless the Administrative Services Director contacted her
within a week. The Director then contacted her and
conversations began.
By the end of November, the SEIU president and
Administrative Service Director had reached an agreement which
provided that the full-time facilitator would take another job
in the City. Roberts would become co-director of the QWL
program, along with a person who was close to some top
administrators. The purpose of this arrangement, several
administrators said later, was to keep Roberts as their expert
on QWL, but to bring on someone to supervise the staff who
'has better people skills.' (22)
When asked why it had taken over three months to resolve
the crisis, both administrators and union officials said they
did not know. Union officials and one administrator surmised
that the union's threat to quit the program was perceived by
the Director of Administrative Services as potentially
embarrassing, before both the program's Federal sponsors and
the Boston public. The Director himself denied this,
however. He stated that he had purposely stalled: 'In view of
the emotionality of the issue, a cooling-off period was
appropriate.' (23) He claimed in December 1985 that the
program was viable, had been a success in the Assessing
Department and should continue, now that the personality
conflict between Roberts and the facilitator had been settled.
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Whatever his exact motives may have been, it seems clear
that the Administrative Services Director would not have acted
as soon as he did and perhaps not at all, had the union not
continued to press the issue. As his other actions with the
SEIU and AFSCME durino the study period indicated, the
Director did not believe in collaborative relations with
unions and he did not see the QWL program as a priority (see
Chapter 3). QWL was a nice idea and if it could improve
worker morale, that was great, but he was not about to spend
inordinate amounts of time focusing on it or even on the
crisis. The union's threat to leave the program seemed simply
to induce him to patch up the conflict as a way of getting it
out of the way. There was no discussion of the program's
problems (aside from the union's assertion that Roberts was a
problem) and the resolution did little to put the program on a
firmer footing for most of the following year.
The new program co-director had no background at all in
QWL. Nevertheless, she expressed a philosophical attraction
to improving human resources management in the City and
putting the program on track. She evinced a leadership style
which that was perceived by the staff and union as more direct
and honest than that of Roberts. (24) From December 1985 to
November 1986, however, she reportedly struggled with Roberts
over issues of control of the program and the program's
approach to department managers. Although her efforts and
those of the facilitators resulted, by September 1986, in
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Roberts' removal from co-directorship of the program, the
struggle itself indicated that the leadership void in the City
had not been filled.
Indeed, the program languished from December 1985 through
August of 1986. Oversight Committee meetings were often
cancelled or postponed and accomplished little or nothing
substantive. The Assessing Department officially quit the
program, with no resistance by top administrators or by the
union. Activity in Police Operations and the Retirement Board
(which had joined the program in May 1985) remained at a very
low level and workers were reportedly demoralized.
Yet a few events kept life in the program and gave hope to
program staff workers. First, when the Federal funding ran
out in March 1986, the Administrative Services Director agreed
to fund the program for the remainder of the fiscal year, as
well as pick up the estimated $125,000 yearly cost of staff
salaries for FY87. Second, a new Personnel Director joined
the administration in May 1986 and claimed to embrace the QWL
concept as a useful component of a modern human resources
management program. (25) Third, in September 1986, a QWL
conference was held for managers and workers throughout the
City,. Worksite groups were then constituted in the Payroll
Office of the Police Department and in the 30-person Rent
Equity Board. Plans were reportedly made to implement
worksite groups in the Inspectional Services Department as
well. Fourth, the SEIU leadership had come to view the
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program as an excellent vehicle for organizing departments and
developing stewards and worked hard to keep the program alive.
In short, by November 1986, the program had been
rejuvenated. Although the administration did not appear to
view QWL as a priority, it was obviously willing to support
QWL activity at the department level.
The next chapter will address the question of whether
these developments bode well for the eventual
institutionalization of QWL in Boston.
-280-
CHAPTER 6 - NOTES
1) Had there not been such a leadership void, it is hard to
imagine how Roberts, who a program observer and longtime
worker in the Personnel Division called 'the most hated person
in City Hall' (November 1985), could have been retained for
long as the director of a program designed to improve
communications.
2) City of Boston Labor-Management Cooperation Program: A
Grant Submitted to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service by the City of Boston,' May 1984.
3) Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor, January 1986; Director of
Personnel Division, May 1985.
4) Assessing Department Commissioner, April 1985; Police
Department Director of Personnel, December 1985; Assessing
Department management assistant, November 1984, respectively.
5) Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor, January 1986; Budget
Director, January 1986; Assessing Department Commissioner,
December 1985.
6) Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor; Assistant to Chief Policy
Advisor; Personnel Division Director, December 1985 and
January 1986.
7) Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor, January 1986.
8) LMCP Training and Process Consultant, January 1986.
9) Roberts, LMCP Director, November 1984 and January 1986;
also informal interviews, April 1984 through March 1986;
Roberts memos and notes, January - April 1985.
10) Roberts, LMCP Director, November 1984 and February 1985.
11) This approach was explained and advocated by Roberts on
several occasions between April 1984 and April 1986,
especially in 'Searching for Public Sector Excellence,' a
paper written by Roberts in May 1984, describing his
organizing efforts from April 1983 through May 1984 and during
bi-weekly meetings of the Learning Action Group (staff plus
researcher, consultant, SEIU President, administrator) during
the early Spring of 1985, as well as at Citywide Oversight
Committee meetings. Specific publicity efforts include an
editorial in Ibe_BQotQn_QlQbe, January 1984 and an editorial
written by Robert Kuttner in June 1986; 'Turning Japanese," an
article in Ib -QsQnLdgec, February 1985; Roberts'
participation in a debate over QWL at the University of
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CHAPTER 6 - NOTES, Continued
Massachusetts, Spring 1985 and invitations to managers from
non-participating departments to observe the Worksite Groups
during February and March, 1985.
12) Roberts presented himself most adamantly and publicly from
November 1984 to August 1985. Specific instances include a
formal.interview in November 1984; public statements at a the
two-day orientation and training session for participants in
January 1985; statements at Learning Action Group meetings
(see note 11, above) in February 1984 and at the Assessing
Departmentwide Committee meetings in April 1984; statements
related to the contract negotiations between SEIU Local #285
and the City in late March 1985; statements at the Assessing
Department training sessions at the Kennedy School of
Government in June 1985; statements to members of Worksite
Groups in justification of his firing of the full-time
facilitator in August 1985.
13) Police Department senior manager, July 1985; Assessing
senior managers, December 1985; Administrators on the Citywide
Labor-Management Oversight Committee, December 1985 and
January 1986.
14) Program facilitators, February - May 1985; SEIU President,
November 1984 and May 1985; Assessing senior managers,
December 1985; Administrators on the Labor-Management
Oversight Committee, December 1985 and January 1986. (See note
11 above).
15) Administrators on the Labor-Management Oversight
Committee, President of SEIU Local 285, Assessing senior
managers, Training and Process Consultant: December 1985 and
January 1986.
16) Roberts, Program Director, January 1986.
17) Assessing Department senior managers, December 1985.
18) Roberts, May 1985 and Police Department senior manager,
July 1985.
19) Roberts advised the workers to be patient and wait for
management to complete its plan and in the meantime work on
their own ideas, but without a framework which only management
had the information to provide, workers could not work on
their own.
20) Administrators on the Labor-Management Oversight
Committee, August 1985.
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CHAPTER 6 - NOTES, Continued
21) Throughout this protracted conflict, the outside Training
and Process Consultant did not play a neutral or mediator
role, as one might expect of a third - party consultant in a
labor-management cooperation program, but supported Roberts'
actions. Indeed, throughout the entire study period, the
consultant limited his contact mostly to Roberts even when he
was on site, and relied almost entirely upon Roberts for his
source of information about the program. This behavior can be
explained, in part at least, by the fact that no administrator
took responsibility for the program, so the consultant's only
contact on the administration side was Roberts. Roberts also
provided the consultant with detailed, written notes of his
conversations with administrators, union representatives and
staff, which the consultant took to be accurate. (In January
1986, the consultant stated that this had been a mistake on
his part). The result of this consulting practice, however,
was that when the staff conflict developed into a program
crisis, there was no one associated with the program who was
regarded as a legitimate mediator by both the union and
administration.
22) Director of the Personnel Division and other
administrators on the Labor-Management Oversight Committee,
December 1985.
23) Director of Administrative Services, December 1985.
24) Program co-director, December 1985; SEIU officials,
December 1985.
25) Director of Personnel Division, June 1986; SEIU officials,
May and June 1986.
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CHAPTER 7
PROSPECTS FOR INSTITUTIONALIZATION
This chapter discusses the prospects for Boston's QWL
program to become a permanent feature of workplace governance
systems in the City. The discussion is divided into two
sections. The first section describes and analyzes the
actions and perceptions of the SEIU and Flynn administration
which led to a continuation of their official commitment to
the QWL program beyond the initial pilot phase, which ended in
March 1986.
The second section draws upon the analyses of
organizational tasks, political structure and routine
relations in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, as a basis for
speculation about the probable long-term status of QWL in the
City. The finding is that because the Mayor's primary tasks
are not to provide high-quality, basic services, but to
satisfy other constituent demands, sustained support from the
Mayor is unlikely. Hence the institutionalization of QWL as a
permanent workplace governance structure is also unlikely.
Yet, persistence by the SEIU, as well as episodes of reformism
by individual managers and administrators, may lead to
recurrent cycles of QWL initiation, implementation, minor
accomplishments and then crisis or decline.
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MinnacQfL a ntCfitment-iabe-Sbct:
Kochan and Dyer (1976) argue that several conditions are
necessary for labor and management to maintain commitment to
cooperative change efforts beyond the initial implementation
phase: The more each party regards its initial goals as having
been achieved and likely to be achieved in the future, the
more likely it is that it will maintain its commitment.
Continued commitment is also more likely when each party's
initial goals have not been displaced by higher priority
goals, when the initial stimulus for the effort remains and
when the benefits of the effort to date are seen as being
equitably distributed. (pp. 69-70)
(A) The Union View
Despite the poor performance of the QWL program during its
first two years of operation, the SEIU leadership was able to
make progress toward its goal of identifying and developing
union stewards and of generally improving its connections with
the rank and file in City Hall departments and in the Police
Department. The program's poor performance may have even
helped the union in this regard, since the program first
raised worker expectations and then disappointed them (as
described in Chapters 4, 5 and 6). As the SEIU President
stated in December 1985: 'We're getting a lot more calls now
from [workers in Police OperationsJ. People are more willing
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to call this office and complain." (1) In short, the union
leadership perceived that the program was strengthening the
union, possibly at the expense of the administration's hold on
worker loyalties; hence the union's primary goal was being
achieved in the program.
The union also achieved some concrete improvements in
working conditions through the program. Assessing workers
eventually received job audits and a few health and safety
improvements. During the Summer of 1986, the long-delayed
civilian 911 operator position classification upgrade went
into effect and training of 911 operators reportedly was
begun.
Finally, the SEIU President stated in December 1985 that
the program had helped the union establish more contact with
top administrators than they had enjoyed under the previous
administration. (2)
The only negative aspects of the program were the time it
took from the President's other activities, the anger of a few
911 operators who disagreed with the union's handling of the
four-day workweek issue and, as of December 1985, the
frustration of the SEIU City Hall Representative that issues
which she deemed priorities were being sidetracked to handle
program issues. (3) Despite their frustration with
management, the SEIU leadership decided that they were better
off with the program than without it. They expressed the view
that they might be able to achieve even more gains if the
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program were implemented in departments where the union was
stronger, such as in the Hospital. (4) This signified a
change from the leadership's earlier refusal to implement QWL
in the Hospital, for fear that it might undermine the union.
(B) The Administration View
The administration expressed no clear agenda, goals or
expectations for the QUL program at the outset, aside from
improving worker morale and making workers feel they were part
of 'the team;' that they had a 'stake in what is going on
here,' as the Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor expressed it. (5)
Indeed, the Mayor was not personally involved in any way with
the program, which indicated that QWL and the performance of
basic service agencies generally, were not high priorities in
the administration.
Administrators' assessments of the program after its first
year of operations were also vague and ambiguous. Although
some administrators, such as the Labor Relations Director, the
Personnel Director and the assistant to the Mayor's Chief
Policy Advisor, expressed the view that the program was not
doing very well at all at that time, others stated that they
perceived it as successful. The Administrative Services
Director, for example, stated that the Assessing Commissioner
informed him that QWL had worked very well in that department.
Within the same two-week period, however, the Assessing
Commissioner and other senior managers informed me that they
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thought the program had not done well in their department. (6)
The administration's willingness to let the program
languish from December 1985 through August 1986 certainly
indicates the program's low status. Yet, in the Spring of
1986, Roberts and the new program co-director claimed that the
administration had acknowledged internally that the program
was not performing well and was taking steps to rejuvenate
it. (7) In interviews conducted in June and August 1986, the
City's new Personnel Director stated that the program had not
performed well to date, but that he viewed it as an important
component of a modern human resources management approach to
personnel administration and would do everything he could to
put the program on a firm footing. (8)
It seems then, that key administration decision makers
continued to view QWL as a desirable tool for improving worker
morale, but not as a priority of any sort. The program's
$125,000 annual price tag was apparently seen as small,
compared to the City's $1 billion annual budget.
Both the Administration and SEIU leadership therefore
maintained their commitment to the LMC program through the end
of the 18-month Federal funding period and into a first year
of operations funded solely by the City (through June 1987).
As of September 1986, both sides expressed optimism that the
program would soon begin to thrive. (9) A successful Citywide
QWL conference in September 1986 and the constitution of
Worksite Groups in the Police Payroll Office and Rent Equity
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Board lent credence to these optimistic statements.
Over the longer term, QWL success and permanency depends
upon more than just competent program administration and
smooth operations; it requires a hospitable organizational
context. A hospitable context is one in which frequent
adjustments or improvements in work processes is required to
fulfill organizational tasks to the satisfaction of the
relevant task environment. A hospitable context is also
characterized by political structures in which the
labor-management balance of power is sufficiently equal that
cooperative methods are necessary to accomplish organizational
objectives.
In the Boston organizational context, neither of these
requirements are met. The Mayor's primary tasks -- as
dictated by constituent demands -- are to provide economic
development projects and innovations which foster image
building and neighborhood links. Less important is the smooth
functioning of basic service departments and responsiveness to
them by internal service departments, except when press
reports or public policy changes necessitate sweeping reforms
(as happened in the Assessing Department after a 1979 court
order).
The task/electoral environment in Boston also induces
mayors to maintain viable campaign organizations, the primary
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basis for which is the awarding of patronage appointments.
Patronage appointments demoralize the career civil servants
who attempt to further their careers without doing political
work; they come to believe that the system as a whole is not
fair and not technically rational, as hard work and skill are
not the most valued qualities in an employee. This undermines
service quality.
Workers -- particularly the miscellaneous employees who
were the targets of the Boston QWL program and the subjects of
this study -- have little power to do anything about the
perceived lack of fairness and technical rationality of their
departments. They lack the right to strike and, more
importantly, the unions which represent them have little or no
clout with the administration or regulatory institutions. Nor
do these unions collaborate to increase their strength
vis-a-viz the administration.
Many workers and middle managers make their peace with
these conditions. Lack of perceived alternatives, but also
the satisfaction of helping people, personal friendships and
for many, employment security, induce them to carve out a
niche for themselves and settle in.
This is not a hospitable context for QWL; hence it is not
surprising that QWL did not do well during its first two years
in this city. No forces within the context generated a need
for QWL, and particularly not for initiatives from workers
performing routinized and increasingly automated tasks.
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Nevertheless, it appears likely that the current QWL
effort will continue to function for some time and that
similar innovations and reforms will be attempted in the
future, for two reasons:
First, QWL appears to be a vehicle through which weak and
fragmented unions, such as the SEIU, can use administration
resources to organize their memberships. The administration
appears willing to tolerate such activity, so long as its
scope and focus is limited to individual departments. Any
assertion of power by the union as a whole, or the suggestion
that the administration cooperate with unions on Citywide
initiatives, however, is clearly not acceptable to the
administration, as indicated by the events described in this
narrative (especially the administration's conception of QWL
and handling of the program staff conflict). (10)
Second, QWL appears, on the surface at least, to be
compatible with various management goals and beliefs.
Managers who want to develop their reputations by reforming
City government and then 'move on to new challenges' in the
public or private sector, see QWL as part of 'modern human
resources management,' as they believe it is practiced in the
private sector and believe it will help them induce workers to
do what they want them to do. (11) Some see QWL as a
manifestation of, or vehicle for the pursuit of their
political ideologies.
Third, the top-down decision making patterns, politically-
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motivated personnel management practices and perceptions of
poor working conditions create, it seems, a sufficient amount
of dissatisfaction among workers, that volunteers will be
available for change programs.
Taken together, these three factors create the illusion of
a shared agenda that can be accomplished through QWL. Yet, as
this case study has attempted to illustrate, the agendas are
fundamentally disparate. As this becomes evident, QWL
processes are undermined.
The ideology of QWL espoused by many practitioner-
theorists (for example, Argyris 1978, 1981; Ronchi and Morgan
1983), is that a QWL committee should and can serve as the
forum in which conflicting interests and agendas are exposed
and reconciled. Yet the many fractious and unproductive
committee meetings which took place in the Boston program
illustrate how utopian this conception of QWL is. Given the
nature and extent of labor-management mistrust in the
departments which participated in this program, daily meetings
and highly skilled facilitators would be required to surface
and resolve the conflicts. Yet daily meetings would hardly
suit the needs or desires of managers (or most workers,
perhaps). Indeed, many middle and senior managers in the
Assessing Department, the Police Department and the Retirement
Board* complained that the Labor-Management Cooperation
*The Retirement Board joined the program in June 1985.
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Program took too much time as it was. As Simon (1957) pointed
out long ago, people are often willing to do with less than
what they perceive as ideal; they 'satisfice.'
More fundamentally, it seems clear that managers in these
departments are not interested in changing lbaic mode of
communication with workers. Managers perceive QWL as a human
relations program for workers; not as a vehicle for
introducting egalitarian worker-manager relations. In the
absence of task environments that make worker-manager
collaboration necessary for organizational survival or strong
unions that can induce managers to be responsive and
participatory, grassroots-based QWL committees are unlikely to
become permanent features of the employment relationship.
It therefore seems safe to conclude that the Boston
municipal context is not conducive to the institutionalization
of QWL as a 2ecmaneaj feature of the workplace governance
system. This context does, however, appear to be a somewhat
hospitable setting for the initiation of QWL and similar
innovations. Hence one might reasonably predict that QWL and
other 'modern human resource management' techniques (such as
performance appraisal systems, flex-time arrangements and at
least pro-forma career ladders) will go through more than one
peak and peter-out cycle in the City. Dissatisfactions and
tensions caused by the lack of responsiveness of the state
civil service system and internal City service departments,
will prompt reformist managers, activist workers and union
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leaders to initiate reforms. These reform attempts will score
modest achievements before being overwhelmed or limited by the
existing context.
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CHAPTER 7 - NOTES
1) President, SEIU Local #285, December 1985.
2) ibid.
3) SEIU Local #285 staffworker, December 1985
4) President and steward, SEIU Local #285, July-August 1985
and December 1985.
5) Mayor's Chief Policy Advisor, November 1984.
6) Director of Administrative Services Department and
Assessing Department senior managers, December 1985.
7) Roberts and LMC Program Co-Director, July and August 1986,
as reported to me by a colleague.
8) Director of Personnel Division, August 1986, as reported to
me by a colleague.
9) Roberts and Co-Director of the LMC Program, Director of
Personnel Division, SEIU Local #285 President and steward,
July - August 1986, as reported by a colleague.
10) It is possible, perhaps, that a QWL program that is
successful in the short- to medium-term may change the
organizational context in ways that make it more conducive to
the long-term viability of QWL. If the SEIU is able to use
QWL as an effective tool for shopfloor organizing, as it did
to some extent in the Police Operations Unit and Assessing
Department, it may be able to modify one feature which makes
the Boston municipal context unconducive to QWL; namely, the
lack of power of miscellaneous workers. As the preceding
discussions showed, lack of strong shopfloor organization
contributes to the relative powerlessness of miscellaneous
employees. If the SEIU is able to develop strong shopfloor
organizations in City departments, it is reasonable to expect
worker-manager relations there to become more systematic, less
capricious and possibly more cooperative.
Yet, as of Fall 1986, it was far too soon to tell if
increased union presence on the shopfloor through QWL Worksite
Groups would lead to permanently stronger shopfloor
organizations. Over the longer term, factors such as the
increasingly routine nature of many clerical jobs may have a
dampening effect on shopfloor organization. Indeed, by April
1986, some of the increased union activity in Police
Operations and Assessing reported several months earlier, had
already died down somewhat. The new or recently activated
shop stewards had reportedly settled into somewhat less active
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CHAPTER 7 - NOTES, Continued
representational roles, and polarization between activists and
non-activists -- which was evident in Police Operations
throughout the program -- had resurfaced.
Moreover, even if union shopfloor power were to eventually
incr-ease as a result of QWL, it is unlikely that the
administration would willingly work with such a large and
cohesive worker organization in a QWL program. As this essay
has sought to make clear, the administration has not perceived
QWL as yiQQ- management cooperation at all and has
demonstrated that it will resist attempts by the union to
interfere in what it considers to be its rightful powers,
11) Between November 1984 and January 1986, several managers
told me they were motivated by these goals, including Roberts
and the LMC Program Co-Director, two administrators on the
Citywide Labor-Management Oversight Committee, one senior
manager and one middle manager in the Police Department, two
senior managers in the Assessing Department, two middle
managers in the Retirement Board and a senior manager in
another department that did not participate in the LMC
Program.
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CHAPTER 8
QWL IN OTHER MUNICIPALITIES
lItcQduction
The foregoing account showed that the Boston municipal
context was a somewhat hospitable setting for the introduction
of QWL, but not for the implementation or institutionalization
of QWL as a permanent feature of the workplace governance
system. More specifically, the primary stimulus for QWL in
Boston came from an outside advocate who secured Federal
funding for the effort, not from any conscious search on the
part of labor or management.
Once initiated, QUL was all but ignored by the
administration, since the nature of the latter's primary tasks
and task environment precluded serious attention to
labor-management issues or even a focus on providing
high-quality basic services. Yet, the union came to see QWL
as a suitable vehicle for its organizing agenda. Its strong
support for QWL helped to sustain the effort, in spite of
neglect by the administration.
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the Boston
experience with that of other cities, as a way of judging
whether the municipal context is generally a somewhat
favorable setting for initiation but not for smooth
implementation or institutionalization, or whether Boston is
an unusual case.
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To answer- such a question completely would require a
replication of the Boston research for each city to be
compared. That task is beyond the scope of this paper. It is
possible, however, to compare program operations and
contextual features with those other cities, insofar as the
latter are reported in the survey and case study literatures.
On this basis, inferences can be drawn about the conduciveness
of municipal contexts generally for QWL.
Available data allow for two levels of analysis. The
first level of analysis uses survey and case study literature
to present a cursory description of all local government QWL
efforts, as of 1983 (but also including Boston'). This
includes an analysis of local QWL programs by jurisdiction
population and employment, extent of unionization (as a proxy
for worker power), nature of initial stimulus (insider versus
outsider and ideological versus pragmatic*), source of funds,
program structure, and types of accomplishments.
The second level of analysis consists of brief case
histories of four of the most well-known and longlasting
municipal QWL programs: San Francisco, Pima County, New York
City, and Columbus. Each case study includes a brief analysis
of worker power in the political structure, the nature of the
* A pragmatic stimulus would conform to Kochan and Dyer's
(1976) notion of a 'felt hurt' that induces labor and
management to search for a solution like QWL. An example of
an ideological stimulus is Boston's program, where an
outsider and administrators thought QWL was a nice idea, but
not a necessity.
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QWL program stimulus, the program structure and program
operational dynamics.
Several important conclusions emerge from the data: QWL
efforts of one sort or another have been initiated in over 500
municipalities. Yet over 90 percent of thse municipalities
have populations of less than 100,000. Most programs are
modest in scope and size, consisting of one or two committees
involving only a handful of persons directly. Many QWL
programs begin with the help of outside funding and through
the prodding of an external advocate.
The primary focal points of QWL activity are issues of
worker satisfaction, especially worker's status in the
bureaucracy. The secondary focus is on adjustments in work
procedures and work rules. Issues of organizational policy,
deployment of resources, determiniation of pay, or service
delivery procedures, do not appear to be focal points of QWL
activity.
The case study data show that big-city programs tend to
suffer from administration neglect and management resistance,
but that strong union support enables most programs to
survive, at a low to moderate level. of activity, for several
years, at least. In short, many features of Boston's QWL
program are present in other municipal QUL programs.
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In 1984, the International City Management Association
conducted a survey of 2,603 cities and towns throughout the
United States. Of the 1,265 cities which responded to the
survey, 539* reported using some type of job enrichment
program as an employee incentive, including labor-management
committees (in 290 cities), quality circles (in 98 cities),
problem-solving task forces (in 192 cities), job redesign (in
128 cities), and job rotation (in 118 cities). Over 90
percent of these cities had populations of less than 100,000,
however; indicating that QWL has not spread to or done well in
large, urban bureaucracies. (International City Management
Assocation, 1985)
Unfortunately, the International City Management
Association survey report provides no data on the size,
particiatpion rates, accomplishments, or any other feature of
the municipal QWL programs. Hence the remainder of the
discussion will rely upon data supplied by the following
sources:
*This is many more than the 'fewer than ten actively involved
with QWL,' acknowledged by Olsen in 1985 and quoted in the
introduction to this thesis. The discrepancy can be explained
by Olsen's 'actiely involved with' qualifier and by the fact
that most local level programs consist of only one department
committee or labor-management committee (see Department of
Labor survey, below). A Department of Labor official also
stated in September 1986 that, although he believed that many
QWL programs had been initiated since the 1983 survey, 'many
of these are probably just one committee, without much commit-
ment" to substantial cooperation by labor or management. (1)
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* ecucce-Guid~e-tfLabecManagrnemt-GeOOecatiol, a surve
of 36 local programs by the U.S. Department of Labor, October
1983. (2)
* joacevingGeon tiExercimentsWith_Qalitzof_
W-, a col lection of case studies edited by
Neal Q. Herrick, 1983. (3)
* Improving Productivity and the Quality of Working Life
in the Public Sector: Pioneering Initiatives in
Labor-Management Cooperation," a collection of case studies
edited by Eric Trist, et al., 1980. (4)
Table 8.1 lists all local government QWL cases reported i
the three sources. The table shows 46 programs, eight of
which were terminated prior to 1933.
(A) Background and Program Structure
Fifty-four percent of all programs are located in the top
ten union states, ranked by percentage of unionized,
non-agricultural workers: New York, Michigan, Washington,
Ohio, Illinois. (Wallihan, 1985, pp. 49-50) Using the same
ranking, only eleven percent of all programs are located in
the bottom 25 states. This helps to confirm a statement made
by an AFL-CIO official in September 1986, in regard to QWL in
the public sector: 'The South and the Southwest are a
wasteland, except for Florida,' as unions are relatively weak
in those states. (5) These statistics also lend support to
the view that formal worker representation and a certain
y
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TABLE 8.1
GENERAL FEATURES OF MUNICIPAL OWL PROGRAMS
YEARS OF 1 IDEOLOGICAL
NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING OPERATION EXTERNAL EXTERNAL OR PRAGMATIC
LOCATION POPULATION EMPLOYEES DEPARTMENTS KNOWN STRUCTURE FUNDING ADVOCATE STIMULUS
ARIZONA
(Union Rank = 39)(1)
Pima County
CALFORNIA
(Union Rank = 15)
Berkeley
Los Angeles
San Francisco
San Francisco
Transit Authority
HAWAII
(Union Rank = 13)
Honolulu
ILLINOIS
(Union Rank = 8)
Dixon Schools
Urbana +
567,862 (2)
103,479
3,022,247
691,637
781,899
59,011 (4)
5,253
1,260
42,393
24,007
2,500 (3)
8,966
380
1,396
General
Public Works;
Hospital
Public Works
Clerical, Blue
Collar, Hospital
Transit Workers
Public Works
Parks & Rec.,
Police
Schools
77-85
80-85
81-83
78-85
82-83
81-83
80-83
76-79
Labor-Mgt.
Committee
& Task
Forces
3-TIER
Department
Committee
3-TIER
3-TIER
Labor-Mgt.
Committee
Department
Comm i ttee
Department
Committee
PN/IPA
FMCS
UI(3)
UI/PN
PN
NSDM
NSDM
UI
UI/PN
(Page 2)TABLE 8.1 (CONTINUED)
GENERAL FEATURES OF MUNICIPAL QWL PROGRAMS
YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL
LMOBER OF PARTICIPATING OPERATION EXTERNAL EXTERNAL OR PRAGMATIC
LOCATION POPULATION EMPLOYEES I DEPARTMENTS I KNOWN ISTRUCTURE FUNDING IADVOCATE STIMULUS
IOWA
(Union Rank = 26)
Jasper Hospitat
KANSAS
(Union Rank = 42)
Wichita
Wichita Schools
MARYLAND
(Union Rank = 25)
Cumberland
MASSACHUSETTS
(ynion Rank = 20)
Artlington +
Boston
Cambridge +
Danvers +
Haverhitl +
Methuen +
Newton +
<50,000
288,723
288,723 (3)
<50,000
<50,000
560,847
93,841
<50,000
<50,000
<50,000
82,791
102
2,993
Hospital,
5,500 (3) Schools
310
NA
14,069
2,590
NA
NA
NA
1,716
Pubt ic Works:
Fire; Other
Ctericat Workers
79-83
76-83
77-83
76-83
74-76(3)
84-86
74-76(3)
None
NA
75-76(3)
74-76(3)
Department
Committee
Labor-Mgt.
Committee
Department
Committee
Department
Conittee
3-TIER
3-TIER
3-TIER
Labor-Mgt.
Commi ttee
Labor-Mgt.
Committee
3-TIER
3-TIER
FMCS
PM
PN
IPA
FMCS
IPA
IPA
IPA
IPA
IPA
FMCS(3)
PN
PN
Brower
Roberts
Brower
Brower
Brower
Brower
Brower
TABLE 8.1 (CONTINUED)
GENERAL FEATURES OF MUNICIPAL OWL PROGRAMS
(Page 3)
YEARS OF Ir1IDEOLOGICALNUMBER OF PARTICIPATING OPERATION EXTERNAL EXTERNAL 1 OR PRAGMATICLOCATION PO AI ON EMPLOYEES DEPARTMENTS KNOWN STRUCTURE FUNDING ADVOCATE STIMULUS
MICHIGAN
(Union Rank = 2)
Avon
Flint Transit
Authority
Garden City
Grand Blanc
Schools
Lansing Police
Lansing Schools
Pontiac
Southfield
Troy
NEW JERSEY
(Union Rank = 18)
Trenton
<50,000
154,019
<50,000
<50,000
128,338
128,338
73,156
73,311
67,031
91,381
110
140
135 (3)
580
317
3,200
2,892
750
489
1,749
Transit
School
Police
School
Police
Firefighters
Clerical &
Blue Collar
80-83
80-83
81-83
80-83
82-83
81-83
81-83
81-83
77-83
81-83
Labor-Mgt.
Commit tee
Department
Committee
Department
Committee
Department
Comittee
& Quality
Circle
Department
Commi ttee
Department
Commi ttee
& Quality
Circle
LMC and
Quality
Circle
Department
Committee
LMC and
Task Forces
FMCS
PH
FMCS
Yes(3)
FMCS
PN
TABLE 8.1 (CONTINUED)
GENERAL FEATURES OF MUNICIPAL OWL PROGRAMS
YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL
NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING OPERATION EXTERNAL EXTERNAL OR PRAGMATIC
LOCATION POPULATION EMPLOYEES I DEPART1MENTS I KNOWN I STRUCTURE I FUNDING ADVOCATE IST IMULUS
NEW YORK
(Union Rank
Jamestown
= 1)
Jamestown
SchooLs
Onondaga
Hospitat
New York Bronx
Hospitat
New York Etmhurst
Hospitat
New York City
New York City
Transit
Authority
<50,000
<50,000
459,440
7,086,096
580
900
3,000
285,644
48,000
Public Works;
Hospitats
Schools
Hospitat
Hospitat
Hospitat
ClericaL;
Btue Cotlar
Transit
75-83
77-83
73-83
76-79
78-83
78-86
74-83
Department
Committee
Department
Committee &
Task Forces
Department
Committee
LMC and
Department
Commi ttee
Department
Committee &
Task Forces
LMC;
Department
Committee &
Task Forces
Department
Committee
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GENERAL FEATURES OF MUNICIPAL QWL PROGRAMS
YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL
NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING OPERATION EXTERNAL EXTERNAL OR PRAGMATIC
LOCATION POPULATION EMPLOYEES DEPARTMENTS KNOWN STRUCTURE FUNDING ADVOCATE STIMULUS
OHIO
(Union Rank = 7)
Cinci Highway
Maintenance
Columbus
Lakewood Public
Works Department
Springfield +
RHODE ISLAND
(nion Rank = 12)
Warwick
TENNESSEE
(Union Rank = 29)
Shelby County
380,118
570,588
61,453
71,344
86,832
784,116
500
6,593
184
673
1,024
6,824
Blue Collar
Blue Collar
Public Works
Public Works
Hospital
75-83
76-83
79-83
74-79
81-83
80-83
Department
Committee
3-TIER;
Task Forces
Labor-Mgt.
Commi ttee
& Quality
Circle
Labor-Mgt.
Comni ttee
& Department
Conittee
Labor-Mgt.
Committee
Department
Committee
PN/OSU
FMCS(3)
IPA
OSU
FMCS
OSU/IPA
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GENERAL FEATURES OF MUNICIPAL QWL PROGRAMS
YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL
NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING OPERATION EXTERNAL EXTERNAL OR PRAGMATIC
LOCATION POPULATION EMPLOYEES DEPARTMENTS KNOWN STRUCTURE FUNDING ADVOCATE STIMULUS
TEXAS
(Union Rank = 48)
Via Metropolitan
Transit Authority 819,021 * 950 Transit 81-83 Department
Committee
WASHINGTON
(Union Rank = 4)
Everett 56,586 761 Transit; Public 82-83 Department P
Works Committee
Seattle Transit
Authority 490,077 3,300 Transit 75-83 Department
Committee
Tacoma 161,351 2,936 77-83 Labor-Mgt. PN PN I
Committee
S4urces:
U.S. Department of Labor: Resource Guide to Labor-Management Cooperation, October, 1983;
Herrick, N.., ed.: Improving Government: Experiments With Quality of Working Life Systems, Praeger, 1983;
Trist, E., et. al.: Improving Productivity and the Quality of Working Life in the Public Sector;
"Pioneering Initiatives in Labor-Management Cooperation," The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1980;
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: County Government Employment in 1984 and City Employment in 1984, Governent in 1984, Government
Employment Series, August, 1985.
GENERAL FEATURES OF MUNICIPAL OWL PROGRAMS
Key to Abbreviations:
Structure: 3-Tier = Program with citywide Labor-Management Committee; Mid-Level Committee(s), usually at the department or agency level;
Bottom-Level Committees, usually Shopfloor Worksite Groups.
LMC = Labor-Management Committee (at citywide or jurisdiction-wide level)
External Funding = Funding obtained from external sources to start or rejuvenate program. PN = Project Network (Federal funding);
IPA = Intergovernmental Personnel Act (Federal); FMCS = Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (U.S. Department of Labor); UI = University of
Illinois (consulting services); OSU = Ohio State University (consulting/facilitation services)
External Advocate = Program was started or rejuvenated largely through the efforts of an (ideologically motivated) advocate from outside the
organization. NSDM = New School for Democratic Management, California; PN = Project Network; U! = University of Illinois; FMCS = Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service; Brower = Michael Brower, of Northeast Labor-Management Center, reported in Herrick, ed., 1983; Roberts = Roberts
(pseudonym, organizer and initial director of Boston Labor-Management Cooperation program); OSU = Ohio State University
Ideological or Pragmatic Stimulus = Program was started for primarily ideological reasons; or pragmatic, functional reasons.
NOTES:
L~J
(1) Wallihan, J: Union Government and Organization, The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1985, pp. 49 - 50. Rankings are
according to number of union members in the state as a percentage of non-agricultural workers in 1980.
(2) Population of the jurisdiction as of 1980, from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: City Employment in 1984 and County
Government in 1984, August, 1985. Figures in the Table do not include school system employees, unless the QWL program is housed in the school
system.
(3) Indicates best estimates.
(4) Population for Champaign, which is assuned to include Urbana.
Key to Symbols:
+ = Program ceased to function sometime prior to 1983.
* = Population for San Antonio, which is assumed to include Via Metropolitan Transit.
< = "less than"
TABLE 8.1 (CONTINUED) (Page 7)
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degree of worker power- vis-a-viz management is a prerequisite
to labor-management cooperation or stable OWL programs.
The size of most local governments in this list is rather
small. The median population size is 86,832 and the median
jurisdiction employment size is 950. Only eight major cities
had initiated programs as of 1983 and many of these were
modest in scope or size. The absence of large cities in the
list, especially those in strong union states, such as
Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Buffalo and Cleveland
indicates that there has been little or no 'felt hurt' or
stimulus to induce labor and management leaders in most large
cities to initiate joint searches for mechanisms such as QWL.
Fifty-two percent of all programs in Table 8.1 consist of
only a department committee or a jurisdiction-wide
labor-management committee. Based upon the program
participation rates of employees in Boston, Pima County,
Columbus and New York City, one can therefore assume that in
the majority of jurisdictions, at most 100 persons participate
directly in the program. (6) Hence, one can infer that public
sector QWL generally does not entail, for the most part,
substantial direct worker participation or organizational
restructuring.
The Boston program deviates from the majority of programs
on all of these features, except for program participation.
Massachusetts ranks 20th in percentage of non-agricultural
workers who are union members; neither a strong nor a weak
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union state, by national standards. Moreover, Boston's
program has an elaborate, three-tier structure, which is true
of only a small number of the programs which lasted through
1983. Boston is also a large city and thus deviates from the
majority on this feature also.
(B) Initiation
In at least* fifty percent of the cases listed in Table
3.1, the initial stimulus to consider a QWL program came from
an external advocate, often one who was associated with a
nearby academic institution. Moreover, external funding,
usually from Federal sources, played a significant and
sometimes primary role in the decision to initiate a program
in at least* fifty percent of the cases.
At least* 41 percent of all programs listed in Table 8.1
began with strong ideological overtones, or for explicitly
ideological reasons, i.e., with vague notions that QWL would
improve labor-management trust, communications and worker
morale, or fulfill ideals of worker participation and
shopfloor autonomy, rather than simply solve specific,
functional problems. Of these 19 programs, seven had ceased
operations by 1979.
*Additional data might show that the number is even higher.
In any event, it is not lower than the number stated.
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Eighty-three percent of al I programs were initiated in a
top ten union state and/or through the efforts of an external
advocate and/or with funds from external sources. Of the
remaining eight programs, seven consist of only one committee
(usually a department committee), whereas less than one-half
of the other programs consist of only one committee. From
this it can be inferred that launching a QWL effort in the
public sector, especially one that entails an elaborate
committee structure, requires either strong external support
or a strong union presence.
The Boston case fits well within these patterns, as its
program was initiated largely through the efforts of an
ideologically motivated outsider, using Federal funds to
support the program for the first 18 months.
(C) Program Accomplishments
Table 8.2 lists the accomlishments reported for the 37 QWL
programs listed in Table 8.1. Although program self-reports
such as these should be used with considerable caution, an
analysis of the data in Table 8.2 does show some informative
patterns.
First, of the 37 jurisdictions which claimed to have made
accomplishments as of 1983, 32 (87 percent) cited improvements
in communications, employee recognition, employee morale
and/or the establishment of an employee newsletter; all of
which may represent only superficial changes in the
TABLE 8.2
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MUNICIPAL-LEVEL QWL PROGRAMS
Staffng, Maintnce, Morale, Org'tn oint of Produc-
Pay, Hours, Tasks, Physical Train'g, Commu- Policy, ervice tvty in
Location Etc. Rules Procedrs Conditni Careers nicatns Budget elivry General
ARIZONA
Pima County x x x x xxxx x
CALIFORNIA
Berkeley x xxx x x x x
Los Angeles xx
San Francisco x x x x
SF Transit Authority x x xx
HAWAII
Honolulu x
ILLINOIS
Dixon Schools x x x x x
Urbana
IOWA
Jasper Hospital x x x
KANSAS
Wichita x
Wichita Schools x x x
MARYLAND
Cumberland x x x x
MASSACHUSETTS
Arlington
Boston x xx xxxxx x(14) xxxx x x x
Cambridge
Danve r s
Haverhill
TABLE 8.2 (cont'd)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MUNICIPAL-LEVEL QWL PROGRAMS
Staffng, Maintnce, Morale', Org'tn oint of Produc-
Pay, Hours, Tasks, Physical Train'g, Commu- Policy, ervice tvty in
Location Etc. Rules Procedra Conditns Careers nicatns Budget elivry General
Methuen
Newton
MICHIGAN
Avon x x
Flint Transit Author. x x x x x x
Garden City x x xxx x x x x x
Grand Blanc Schools x x X X
Lansing Police x xx
Lansing Schools x x
Pontiac xx x xx
Southfield xx
Troy x x x
NEW JERSEY
Trenton x x x
NEW YORK
Jamestown xx xx x xx
Jamestown Schools xx x x xx x x x
Onon aga Hospital xx x
NY Bronx Hospital x x x x x
NY Elmhurst Hospital x x xx xxx x x
New York City x xx x x x x x
NY Tiansit Authority xxx
OHIO
Cincinnati. Hwy Mntnce x x
Columbus xx xx xxxx xx x x
Lakewood Public Wrks x x
TABLE 8.2 (cont'd)
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MUNICIPAL-LEVEL QWL PROGRAMS
Staffng, Maintnce, Morale, Org'tn ?oint of Produc-
Pay, Hours, Tasks, Physical Train'g, Commu- Policy, iervice tvty in
Location Etc. Rules Procedre Conditns Careers nicatna Budget )elivry General
Springfield X x
RHODE ISLAND
Warwick x x x x
TENNESSEE
Shelby County xx x x xx x -
TEXAS
Via Metro Transit x x x x
WASHINGTON
Everett x
Seattle Transit Auth. x x x
Tacoma x xxx x x x x
Total # of jurisdic-
tions in table a 46
1 of jurisdictions
claiming accomplish-
ments - 39 6 16 22 20 18 33 6 11 15
# jurisdictions cug
th.s accomplishment
as % of jurisdictna
claiming accomplsmts 15.3 41.0 56.4 51.3 46.2 84.6 15.4 28.2 38.5
Total # of accomplish-
mts cited in table -
202 7 21 33 39 24 44 6 11 17
0 of times accomplsh
mts cited as % of al
accomplishmts cited 3.5 10.4 16.3 19.3 11.9 21.8 3.0 5.4 8.4
Sources:
U.S. Department of Labor: Resource
October, 1983; Herrick, N.Q., ed.:
Guide to Labor-Manaqement Cooperation,
Improving Government: Experiments with
Quality of Working Life Systems, Praeger, 1983; Trist, E., et al.: "Improving
Productivity and the Quality of Working Life in the Public Sector: Pioneering
Initiatives in Labor-Management Cooperation," The'Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania, 1980.
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organization. These items also accounted for 25 percent of
all QWL accomplishments listed by the 37 programs, taken
together.
Second, most of the more substantial accomplishments
involve matters that are secondary to the primary activities
of the organization. Twenty-two jurisdictions (60 percent of
those claiming accomplishments) cited minor changes in
staffing or work procedures, fifty-four percent cited
improvements in housekeeping matters, forty-nine percent
listed training programs, career ladders and related actions,
and forty-three per-cent listed changes in hours of work and/or
work rules. Only nine programs specifically mentioned
improvements that could be assumed to directly involve the
point of service delivery (although many improvements in work
procedures can be assumed to affect service delivery in some
way),, only six programs mentioned worker pay issues, and only
five mentioned activities specifically involving
organizational policy or the budget.
This section presents brief case histories of QWL programs
in four cities for which somewhat detailed data on program
initiation, operations, accomplishments and contextual
features are available. Using these data, more thorough
comparisons of the Boston case with other cases, particularly
on program operational dynamics and worker power can be
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drawn. Note that these four cities -- San Francisco, Pima
County, New York City and Columbus -- are much larger than the
median-sized QWL city, their QWL programs are the most
well-known and longl asting in the country, their three-tier
and four-tier program structures are, like Boston's, more
elaborate than those of the majority of municipal QWL
programs, and they have, on the whole, made more substantive
accomplishments than most other programs appear to have done.
Hence they should not be considered a representative sampling
of all programs.
(A) San Francisco
ac und: The City of San Francisco is similar in some
respects to Boston; its QUL program also shares features with
Boston's. San Francisco's population of 691,637 is somewhat
comparable to Boston's 560,847. San Francisco employs 24,007
persons; Boston employs 14,069 (employment figures exclude the
school system). (See Table 8.2.)
San Francisco's governmental structure is a mixture of
strong mayor and commission systems; the City's Board of
Supervisors retains more authority in administrative matters
than does Boston's City Council. San Francisco's collective
bargaining institutions reflect this sharing of administrative
power -- wage rates are set by the Board of Supervisors, not
by the Mayor. (Katz, 1979, pp. 45-53) -
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The power of San Francisco's municipal employee unions is
similar to that of Boston's, although the processes through
which that power is exercised differ from Boston -- Police,
fire and other craft union pay is set through formulas and
through effective political pressure by these unions on the
Board of Supervisors.
Since 1973, the miscellaneous employee unions have the
right to negotiate with the Board of Supervisors over wages,
but like their Boston counterparts, they are generally unable
to secure sizable wage increases. (Katz, pp. 45-54) Like
their Boston counterparts, San Francisco's miscellaneous
employee unions apparently lack internal cohesiveness. This
is due, says Katz (p. 53), to the diversity of occupations
represented by the miscellaneous employee unions and to
traditional reluctance on the part of clerical workers to
become active unionists. As described in Chapter 3 of this
essay, similar causes contribute to Boston miscellaneous union
weakness, especially in City Hall departments.
As in the Boston case, the primary stimulus for the San
Francisco QWL program appears to have been an external
advocate. In 1978, after the passage of Proposition 13 (a
statewide property tax limitation referendum that forced many
cities to make budget cuts), a faculty member at the nearby
New School for Democratic Management approached the SEIU local
#400 (San Francisco's largest miscellaneous employee Union).
-317-
The advocate suggested QWL as a way for the union to "take the
initiative in improving service delivery and so avoid being
caught in a reactive posture as budgets declined relative to
inflation.' (Olsen, 1983, p. 109) The SEIU immediately
picked up on the idea and launched itself into an ad hoc QWL
program in the Medical Records and Radiology departments of
the General Hospital.
At first, these committees were successful in improving
personnel policies, supervisor evaluation procedures, employee
orientation practices, and in reducing grievances. Moreover,
the committees developed initiatives which led to over
$350,000 in annual savings. According to Olsen (1983), this
success led to a dispute between labor and management over
whose efforts were most responsible for the cost savings. By
1980, this dispute had brought the entire QWL effort to a
halt. (A related event occurred in the San Francisco Housing
Authority, where labor and management wrote QWL into a 1979
strike settlement at union insistence. Subsequent passive
resistance to QWL meetings by managers undermined the effort
by 1980).
Ecgc -i-dQ i l3 These
conflicts notwithstanding, the Feinstein administration became
interested in the prospect of further cost savings through a
QWL program. With design assistance from the New School for
Democratic Management and grants from both the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service and the U.S. Office of
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Personnel Management, a formal QUL program was established
with the SEIU and began operating late in 1980. The "Work
Improvement Program,' as it is called, was designed with a
three-tier structure, which Boston later emulated.
By 1983, Olsen reported that 15 worksite groups had been
established in eight departments. These departments had
agreed to help support the program financially in FY84 and it
appeared likely that the number of project committees would
expand during 1984. The program was said to have:
'Greatly improved communications. Implemented
lease-purchase policy for city vehicles; assessed Civil
Service exam procedures and information provided to city
employees; and implemented project with city gangs
resulting in reduced vandalism.' (Department of Labor,
1983, p. 181)
Yet Olsen also complained that efforts to expand the
program throughout the major departments had met with
continuing management resistance and that only one department
had made 'a substantial commitment to the...QWL system.'
(Olsen, 1983, p. 116). Olsen attributed these problems to
several causes: First and foremost, he accused the Mayor of
providing no personal support or leadership for the program.
Likewise, the SEIU, which was consumed by internal problems
during much of the period from 1980 - 1982, provided
inadequate leadership, in Olsen's view. The program staff
provided program committees with inadequate training and
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preparation for hurdles in the problem-solving process and
failed to assess the readiness of sites prior to
implementation of committees. As a result of all of these
operational problems, wrote Olsen, worksite groups were
typically active for no longer than six months.
As an example, Olsen described the streetcleaners worksite
group in the Public Works Oepartment. This group started
meeting in 1982 and spent several months solving minor safety
problems that could be handled without assistance from other
committees. The worksite group then began to focus on the
issue of equipment availability, but needed cooperation from
the Purchasing Department to implement its recommendations.
The worksite group's recommendations were passed upward to the
Public Works Department Committee and then to the Citywide
Committee, but never implemented because of the conflictual
relations between the Public Works Department and the
Purchasing Department. By 1983, the worksite group was
demoralized, its activity level declined and it considered
formally dissolving.
Olsen concluded that since the City's basic 'personnel and
control' systems were not being redesigned, it was unlikely
that QWL would become institutionalized throughout San
Francisco City government.
Overall, the similarities between the San Francisco and
Boston program initiation processes are striking. The
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influential role of ideologically motivated outsiders from the
New School for Democratic Management is similar to Roberts'
role in Boston. The role of FMCS and IPA funds in starting a
formal program is the same as the FMCS role in Boston.
Indeed, as in Boston, Olsen claims that 'there is little
chance San Francisco would have' begun QWL without external
funding. (Olsen, 1983, p. 111) The debilitating labor-
management conflicts which disrupted the San Francisco program
after its first one-to-two years of operation are somewhat
analogous to the union-management antagonism in Boston that
transformed a staff conflict into a major labor-management
dispute.
The operational features of the San Francisco program also
bear a striking resemblance to those of the Boston QWL
program. The lack of strong mayoral leadership in particular,
and the apparent effect of this deficit on inter-departmental
coordination and relations is a major feature in both
programs. Likewise, lack of cohesiveness on the labor side,
the failure of the program administration to conduct
systematic analyses of departments prior to the establishment
of worksite groups, as well as the lack of.staying power of
worksite groups, are features which are common to both
programs. During a brief conversation which I had with Olsen
in 1985, he claimed that little had changed in the San
Francisco situation since 1983, although the program was still
funded by the administration and still functioned in several
departments.
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(B) Pima County, Arizona
BackgcQynd: In several important respects, Pima County is
unlike the City of Boston. Although its population as of 1980
was comparable to Boston's, it employed only 5,253 persons in
1984, compared to Boston's 14,069 (schools excluded), as shown
in Table 8.2. (This is accounted for, in part, by the fact
that Tuscon, the largest city in Pima County with 352,455
persons in 1980, employs 4,360 persons. Tuscon provides its
own police, fire, sanitation and parks services, but Pima
County provides welfare and health services for Tuscon, as
well as general services elsewhere in the County). (7)
Pima County's political structure differs greatly from
that of the City of Boston. It is comprised of a five-member
County Board which has substantial power and a County
Administrator who has little power. Trist describes this
system as politically fragmented, claiming that the power of
the County Board members makes administrative coordination
very difficult to achieve. (Trist, et.al., 1980, pp. 103-4)
Unlike Massachusetts, Arizona is a "right to work' state;
public officials are not permitted to negotiate binding
agreements with employee groups, nor can employee
organizations become the sole and exclusive representatives of
county employees. Unions therefore have a weak presence in
Pima County. As of 1983, the County's three unions, the
Fraternal Order of Police, the Pima County Nurses Association
and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
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Employees (AFSCME) local #449, represented 20 percent of the
County's 3,800 non-managerial employees. (Showalter and
Yetman, 1983, p. 120) According to Showalter and Yetman,
Arizona's legal constraints on unions discourage employees
from joining them, and the unions' small sizes render them
powerless to change the restrictive laws. Although provisions
for a 'meet and confer" process between management and unions
exist, from the mid-1970's through 1982, management reportedly
refused to call meetings. (Showalter and Yetman, pp. 121-3;
Trist, p. 104)
E aii dZ -19: Pima
County embarked on a QWL effort after receiving an invitation
and offer of Federal funds from Project Network in 1977.
(Trist, p. 105). Although the project was to include all
three County unions, only AFSCME participated during the early
years. By 1983, all three unions were regular participants.
The initial program structure consisted chiefly of a
Central Countywide Committee, comprised of nine upper-level
labor and management representatives. This Committee
identified issues and delegated them to one of five sub-
committees for consideration.
According to both Trist (1980) and Showalter and Yetman
(1983), Pima County's QWL program did not perform well during
its first three years of operation. The Central Committee did
not promote the program within the organization at-large; as a
result, QWL remained a low-level, almost invisible program.
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Sub-committee members complained that the Central Committee
was unresponsive to their recommendations. Workers complained
that managers refused to allow them to attend sub-committee
meetings; middle mnagers were accused in general of
withholding resources and resisting the program. Additional
tensions over postponed cost of living raises and
representation in the program of non-employees soured the
general labor-management climate. By 1979, according to
Trist, there was 'growing dormancy' in the Pima County QWL
committees. (Trist, 1980, pp. 108-111)
cog-aio-adiQa ati _22_:_123: Pima
County's QWL program took a slight turn for the better in
1979. A 'highly motivated' person joined the staff, a QWL
workshop was held in April and an arrangement for supervisor
training was worked out with the Arizona State University.
(Trist, 1980, pp. 112-115) In 1980, a significant structural
innovation was adopted, apparently through the assistance of
the Arizona State University: Shopfloor worker problem-solving
groups and a departmentwide committee were established in the
Oepartment of Transportation, so the program structure began
to resemble those of San Francisco and Boston. In the Fall of
1983, a similar system was developed in the County Health Care
Center. (Showalter and Yetman, pp 119-120).
In November 1981, AFSCME succeeded in having the original
Countywide Committee disbanded and replaced by a small
Executive Board, which includes the County Manager and makes
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major policy decisions. The sub-committees were reformed as a
Labor-Management QWL Committee, comprised of six program
development task forces with a total of 31 members: Ten
managers are appointed to the task forces by the County
Manager and 21 worker representatives are elected by each
department or group of departments with 200 employees. Neal
Herrick, a professor of Labor Relations at Arizona State
University and a QWL advocate, was hired as a third party
facilitator for the program. By the end of 1983, Pima County
claimed that its program had:
"...reduced sick leave and turnover; improved efficiency
and service; improved job satisfaction, participation and
trust, and overall well-being...automatic payroll deposits
for employees...seminars for employees during lunch break;
two countywide blood drives and one food bank drive," as
well as a 'QWL handbook.' (Department of Labor, 1983, p.
179)
In 1983, the Labor-Management QWL Committee established a
'Quality of Work Incentives Program' to 'provide employees of
Pima County a monetary incentive to increase productivity,
cost savings and service.' By August 1984, the County claimed
to have achieved '$591,832 in cost savings and revenues"
through worker suggestions and to have awarded $9,550, or 1.8
percent of the gains to 162 workers whose suggestions had been
accepted. (8)
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Despite the fact that Pima County's QWL achievements seem
to consist of primarily housekeeping, superficial human
relations matters, or productivity increases in which only 1.8
percent of the gains are returned directly to workers, by
1983, QWL had reportedly won the support of many workers. In
fact, worker satisfaction with QWL was so strong that it began
to undermine worker support for and attraction to AFSCME and
to other unions:
'The Cnon-union] committee members regarded the gains
being achieved by the LMQWLC as clear evidence that no
union was needed in Pima County. Their ability to achieve
substantial gains in a pleasant, cooperative atmosphere
without paying union dues presented a striking contrast to
AFSCME's history of achieving few gains in an unpleasant,
adversary atmosphere at a cost to members of 1 percent of
their monthly salary. At an LMQWLC retreat held on
September 17, 1982, the nonaffiliated employees openly
raised the question: What do we need a union for now that
we have QWL?' (Showalter and Yetman, 1983, p. 123)
Contributing to this development was the fact that
management, which had resumed the meet and confer sessions
with unions in 1982, had almost immediately afterward begun to
request that certain labor-management issues be transferred
from those sessions to QWL committees. The union leaders
acquiesced to these requests at first, but later regretted
doing so.
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By 1983, AFSCME had begun to lose members and to suffer
criticism from non-affiliated workers. Its leaders began to
fear that the union would be turned into a company union
and/or that it would lose its ability to enforce management
adherence to the worker participation procedures that it
deemed essential to QWL. One summed up the problem as
follows:
'The Pima County experiment with QWL originated with
AFSCME. Without union impetus, it would never have gotten
off the ground; without continuing union pressure, it
could not continue. Management would drop the
uncomfortable parts of the system (such as having regular
meetings, making up committees by election rather than
appointment, genuinely sharing information, discussing
problems on.an equal footing with employees) and retain
the comfortable ones (having employees develop suggestions
and solutions for management problems). It has been our
experience that even the most effective managers tend to
violate policies and procedures developed under QWL if it
becomes expedient -- until the union protests and sets
things right. QWL situations have a number of dynamics
that combine to make the union necessary.' (Showalter and
Yetman, p. 124)
QWL was still functioning in Pima County as of 1985. The
status of AFSCME and the nature of the issues being addressed,
however, are not clear, as of this writing.
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Despite the differences between the Boston and Pima County
contexts, particularly in the area of formal worker power, QWL
had similar beginnings in both places. The programs were
created through external, ideological stimuli and Federal
funds. Both suffered from a lack of executive leadership,
lack of cohesiveness among workers and to some extent,
management resistance, especially during the first two years
of operations.
Strong support for QWL by the union (as in Boston), as
well as the timely intervention of labor relations experts at
the Arizona State University and a change in program staff,
helped to put the program on a firmer footing after 1979. Yet
the weakness of AFSCME local #449 and its lack of internal
cohesion threatened to undermine its efforts and possibly QWL
in the longer-run. In Boston, by contrast, SEIU local #285
appears to have been strengthened, at least internally and in
the short-run, by QWL.
Another feature which distinguishes the Pima County and
Boston programs is the nature and extent of management
involvement and the extent to which the Pima program appears
to be attuned to management interests. Although the Pima
County management's stance of resistance or apathy prior to
1980 appeared similar to the position taken by administrators
in Boston, Pima's program reconstruction created a formal role
for the County Manager. The establishment of a productivity
suggestion program in Pima County, which returns only a very
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small percentage of cost savings to workers who have no
collective bargaining rights, indicates a very different
climate from that of the Boston program, in which workers
focused their QUL efforts on gaining wage increases over and
above what they received through collective bargaining.
(C) New York City
Backgryd: With a population of over seven million
people and 373,682 municipal employees (see Table 8.2), the
City of New York is difficult to compare with most other
American cities on any dimension. Its strong mayor political
structure, however, is similar to that of Boston.
New York City's labor unions are indisputably among the
most powerful in the public sector. New York State ranks
first in the country in number of union members as a
percentage of the non-farm labor force (Wallihan, 1985, pp.
49-50) AFSCME District Council 37 -- the largest municipal
union in the country with over 100,000 members -- is said to
be one of the most powerful and innovative unions in the
public or private sectors (Trist, 1980, p. 76) Its Executive
Director, Victor Gotbaum, is widely respected, even by some
advocates for privatization of public services, for his
efforts to broaden the scope and -responsibility of jobs.
(Savas and Ginsberg, 1973; see also Billings and Greenya,
1974, and Spero and -Capozzola, 1973.)
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Ecgatimuli-ad-Ecifft _2Z5_:_1979: According
to Trist (1980), the primary impetus for QWL in New York City
was the fiscal crisis of 1975 and subsequent refusal by the
Federal government to provide financial assistance to the
City. An agreement between the City and its major unions in
1976 provided for wage, hiring and lay-off freezes for three
years, and for all cost of living (COLA) increases to be
funded by worker productivity improvements, over and above
those outlined in the City's financial plan. (See also
Shefter, 1985.) To coordinate the raise/productivity aspect
of the agreement, a Citywide Joint Labor-Management
Productivity Program involving all City agencies was
established. Each agency was to report productivity
improvements, savings and revenue increases to the City's
Emergency Financial Control Board for review and authorization
of COLA payments. Trist (1980) reported on this productivity
program in the Bronx Municipal Hospital.
The Bronx Municipal Hospital is one of 17 hospitals under
the City's Health and Hospitals Corporation, which employed a
total of 35,000 persons in 1980. (Trist, p. 76) The
Productivity program was implemented in the Bronx Hospital and
in three other hospitals in 1976. By 1978, it had been
implemented in all 17 hospitals. (Trist, p. 76)
The structure of the Productivity Program consisted of
three tiers:
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* A Joint Labor-Management Committee of 24 elected labor
and appointed management representatives in each hospital
generated proposals;
* A Corporation-Wide Central Productivity Committee
reviewed the proposals, established guidelines and provided
technical assistance to each hospital committee. The
Corporation-Wide Committee, like all other department-wide
committees in the City, reported to the Emergency Financial
Control Board (the third tier).
During the first two years of program operations,
recommendations from the Bronx Municipal Hospital's Joint
Labor-Management Committee led to several productivity
improvements: An improved outpatient fee collection system was
developed, hospital employees began filling their personal
prescriptions at the Bronx Hospital and a more efficient
inventory supply system was developed. These projects
generated an estimated $350,000 in additional yearly revenue,
which was applied toward COLA payments.
In May 1978, a new City-Union agreement was reached, which
broadened the purpose of the program to include QWL issues
getecally (in addition to productivity improvements) and which
provided that future productivity improvements would be split
50-50 between the individual hospitals and the Hospital
Corporation Committee.
The Bronx Hospital's Labor-Management Committee went on to
develop several new proposals, including rental of space to
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other agencies, increasing the flexibility of clerical job
descriptions, a new linen delivery system, employee
newsletter, a public information campaign to control the
spread of infections and additional training for employees.
Yet by September 1979, morale on the Bronx Labor-Management
Committee was reportedly quite low, due to a failure on the
part of the Hospital Corporation Committee to respond to many
of these proposals or to distribute any gainsharing funds.
Trist attributed these problems to the fact that the fiscal
crisis had passed and that COLA payments had been provided,
thus reducing the incentives for change in the upper levels of
the organization. (Trist, pp. 82-83; 89). Although the
program continued within the Hospital Corporation at least
through 1983, the level of program activity in the Bronx
Hospital after 1979 is not clear.
1281_1286: Although the original Productivity Cost of Living
Allowance Program did not maintain a high level of activity
beyond the first three or four years of operations, it
stimulated the establishment of and provided a foundation for
a Citywide Labor-Management program that was to arise later.
(Powell, 1983, p. 137).
As part of the Federal Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, the
City established a Productivity Council, independent from the
aforementioned Cost of Living Allowance Program. The
Productivity Council is comprised of four management
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representatives and four union representatives; the latter are
appointed by the Municipal Labor Committee, which is comprised
of representatives of all unions in the City. According to
Powell, the Productivity Council endorsed the concept of QWL
as early as 1978. (Powell, 1983, p. 136)
In 1981, the Mayor's Office of Operations, with the
approval of the Productivity Council, the endorsement of
AFSCME Council 37 and funding through the Intergovernmental
Personnel Act (IPA), set up a pilot labor-management
cooperation program. In 1982, the City assumed financial
responsibility for the program, but received additional grants
from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in 1984.
The primary arenas of activity in the program are agency-wide
QUL Committees, comprised of nine to twenty labor and
management representatives. These committees have power to
take action on affairs within their departments, but must
report their activities to the Productivity Council.
The program began operations in 1981 with one QWL
Committee in the Department of Sanitation. By 1984, eleven
agencies had established QWL Committees, representing over
50,000 employees. In a conversation in September 1986, a New
York City union official indicated that the program had
continued to expand and now represented over 70,000 employees.
(9)
Each agency QUL Committee also established sub-committees
to address specific issues. Membership on these
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sub-committees is comprised of interested volunteers from
labor and management. By 1984, 121 sub-committees had been
formed and program documents indicated plans to both continue
building sub-committees and to establish formal, shopfloor
problem- solving groups organized by area, rather than issue.
(10)
Noteworthy achievements during the first three years of
program operations included an Alternative Work Schedules
Program (flextime) for over 4,000 persons in several agencies;
a preventive maintenance inspection program in the Department
of Parks and Recreation, which involved additional training
for some workers; career development programs and various
cost-saving programs.
Most significant, perhaps, from the standpoint of
long-term program viability, is.the establishment, by 1984, of
an "interagency labor-management committee,' to plan and
coordinate improvement of services (specifically elevator
repairs and other building maintenance services) by the
Department of General Services, for the City Planning
Commission, Department for the Aging and City Comptroller's
Office. Recall that in Boston and in San Francisco,
department needs and QWL proposals often went unattended
because of-a lack of interagency cooperation, specifically
between line agencies and internal service agencies.
Available evidence suggests that cooperation of this sort in
New York may have been facilitated by the fact that the
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General Services Department joined the QWL program prior to
the establishment of the interagency committee. (11)
The interagency committee appears to be one of many
features which distinguish the labor-management cooperation
program in New York City from its Boston, San Francisco and
Pima County counterparts. First, the stimulus for labor-
management cooperation in New York was a pragmatic one -- the
fiscal crisis of 1975. This stimulus arose from witbin the
municipal context, rather than being imported via an
ideologically-motivated outsider. Ideological elements may
have been present, perhaps through the influence of Victor
Gotbaum, but the primary goal of cooperation until 1978 was
productivity improvements. This remained a leitmotif in the
subsequent Citywide Labor-Management Cooperation Program and
is reflected, to some extent, in the accomplishments of QWL
Committees. To recall the Kochan and Dyer (1976) hypothesis
of conditions leading labor and management to initiate a
search for a more cooperative relationship, the New York case
is perhaps the only one described here in which both labor and
management experienced a 'felt hurt.' (See Chapter 3, above
and Shefter, 1985.)
Second, the pragmatic nature of the program was reflected
in the development of its structure. The initial COLA program
was simple and streamlined; the focus on a single committee
for each hospital was intended to surface and develop ideas
for cost savings and work improvements, not to develop worker
self-management on the shopfloor.
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The Productivity Council, which was established in 1978
and was comprised of top-level labor and management
representatives, functioned for three years before
establishing lower-level committees. The agency-level
committees in turn, developed lower-level sub-committees
gradually, it seems, as needs arose to work out specific
initiatives; lower-level worksite groups were not constituted
as part of an ideologically-based program. Moreover,
coordination of line agency needs and internal agency services
was achieved through an interagency committee developed
specifically for that purpose. This indicates the
pre-existence of a certain amount of trust, organizational
cohesiveness and cooperation in New York City that did not
obtain in the other QWL programs.
Third, administration leadership of the New York City
program appears to be somewhat stronger than leadership in
Boston or San Francisco. Although data on this point are
scanty, statements by a consultant with the New York program
in March 1986 (who was also the sole consultant with the
Boston program) indicated that the New York City Deputy Mayor
for Operations, who chairs the Productivity Council, had
publicly expressed a strong commitment to the QWL program from
its inception onward and that this commitment had prevaled
despite actions by the Mayor which contradicted this spirit of
cooperation. A union official made similar statements to me
in September, 1986.
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Fourth, and possibly most important, union leadership is
apparently very strong in the New York City program, owing in
large part to the work of AFSCME Council 37 and its Executive
Director, Victor Gotbaum. (Powell, 1983, pp. 136-140). As
noted above, District Council 37 is the largest municipal
union in the U.S. and reputedly one of the strongest. Whereas
problems of union weakness and worker dissension plagued the
Boston, San Francisco and Pima programs, such problems were
not reported in accounts of New York City's program. On the
contrary, Powell's essay points out how unique is the equal
'partnership" relationship between the administration and
unions in the Labor-Management Cooperation Program. (Powell,
1983, pp. 136-140) Moreover, Trist's (1980) observation that
workers in the Bronx Hospital who did not participate directly
in the work of the Hospital Committee, nevertheless. felt a
sense of 'ownership' of the hospital's innovations, indicates
worker cohesion and probably good worker - union leadership
relations as well. (Trist, 1980, p. 89) Although union
leadership and persistence is a common feature in all public
sector programs, only in New York City, where unions
apparently have considerable clout, does this leadership
appear to have produced a strong program.
The only major point of similarity between the New York
City program and the others mentioned thus far, is the use of
Federal funds to support program administration. Yet here
too, the New York situation appears to diverge from the
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others,.in that outside funding does not appear to have been a
primary factor in program initiation, but simply a
contributing one.
(D) Columbus, Ohio
Backgcoyod: The City of Columbus and its QWL program
appear to share fewer common features with Boston than San
Francisco does, but more than Pima County and perhaps more
than New York City. Columbus' population was 570,588 in 1980
and it employed 6,593 persons as of 1984 (see Table 8.2).
This is far less than Boston's 14,069 employees. One reason
for the difference is that Columbus does not maintain
hospitals. (12)
Like Boston, Columbus is governed by a strong mayor
system. Ohio has traditionally been a strong union state,
both in the public and private sectors. The state ranks
seventh nationally in number of union members as a percentage
of the non-farm labor force, whereas Massachusetts' rank is
20. (Wallihan, 1985, pp. 49-50) Although agreements made by
public administrators with unions in Ohio as of 1976 were not
legally binding, they were reportedly treated as such by labor
and management. (Trist, 1980) Trist also notes the existence
of substantial internal cohesion on both the labor and
management sides in Columbus, from 1976 through 1979. (p. 18)
EccamJloitiai _1226: The initial stimuli of the
Columbus program were of both a pragmatic and an ideological
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nature. Layoffs in 1975 and a brief strike in 1976, as well
as "excessive rates of grievances, disciplinary actions and
leaves without pay,' gave evidence of tension in
labor-management relations. (Trist, 1980, p. 18) A QWL
program had been initiated in nearby Springfield in 1973,
largely through the organizing efforts of Ohio State
University's Center for Human Resource Research, which then
acted as a third party facilitator. (This program ceased to
function sometime before 1983.)
Since both Columbus and Springfield are in the same AFSCME
district, the AFSCME District Director reportedly received
exposure to and became impressed with QWL through the
Springfield program. He suggested that a similar program
might improve labor-management relations in Columbus. The
Mayor of Columbus agreed and, with Ohio State University again
filling a third-party facilitator role, a QWL program was
initiated in July 1976. The program was initially funded by
management, with a small contribution from AFSCME local 1632.
Federal funding through Project Network began in 1977. (Trist,
p. 19)
A four-tier structure was designed for the Columbus
program:
* A City QWL Committee, whose members include the Mayor,
his 'cabinet representatives," the AFSCME local President and
the AFSCME District Director. (Department of Labor, 1983, p.
154) This Committee began meeting in November 1976. It
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provides overall program guidance, but it does not become
involved in day-to-day affairs of the program.
* A Department Committee in the Public Service Department
includes department-level labor and management
representatives. This Committee began meeting in April 1977.
* A Labor-Management Division Committee in the Division of
Sewers and Drainage began meeting in April 1977.
* Five grassroots working-level committees in the division
of Sewers and Drainage, each comprised of a line supervisor,
union steward and worker representatives. Four of these
committees began meeting in July 1977.
In June 1978, the program was expanded into the Division
of Water Treatment of the Public Service Department. By 1983,
both this division and the Sewers and Drainage Division had
five working-level committees.
EgQaion-2ZZ_128: As in the Boston and San
Francisco programs, the intended locus of initiation in the
Columbus program is the working-level committee. Higher-level
committees are supposed to facilitate the resolution of
problems and the implementation of these initiatives. By
1983, the program's accomplishments included:
"Improved safety programs, flex time, tardiness, overtime
and vacation policies, clarification of Civil Service
rules, orientation program, employee newsletter, stockroom
redesign, cross-training, equipment specifications to
improve functioning, analysis of alternative sewage
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treatment processes, blood pressure screening for
employees, proper stocking of vehicles to meet field
conditions, exploring use of computer for preventative
maintenance scheduling, and compilation of all work rules
affecting work locations.' (Department of Labor, 1983, p.
154)
Trist also noted a general improvement in labor-management
relations and a reduction in tensions and grievances by 1979.
(p. 35) Moreover, by 1979, a structure evolved to solve
lateral coordination problems among departments. Two
different QWL committees, representing two different water
treatment plants in the Water Division, began meeting jointly
to resolve joint issues. This is similar to, but apparently
much more modest than the lateral committee arrangement which
arose in New York City with the Department of General
Services.
These accomplishments notwithstanding, by 1979 the program
had apparently reached a plateau. Meetings were characterized
as 'boring or unexciting.' (Trist, p. 25) More important, an
effort to expand the program into the Sanitation Division from
1980 - 1982 foundered on manager reluctance and worker-manager
disputes. (Morgan and Ronchi, 1983, pp. 72 - 78) As of 1983,
the Columbus program had not, according to the Department of
Labor survey, been expanded beyond the Sewers and Drainage and
Water divisions. One of the Ohio State University
consultant/practitioners associated with the program claimed
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in 1985 that the program was "doing just fine,' whereas
another Ohio State University labor relations practitioner
told me in 1986 that 'nothing's happening there.' (13)
On the surface at least, the Columbus program has little
in common with the Boston QWL program, save perhaps its partly
ideological beginnings and the role of a third party in
facilitating the program. In Columbus, the AFSCME leadership
apparently enjoyed the respect of and good relations with the
administration. Both the union and administration provided
strong leadership for the program, at least during the first
couple of years.
Yet the failure to implement the program in the Sanitation
Division shows that in Columbus, as in Boston, San Francisco
and Pima County, middle management resistance, as well as a
background of conflictual labor-management relations in
certain departments, created an inhospitable environment for
QWL. Moreover, the program's early plateau indicates that
despite strong executive leadership, the overall context may
not be conducive to the institutionalization of QWL at a
sustained level of activity. Indeed, the Mayor himself
acknowledged upon leaving office, that the QWL program was of
little consequence in the eyes of the voters (Ronchi, 1983).
Hence it seems unlikely that his successors will continue to
provide strong support for the program.
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This chapter has compared several salient features of the
Boston Labor-Management Cooperation program with other
municipal QWL programs. On the basis of limited data, it can
be argued that these programs share several features with
Boston's program:
* The importance of ideologically motivated outsiders in
initiating QWL programs.
* The importance of Federal funding in supporting
administrative and training costs for program start-ups and
rejuvenations.
* The lack of support by chief executives and management
generally for such programs.
* The existence of relatively strong union support for the
initiation and rejuvenation of QWL programs (notwithstanding
the resistance of AFSCME Council 93 in Boston).
* Union weakness. Most programs have been established
within the top ten most unionized states and almost all
programs have been established within the top 25 unionized
states. Yet, union strength within this group appears to be
lacking, expecially among the non-craft unions. (14) Of the
four cities studied in case histories above, union weakness
undermined program stability and progress in San Francisco,
Pima County and to some extent, in Columbus.
* The primary operational focus on 'human resources'
issues, with only secondary emphasis on work processes, the
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point of service delivery and productivity, and almost total
absence of organizational policy or budget issues from lists
of program achievements.
* The dynamics of QWL processes, in which efforts seem to
start, stall out or run into overwhelming barriers and then be
rejuvenated, or reach a plateau after solving problems for a
couple of years.
Only on the feature of program structure does there appear
to be much variation among programs. Over half of all
programs consist of primarily one committee. Very few stable
programs consist of three- or four-tier committee structures.
From this it can be inferred that the Boston municipal
context, while certainly different from that of other cities,
is sufficiently similar so that tentative general statements
can be made about the conduciveness of the municipal context
for the institutionalization of QWL as a more or less
permanent feature of the workplace governance system.
It seems that the formal superstructures of QWL programs--
the committees and program staffs -- do tend to become more or
less permanent features of local government organizations.
Yet, this does not mean that QWL problem-solving activities
become permanent or ongoing features of employment
relationships. Indeed, in at least two out of the four most
active QWL programs described in detail above -- San Francisco
and Columbus -- activity tended to reach a plateau after a
while.
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This may be due to the fact that initiatives (or at least
accomplishments) do not involve workplace governance or work
process issues, but mostly housekeeping and personnel issues.
(This is true even in the New York program, which appears to
be thriving). Since these matters are not crucial to the
day-day functioning of the organization, problem-solving
activity can taper off or cease entirely for a time, without
the program officially ending.
In short, municipal contexts do seem to support the
establishment of QWL as more or less long-term programs at the
citywide level. Municipal contexts do not, it would seem,
support the institutionalization of QWL as new models of
worker-manager collaboration on the shopfloor, at the
department level, or even at the level of union-administration
leadership. In other words, QWL is a modest and functionally
peripheral innovation in what appear to be fairly stable
bureaucratic contexts.
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CHAPTER 8 - NOTES
1) Telephone conversation with U.S. Department of Labor
official, Labor-Management Services Administration, September,
1986.
2) This document presents results of a survey of labor-
management cooperation efforts in the private and public
sectors, conducted in 1983. It lists over 56 different public
sector programs, of which 36 are local level programs (city,
county, special district), five are state-level (mostly in New
York State) and 15 are Federal level programs (five of which
are housed in the Veterans' Administration). Only the local
level programs will be analyzed here. (A Department of Labor
official informed me in September, 1986 that an update survey
was currently being designed, but that results of the survey
would not be available until 1987.)
For each program, a one-page report is provided, showing
the program's initiation date, the departments and number of
people covered in the program as of 1983, as well as the
program's structure, scope and accomplishments, as provided to
the Department of Labor by each program's staff or officials.
The brevity and vagueness of these reports limit their useful-
ness for this analysis. Almost one-half of the accomplishments
listed lack specific details and instead cite outcomes such as
"improved morale and communications.' Nevertheless, the survey
is the only comprehensive published source of data available
as of this writing, except for the aforementioned ICMA report.
3) A collection of five-to-ten-page case studies of QWL
programs in U.S. and Canadian federal, state and local
governments. Most of the studies were written by consultant-
practitioners who were involved with the programs. Although
the focal points and types of data differ from one case study
to the next, the collection as a whole is informative. Of the
seven accounts of municipal QWL efforts in the book, the five
most famous (in academic and QWL consultant circles) and/or
longlasting are included: San Francisco; Pima County, Arizona;
New York City; Columbus; Springfield, Ohio.
4) 1980, by Eric Trist, et al. (The Wharton School, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania). This is a final evaluative report of
'Project Network,' a national QWL project funded by the Office
of Personnel Management's IPA Program, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and the National Center for
Productivity and the Quality of Working Life. Project Network
consisted of ten state and local government organizations that
were invited to receive Federal funds for QWL efforts in
1977. Many of these sites had no previously functioning QWL
programs or labor-management cooperation efforts, but
established them through Project Network assistance. Federal
funding and evaluation of the projects lasted through 1979.
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The local government organizations participating in the
program were Columbus, the Jamestown, N.Y. School District,
the Bronx Municipal Hospital, Pima County, Tacoma, Troy,
Urbana and Wichita. All but the Urbana project were recorded
as still in existence in the 1983 Department of Labor survey
described above.
5) Telephone conversation with AFL-CIO official who was
formerly associated with the QWL program in New York City.
6) Boston, Columbus, Pima County and New York City are the
largest jurisdictions and have the most structurally elaborate
programs of any in the country. In Boston, roughly 85 persons
participated in the QWL program Citywide during its first two
years (not including participant turnover); in Columbus,
roughly 150; in Pima County, an estimated 150 persons
participated in the QWL program, plus 300 were reported to
have made productivity suggestions during 1984. Since many of
these suggestions reportedly came from departments with QWL
committees, it is likely that there is considerable overlap
between the two groups of participants. In New York City,
1,000 persons were reportedly participating directly as of
September 1986 (AFL-CIO official, op. cit.), representing
70,000 employees.
7) U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census: CitY_
EmelQormet-in_12Q4, Government Employment Series, No. 2,
Issued July 1985, p. 4; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census: y
Government Employment Series, No. 4, Issued August 1985, p. 4.
8) Pima County 'Quality of Work Improvement Program' report,
1984.
9) See note #6, above.
10) New York City Productivity Program report, September 1984.
11) Ibid.
12) See note #7, above.
13) The first remark was made in Spring of 1985; the latter in
the Spring of 1986.
14) It should be noted, however, that in none of these five
cases were craft unions, such as the police, firefighters or
teachers involved. Since other municipal QWL programs have
included these powerful employee groups (see Table 8.1), it
would be wrong to conclude that city administrations only
initiate QWL programs with weak employee groups.
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CHAPTER 9 -- CONCLUSION
Qea~f-tbe-Stud
This study addressed the question of whether Quality of
Working Life structures are likely to become permanent
features of municipal contexts, by studying an attempt to fit
a QWL structure into the Boston municipal context. That
context was found to be unconducive to sustained, high levels
of cooperation among managers and workers within departments,
among departments themselves and between the administration
and miscellaneous employee unions.
This is partly because the Mayor's primary tasks, as
determined by the task/electoral environment, are not to
provide high-quality, basic services -- for which
labor-management cooperation might be valuable -- but to
provide neighborhood development projects and patronage
employment, as well as to maintain a favorable citywide image.
Hence, sustained attention to basic service delivery
procedures and internal management processes, especially
innovations or improvements in those procedures, is precluded.
Such improvements are desirable, but the time and effort
required to bring them about are not reimbursed at the polls.
As the Mayor of Columbus put it, in speaking with pride of his
support for QWL over several years:
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"My greatest legacy to the city is one that is impossible
to see and, for many people, impossible to believe.'
(in Ronchi, 1983, p. 70)
Moreover, the City's political structure is not such as to
induce the Mayor to cooperate closely with workers or unions,
especially not miscellaneous employee unions, such as the
SEIU, which have very little power. Rather, it is the State
Legislature and State regulatory institutions with which the
Mayor shares power in the administration and they are not
concerned with labor-management cooperation or with the
service delivery process, per se.
Given this context, it is understandable that the primary
stimulus to initiate QWL should have come from Qutside the
City, from an ideologically motivated advocate who secured
Federal funding for the QWL effort. The administration
accepted the Federal funds and the program, but as an optional
tool for department heads, not as part of a new service
delivery policy or new labor relations policy. Administration
of the program was left in the hands of the self-proclaimed
expert who had initiated it; it was referred to as his
program. The administration's attitude toward QWL was so
casual that the Mayor's top aides did not inform him of the
program's existence.
Of the two unions whose participation in the program was
solicited, only one, the SEIU agreed to participate. This
union joined the program not so much in order to cooperate
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more with the administration, however, but as a way to
organize City Hall workers and combat the Mayor's political
organization.
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that the
program performed poorly during its first two years of
operation. Conflictual relations among workers and between
workers and managers undermined, or precluded the development
of many QWL initiatives. Departments whose services were
required to carry out QWL initiatives were unresponsive and
top City administrators ignored the program. Conflicts among
the staff eventually brought the program to a halt for over
three months.
Largely through the persistence of the union, the program
was gradually rejuvenated. The administration began to fund
the program after the initial Federal grant expired, although
it did not develop a clear agenda for the program and the
Mayor did not infuse the program with his own personal
leadership. Hence it appeared that QWL would continue to
function in the City for the forseeable future; plagued by
lack of strong administration and management support, but
enjoying enough union support to make modest improvements in
working conditions and perhaps build a more cohesive union.
An analysis of the survey and case study literature of QUL
in other cities indicated that the Boston experience may be
common among municipalities, or at least large cities.
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Irnelication forQWLPractice inMunicipalities
Two implications emerge directly from this study. One is
that one should not expect QWL to bring about a transformation
of labor-management relations or service delivery systems in
municipalities; particularly not where miscellaneous employee
unions and line service agencies are concerned. Mayors simply
have too little incentive to apply the sustained attention and
leadership to these departments that would be required for
substantial and lasting changes to take place. Moreover,
given the nature of the tasks of line service agencies
themselves, especially given the increasing automation of
tasks, it is not clear that even a great deal of attention to
these departments would alter much in the daily experience of
semi-skilled workers there (although their working lives could
certainly be improved). It does seem that QWL programs can
survive in municipalities, but only if they receive strong and
consistent support from unions.
The second implication of the study is that municipal QUL,
despite its shortcomings, may well be worth the time that
miscellaneous employee unions devote to it. Although further
research on this point is needed, it seems that the SEIU in
Boston was able to strengthen its union through QWL, at least
in the short-term. AFSCME Local #449 in Pima County, however,
may have become weaker because of QWL. It may be the case
that a minimum level of legal protection and organizational
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legitimacy is required before a union can become stronger
through QWL.
Question5_foc-Euctbec_Re5accb
This study is only one step toward an assessment of the
quality of the fit between QWL and municipal contexts. The
results of the study point to three agendas for further
research.
(A) The first agenda consists of efforts to build upon and
refine the results of this thesis. More detailed, case study
analyses by non-partisan researchers, such as that conducted
here, would be useful, particularly since most of the
literature on municipal QWL published to date was written by
practitioners. On-site research of the four cases discussed
in Chapter 8 should be conducted, if only to corroborate the
information that I was able to glean from the literature.
In addition to exploratory case studies, the results of
this study indicate that more specific questions about
municipal QWL should be addressed. First, how do
mayoral/administration task priorities differ across
municipalities of different sizes and economic structures?
Boston mayors must devote their primary energies to economic
development and housing issues and must, it seems,- provide
patronage jobs for supporters. Do the citizens of more
affluent or smaller cities have the luxury of requiring their
officials to devote relatively more energy to providing
high-quality services? Do QWL efforts thrive in these cities?
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Second, are council-manager political structures more
conducive settings for QWL than strong mayor structures? Do
their executives devote more attention to provision of basic
services than strong mayors do?
Third, does QWL fare better in cities without a tradition
of political patronage in employment practices, as the
analyses in this study would suggest?
Fourth, how does QWL affect internal union politics and
cohesiveness over time? Does it generally strengthen unions,
as it appears to be doing in Boston, or weaken them, as it
appears to have done in Pima County?
Fifth, do craft unions have better experiences with QWL
than miscellaneous employee unions, as the foregoing analysis
would suggest?
Sixth, do municipal QWL efforts in fact go through
recurring cycles of initiation, instability, decline and
rejuvenation, as predicted in this study, or is a permanent
plateau in activity reached at some point?
(B) A second and somewhat broader set of questions
concerns the nature of QWL mythology and practice. It was
mentioned many times in this thesis that QWL is driven, to a
large extent, by ideology. I also pointed out that QWL may be
embraced by persons espousing mutually incompatible
ideological values and that the relationships between ideology
and behavior, or intervention technique, often seem to be
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tenuous. Beyond these passing remarks, however, I said little
about QWL ideologies and practices.
This is an important issue, however, especially for those
who believe that workplace democracy is worth supporting.
More study of the relationship between the ideologies of QWL,
its pre-packaged techniques and its actual performance in
specific organizational contexts, might help to elucidate the
contradictions between QWL myth and real world outcomes.
Perhaps this would help to point the way toward the
development of organizational change practices that are more
firmly grounded in real organizational contexts.
(C) A third research program would utilize a more
historically-based approach to understanding QWL in the
municipal context. Such an approach would focus on the
evolution of labor-management relations over a longer period
of time, say, since the introduction of civil service systems
100 years ago. Such a perspective might reveal the conditions
under which labor-management relations generally change in
cities and how they tend to change. A comparison of these
findings with current QUL efforts might reveal more about the
meaning and significance of QWL and the plethora of "human
resource" initiatives currently being tried in municipalities,
than this thesis has done. (International City Management
Association, 1985)
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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGICAL ADDENDUM
This addendum provides a more detailed and personal
account of certain aspects of the research design and process
than is provided in Chapter 2.
I began this study with a belief in the goodness of
workplace democracy and a desire to learn how to make it work
in American organizations. I also came to the study with some
knowledge of the history of failures to democratize
workplaces. Despite the popularity of QWL in investor-owned
firms, I was particularly skeptical of its potential for
success, since it seemed to me that only public ownership and
substantial worker control over major organizational decisions
could lay a foundation for stable democracy in the workplace.
At the same time, I was influenced by writers who claimed
that there was a potential for QWL to effect at least a new
compromise between the interests of labor and management in
the workplace that was more democratic than the traditional
relations codified in the Wagner Act of 1935. I decided to
study the mechanics of QWL programs first-hand and figure out
how and why QWL does well where it does and why it breaks down
when it does. These questions were not addressed in the QWL
literature, so I thought that my research might both satisfy
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my desire to understand QWL, as well as contribute to the
cause of workplace democracy. As the study progressed, these
questions -- and the research tools I used to address them --
evolved considerably.
I understood QWL programs as conflict-resolution devices
that fare better or worse, depending upon the adequacy of the
fit between the particular device and the nature of conflicts
in a particular type of organization. I had developed this
perspective through my work with several social psychologists
over the previous few years. We had constructed a research
instrument, the purpose of which was to describe the nature,
causes and extent of conflict in an organization. Data was
gathered through in-depth, semi-structured interviews and
surveys.
Although we had initially developed this instrument for
use in small, worker-owned companies, we came to hope that it
would be used by consultants, managers and union officials,
prior to the design and introduction of organizational change
efforts such as QWL. The instrument was never used for this
ambitious purpose, but we did employ it a few times as a
diagnostic and evaluation tool aftac organizations had
implemented pre-packaged QWL structures. Ironically perhaps,
the instrument's tendency to capture mostly small group
relations and its blindness, for the most part, toward larger
contextual issues, made it suitable for this more modest
purpose.
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This was the purpose to which the research instrument was
put in the Boston LMC program and it was the primary means by
which I gained entre to the program. I used it to collect
data for my analysis of routine workplace relations in the
Assessing Department and Police Operations unit, which I
reported in this thesis. (A copy of a survey that was
developed from this instrument is included at the end of this
Appendix).
I decided that I could address the broader questions about
the mechanisms of QWL programs and the reasons for QWL success
or failure, by watching the Boston QWL program closely --
observing program meetings and daily work routines and trying
to relate what I saw and heard to the assessments of workplace
relations that I had made through my research instrument.
By the time the program committees had been meeting for
three months, however, I had become confused about the program
and my research strategy. There seemed to be much less of a
program than I had expected there would be. Senior managers
and top administrators hardly showed up for scheduled meetings
and most of the worksite groups were having substantial
difficulty developing initiatives and pushing them through
management layers in their own departments, not to mention
through the departments whose actions were needed to respond
to the initiatives. Much of the remaining program activity
revolved around Roberts' conflicts with the staff and union
president.
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I had been prepared to find that QWL would not work in
Boston because the program's structure and bottom-up process
design were ill-suited to the routine workplace relations of
the departments in which the program was implemented; which I
do, in fact, believe was the case. Yet the program's primary
operational problems seemed to be the fault of incompetent and
insincere individuals, not an inappropriate QWL design. I
felt that if only those responsible would do their jobs, I
could get on with the business of studying QWL.
About this time -- April 1985, four months after the
program committees had begun meeting regularly -- I began to
discuss these details of the Boston program with my
dissertation committee. These discussions eventually induced
me to pay more attention to both the historical context of
labor-management relations in the City and the question of why
the City administration and unions would or would not want to
become seriously involved in QWL to begin with. I had posed
the latter question to both union and administration officials
as early as the Spring of 1984 and devoted considerable time
to discussing it with members of the Labor-Management
Oversight Committee in my November, 1984 interviews. Now it
dawned on me that in my own ideological zeal to get on with
QWL and see how it functioned, I had accepted ideological or
superficial answers to these questions, especially from
administrators and senior department managers. Perhaps there
was no place for any sort of QWL program in this organization.
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During the Spring, Summer and Fall of 1985, I reviewed my
initial interview protocols and conducted a thorough search in
the press and other literature, for documentation of the
historical development of labor-management relations in the
City. I re-interviewed some of the current officials in the
administration, as well as past officials of the union,
administration and other informants, focusing on the
labor-management balance of power and the ways in which the
unions and administration pursue their interests. I also
began to think more seriously about the nature of the City's
electoral and regulatory environments and the implications of
these environments for mayoral action. In my research on the
site, I began to focus more on understanding the tasks,
technology and environments of the Assessing and Police
departments, rather than following every nuance of the
program. I did not discard or discontinue my assessments of
workplace relations and observations of program meetings, but
placed them within the much larger framework of the political
and technological features of the organizational context.
As my study ended several months later, I found myself
still preoccupied with the exotic behavior of Roberts and the
apparent insincerity of other individuals, and prone to blame
this behavior for the program's problems. Yet, in the
meantime, my study of the broader organ-izational context had
gradually convinced me that there was little room for stable,
lasting labor-management cooperation in the City, particularly
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between the administration and the members of the
miscellaneous employee unions. It was this distinctive
context that had allowed or fostered the individual behavior
that had undermined QWL in Boston. Put differently, it was
just this sort of behavior that constituted the Boston context
and which made it unconducive to successful and lasting QWL.
When I first began my research on the Boston program, I
thought it would be useful to compare the Boston QWL
experience with that of other cities. As it became clear that
the Boston program was not doing very well, I thought that
such a comparison would be the only way to say anything useful
about QWL in municipalities. I made plans to visit three
cities that had implemented QWL programs for a few days each.
After several more months of extensive research on the
Boston case, however, I came to the conclusion that a few days
each on these sites would only acquaint me with the outlines
of each city's QWL mechanisms; not with the features of the
organizational context, which I had come to see as the
important issue. I therefore decided to forego the site
visits and content myself with a thorough review of the case
study literature on municipal QWL.
My formal role in the Boston QWL program was that of a
research evaluator of the program. My involvment began when
Roberts, the program organizer and director, approached my
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colleague and me in March, 1984, to write a proposal to the
U.S. Department of Labor to fund a pilot QWL program, using
the design that he had copied from San Francisco's program.
Monetary compensation for our successful grant writing
efforts was negligible, but the Department of Labor agreed to
provide about $4,000 for research and evaluation of the
program. At Roberts' recommendation, the Labor-Management
Oversight Committee used the $4,000 to have me (with the
assistance of my research colleagues) conduct a baseline
analysis of workplace relations and attitudes about a QWL
program in the Assessing Department and Police Operations
unit. We conducted the study in November 1984, using the
research instrument described above. We agreed to search for
additional funds so that the City could have us conduct a
follow-up study one year later, to assess the extent of
changes in workplace relations due to the program and to make
recommendations for improvements in the program.
Although most of my reseach work for the next year was not
funded, the initial contract established my role as an outside
program evaluator who was paid by the program or the federal
government. During a training session for program participants
in January, 1985, I explained that I would observe the program
for about a year, conduct another round of surveys and
interviews and then provide the City and the federal
government with a report on the program's progress. I also
made it known that I was writing my dissertation on QWL in
municipalities.
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In the meantime, I provided written reports and verbal
presentations of the results of the baseline research to each
committee in the program. At program staff meetings during
the first few months of program operations, I occasionally
commented on the implications of the research results for the
conduct of the program.
As the researcher/evaluator, I had access to all regular
program committee meetings. Throughout most of the study
period, I spent the equivalent of at least two full days per
week on site, attending at least three of the five weekly
worksite group meetings and almost all of the monthly
departmentwide committee meetings in the Assessing Department
and Police Operations unit, as well as Oversight Committee
meetings, monthly labor caucuses at the union hall and
bi-weekly program staff meetings. I attended special meetings
of managers or workers as well. My practice at these meetings
was to take notes in the back of the room and ask questions
for clarification purposes later.
I also had official permission to observe work routines in
the departments participating in the program, at any
reasonable time. I never needed to cite this official
permission, however, to enter a site. Within a short time, I
had become acquainted with everyone involved with the program
and many of the non-participants in the Assesssing Department
and Police Operations unit, all of whom readily granted me
access to the worksites. I never took notes while observing
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work routines or conducting informal interviews. I made
occasional trips to the restroom to jot down ideas or key
words to remember later and I ended each session -- indeed,
each day on the site -- by writing out dialogues and
reflections from the day, which usually took one to three
hours.
CbalengesiDeelingMo00:ite-8esacoRle
Although certain aspects of my formal research role (eg.,
conducting surveys and interviews) were mostly cut and dried,
I found other aspects, such as the conduct of observation of
work routines and informal interviews, as well as the overall
management of my relationships with some principal actors,
rather challenging.
Working with Roberts, the program director, proved to be
particularly difficult. In addition to my baseline analyses
of workplace relations in Assessing and Police Operations, he
wanted me to provide him with raw data from my interviews and
surveys for his own dissertation and to add his dissertation
questions to my surveys and interviews. He also wanted me to
provide him with personal notes from meeting observation, with
information on the content of confidential interviews I
conducted and with reports on the actions of the program
facilitators. He wanted me to write a positive and uplifting
account of the program and of his actions to the City and the
U.S. Department of Labor and he tried to induce me to
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structure both the timing and content of the follow-up
research, so that the results would show him in the best
possible light. Roberts also tried, on a few occasions, to
use me in his efforts to manipulate the perceptions of other
actors; at one point claiming (falsely) to a room full of
outraged worksite group representatives, that he had summarily
fired a program facilitator after consulting with me about the
matter. Roberts made these and many other, less important
demands, from week to week, with little or no warning and with
the expectation of immediate compliance. I often felt that I
could not appear on the site or answer the phone without being
asked or told to do something by Roberts.
Throughout the entire study period, I was often unsure of
how to respond to these demands and develop my relationship
with Roberts. It was Roberts who had first introduced me to
the site and my continued presence there depended to a large
extent upon his support. No one else saw any great value in
my research (until I submitted my report in March 1986) and a
few managers, workers and administrators told me that they
found the research a waste of time and federal money.
Moreover, I wanted access to Roberts and his interpretation of
events, especially after it became clear to me that his
perceptions of reality differed from those of other program
participants. I therefore tried to stay on good terms with
Roberts throughout the entire study period, by discussing the
program with him at regular intervals and acceeding to some of
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his requests for information and input into the research
instrument, while maintaining the confidentiality of the
interview and survey data and avoiding involvement in his
conflicts with other individuals.
I also found it challenging to develop a relationship with
the two program committee facilitators that I felt was both
productive and appropriate for my role as a non-participant
researcher. Throughout most of the study period, I discussed
the departments and committee meeting dynamics with them each
week, immediately following meetings, during lunch and
sometimes on the phone at night. As a non-participant
researcher of the program, I felt that my role in these
discussions should be limited to helping the facilitators
understand my baseline analysis of workplace relations and
asking them questions about their actions and interpretations
of events. Although I made a conscious effort to stay within
these somewhat vague boundaries, they told me that my comments
in these discussions affected their thoughts about their work
and helped them formulate strategies for action. When I first
heard this (about four months after the program began), I
considered abbreviating the discussions, since I thought it
would be ludicrous to claim that I had no stake in the outcome
of the program if I were involved in running it. I decided,
however, that my influence on events through these discussions
was negligible and that it would be foolish to deny myself
such a valuable source of data.
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My relationships with the facilitators provided something
far more valuable than simply raw data, however. By the time
the program was three months old, I had developed great
respect and affection for both facilitators. Their
backgrounds and political values were similar to mine and I
felt more comfortable with them than with anyone else in the
program. Most importantly, they were new to the practice of
QWL and wanted, like me, to figure out how it worked, or could
work in the City. Our discussions were a chance for all of us
to puzzle through QWL and the City bureaucracy. Without these
discussions, my study of QWL in Boston would have been a
somewhat lonely and boring experience, as well as a less
fruitful one.
By the third month of the program, however, I began to
worry that I was spending too much time with the facilitators
and not nearly enough with the program participants. I
worried that participants would see me as so closely tied to
the program administration that they would not be candid with
me about it. To calm my fears, I began to make a point of
arriving at meetings after or before the facilitators did and
to linger after they left the meetings, talking to
participants and asking questions. I also started spending
more time in the worksites between meetings and establishing
closer relationships with the participants. I became
convinced that this strategy was working when, during the Fall
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of 1985, some Police Operations workers complained to me about
the quality of the facilitation and some Assessing workers
asked my opinion of one of the facilitators. I maintained my
good relationship with the facilitators, however, by spending
more time discussing the program on the phone. I continued
these phone discussions into the Summer of 1986, long after I
had completed my field research.
My greatest challenge was deciding how much time to spend
with program participants and what kind of a relationship to
pursue with them. The baseline assessment of routine
workplace relations, which consisted of interviews, surveys
and some observation of work routines, as well as the
observation of program committee meetings and questioning of
participants afterward, were highly productive research
activities that were easy to do; they had clearly defined and
easily explainable purposes and they had clear temporal
boundaries.
Yet I was convinced, to some extent at least, that if I
spent as much additional time as possible with program
participants in their workplaces, in the snack bars and at
parties, I would be rewarded with valuable knowledge of the
organizational context and a solid understanding of the fit
between context and QWL program. The problem lay in figuring
out how to structure these interactions with participants.
For the first few months of the program, I felt stiff and
uncomfortable if I stayed in a worksite longer than to pass
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the time of day. I could ask only so many questions about the
work; most of it was just not that complicated and people were
busy doing it. Moreover, since it was I who was asking the
questions, these sessions almost always turned into
interviews. Although I usually learned something when I spent
time like this in a worksite, I did not feel that I was
developing rapport with program participants. Since I did not
know exactly what I needed to know about the organizational
context, I assumed that, at a bare minimum, I needed to
establish and maintain a good rapport with participants.
As the months went by, however, workers, supervisors and
managers began to ask me about the latest developments in the
program when I showed up in the workplace. Since I knew much
more about the program and about the actions of committes at
other levels than they did, I would answer their questions.
In doing so, I slipped, somewhat inadvertently, into the role
of program newscaster in the worksites, which lent more
structure and a back-and-forth quality to my interactions with
participants that gradually put me at ease. By the Fall of
1985, I was able to spend entire days in the worksites and to
return day after day, feeling comfortable with a low level of
verbal interaction with workers, supervisors and middle
managers.
More importantly, by taking on the program newscaster
role, while taking care not to speak fQc the program and
assuring each person that certain information was
confidential, I think I put them more at ease, which built a
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foundation for deeper and more meaningful dialogue. As time
went on, they began to tell me many things about their work
and about their relations with their superiors, subordinates,
peers and union officials that I am sure they did not say to
those persons directly. For example, by the Fall of 1985,
workers and managers in both of the departments I studied
began explaining to me how they attempted to manipulate and
deceive each other.
Although I found it personally stressful to know and have
the opportunity to divulge such important workplace secrets, I
considered them a flattering reward for my long hours on the
site. I also considered them to be excellent data that spoke
volumes about workplace politics in the City.
Not all relationships were challenging to manage, however.
My relationship with the SEIU President was productive of good
data, as well as edifying and enjoyable for me. She
understood my research, she took time from her busy schedule
to talk with me whenever I asked and she provided me with a
lot of useful data on the history of the union. I felt
comfortable both asking questions and occasionally giving an
opinion in the course of discussions about the program. Like
the facilitators, she was also trying to understand how QWL
might work in the City and I learned much by discussing the
program's problems with her.
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I also developed relatively smooth and uncomplicated
relationships with two administrators who were members of the
Citywide Labor-Management Oversight Committee. I approached
them only a few times during the study period, but managed to
have informative, informal interviews when I did.
I did not develop any sort of informal relationship with
the other administrators on the Oversight Committee and I did
not attempt to do so, mostly because the official focus of the
program was the workgroup and departmental level. I
interviewed these administrators at length, both at the
beginning and end of the study period, I attended almost every
program meeting which they were scheduled to attend and I
cultivated contacts with a few persons who spoke with them
regularly. According to their own words and actions and every
secondary source I could find, these administrators knew
little about the QWL program and had no desire to become more
deeply involved in it.
ConglysiQn
Over the course of my study of the Boston Labor-Management
Cooperation Program, my motives and research questions evolved
from trying to understand how to make QWL work, to trying just
to understand how an organization works. I learned a great
deal about organizations through this process and I developed
a sincere appreciation for the difficulty of resolving human
conflict.
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In the course of this research odyssey, I employed
virtually every type of standard organizational research tool
-- surveys, formal and informal interviews, personal
observation of meetings and work routines and library
research. The use of so many tools enabled me to paint as
rich and thick a description of QWL in the Boston context as I
think can be painted.
In retrospect, I can see only one major shortcoming of
this evolutionary and multi-method research approach, and
particularly of its less structured components. While I was
collecting the data, I never felt that I had enough, but when
I was done, I realized that I had collected far more than I
needed to tell the story. Moreover, I had to write the story,
or parts of it, a few times before I became more or less
certain as to which story I was telling.
This aspect of my research experience is due, in part, no
doubt, to my lack of experience as a researcher and writer.
Yet the reflections of Whyte (1981) and Bogdan (1972) have
convinced me that this is also, in part, in the nature of
qualitative research. Given the nature of QWL and the
questions with which I approached it, I believe that this
research approach served me well.
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4DEMOS RESEARCH, INC. CITY OF BOSTON EMPLOYEE SURVEY 11/84
INSTRUCTIONS
For each question on this survey, you are asked to respond either by placing a check (/)
next to the answer that best describes your views or by writing a number (1,2). Please
read each question carefully before responding. If none of the aaswers listed applies
to your situation, check "Other" and write in your answer.
1) Generally, speaking, how satisfied are ycu with your job here? (Check one):
Very Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Not Satisfied at All
2) How satisfied are you with the amount you are paid here? (Check one):
Very Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Not Satisfied at All
3) How satisfied are you with the opportunities for promotion or career advancement
here? (Check one):
Very Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Not Satisfied at All
4) How satisfied are you with your employment security here? (Check one):
Very Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Not Satisfied at All
Please Note: Questions 5 and 6 ask about your specific job tasks and questions 7 and 8
ask about your work area or unit in general.
5) What do you like most about the specific job tasks you do here? (Write "1" next to
the thing you like most and "2" next to the thing you like second-most):
My tasks are challenging and interesting
My work load is good - I'm not expected to do more than I can handle
I like serving the public - helping people -
I can organize and do the work the way I think is best
Nothing - I really don't like anything about by job tasks
Other (specify)
6) What do you like least about your job tasks? (Write "1" next to the thing you like
least and "2" next to the thing you like second-least):
My work tasks are boring
My work load is bad - I'm expected to do more than I can handle
I do not like dealing with the public
I cannot organize and do the work the 'way I think is best
- __Nothing - I like everything about my tasks
Other (specify)
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7) What do ycu like most about your work area or unit in general? (Write "1" next to
the thing you like most and "2" next to the thing you like second-most):
My co-workers respect and appreciate me
Surervisors and managers respect and appreciate me
People cooperate and share the load
I get to talk with other workers and make friends
The work environment is clean and safe
Nothing - I really don't like this area or unit
Other (specify)
8) What do you like least about your work area or unit in general? (Write "1" next to
the thing you like least and "2" next to the thing you like second-least):
My co-workers do not respect or appreciate me
Supervisors and managers do not respect or appreciate me
I am isolated - I never get to talk with anyone on the job
The work environment is dirty and unsafe
Nothing - I like everything about this place
Other (specify)
9) What kind of work would you most like to be doing five years from now? (Check one):
Same thing I'm doing now
Other (specify)
If you checked "Other," please answer the following question:
What would this other job give you that you don't have now? (Write "1" next to the
most important thing and "2" next to the second-most important thing):
More authority and responsibility
More respect from friends and relatives
More money or job security
More interesting and challenging work
A cleaner, safer work environment
Better treatment from people on the job
Other (specify)
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10) If you could change anything about your job, the people here or the way this
department or work unit is run, what is the thing you would most like to change?
Please write:
How strongly do you feel that this change should be made? (Check one):
Very strongly
Somewhat strongly
Not strongly at all
What, if anything, have you done so far to change this? (Check all that apply):
Nothing at all
Spoken with workers about it
Spoken with a supervisor or manager about it
Spoken with a union representative about it
Filed a grievance
Other (specify)
11) On which of the following types of decisions would you like to have more input
than you do now? (Check each decision on which you want more input. You may check
more than one):
Deciding who does what tasks in my work area
Deciding how the work should get done
Deciding what the goals or functions of this department or work unit should be
Deciding which people should be hired, fired or promoted
Deciding what equipment and supplies are needed for my work area or unit
12) What does your supervisor or the person you report to generally expect of you?
Write "1" next to the thing he or she expects most and "2" next to the thing he
or she expects second-most:
Very little - he or she does not care what I do
Do my job as it is defined in my written job description
Do anything he or she asks, even if it's not in my job description
Figure things out on my own and not bother him or her
Do the best and most professional job I can for the City
Make the supervisor look good to his or her superiors
Cooperate with everyone to help get the work done
Other (specify)
13) What things does your supervisor generally expect of other workers? (Check one):
Basically the same things he or she expecM of me
Different things, because all of the jobs are different
Other (specify)
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14) Do most people in your work area or unit usually follow the supervisor's expectations?
(Check one): Note that this question has two parts.
Yes, usually
About half of the time
No, usually not
if you checked "Yes, usually" please answer the following question:
W do people follow the supervisor's expectations? (Write "1" next to the primary
reason and "2" next to the secondary reason):
Supervisors are paid to make decisions and give orders - workers are paid to follk>
Supervisors know the job best and know what should be done
Supervisors will get you fired or make your life miserable if you don't follow the:.
Supervisors treat workers OK, so workers should do what the supervisors want
Other (specify) ._.
If you checked "About half of the time" or "No, usually not," please answer the
following question:
Why don't people follow the supervisor's expectations? (Write "1" next to the
primary reason and "2" next to the secondary reason):
Supervisors don't know what they're doing
Supervisors really don't care if you do what they say or not
Supervisors can't force people to obey because they can't discipline people
Supervisors' expectations are unfair
Other (specify)
15) What do people do most often when they disagree with what the supervisor wants?
(Check one):
They discuss it with him or her and work it out
They tell the supervisor but get no response
They just refuse to do what the supervisor wants
They do what the supervisor wants just enough to get by
They do exactly what the supervisor wants as best they can
16) What happens when someone doesn't do what the supervisor expects of him or her?
(Check the one thing that happens most often):
The supervisor tries to have the person fired
The supervisor writes the person up or gives them a formal reprimand
The supervisor yells at the person
The supervisor discusses it with the person and they work it out together
The supervisor discusses it with the whole work group and everyone helps to
straightn things out
Other (specify)
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17) Generally speaking, do most supervisors treat workers fairly in your work area or unit?
(Check all that apply):
Yes
No, they play favorites
No, they discriminate on the basis of race
No, they discriminate on the basis of sex
No, they discriminate on the basis of political connections
No, they don' t pay much attention to what's going on
Other (specify)
18) Generally speaking, do workers treat supervisors fairly in your work area or unit?
(Check all that apply):
Yes
No, many try to get away without doing much work
No, many embarass the supervisor by going around them to the higher-up's
No, they openly refuse to do what the supervisor says
Other (specify)
19) What do the workers in your work area or unit generally expect of each other? (Write
"1" next to the thing they expect the most, "2" next to the thing they expect
second-most and "3" next to the thing they expect third-most):
Very little - they don't care what people do
Do your job as it.'s defined in the written job description
Figure things out on your own and don't bother people
Do.the best and most professional job you can for the City
Cover them so they won't get into trouble with the supervisor
Cooperate with everyone to help get the work done
Be friendly and sociable
Other (specify) .
20) Why do people follow their co-workers' expectations? (Write "l" next to the
primary reason and "2" next to the secondary reason):
They will be harrassed or "stabbed in the back" if they don't
It makes the work atmosphere more pleasant
It gets the work done more quickly and efficiently
It would be unfair not to since everyone agrees these are good expectations
Other (specify)
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21) What happens when people don't follow their co-workers' expectations? (Check the
thing that happens most often):
They are yelled at by their co-workers
They are excluded socially - they become "outsiders"
They are harrassed or stabbed in the back
A co-worker discusses it with the person and they work it out together
A group of workers gets together and they all work it out
Other (specify)
22) Do workers generally treat each other fairly in your work area or unit? (Check all
that apply):
Yes, usually
No, they only treat their personal friends fairly
No, they discriminate on the basis of race
No, they discriminate on the basis of sex
No, they discriminate on the basis of political connections
No, they look down on people with different training or educational backgrounds
No, they look down on people in certain jobs
Other (specify)
23) Are job hirings and promotions in your unit or department generally done fairly?
(Check all that apply):
Yes, usually
No, you have to have political connections
No, there is racial discrimination-
No, there is sexual discrimination
No, but there is no single type of discrimination involved
Other (specify)
24) Are lay-off's done fairly in your department or work unit? (Check all that apply):
Yes, usually
No, it's based on political connections
No, it's based on racial discrimination
No, it's based on sexual discrimination
No, but there's no single type of discrimination involved
Other (specify)
25) Do you think that the Flynn Administration and the Service Employees International
Union made the right decision by getting involved in the Labor-Management Program? (Chec
Yes No Do not know
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26) Is it a good idea to have the Labor-Management Program in your work area or unit?
(Check one):
Yes No Do not know
27) Do you think you would like to participate in this program by being on one of the
work site committees? (Check one):
Yes No Do not know
28) Have programs like this ever been tried here in the past that you can remember?
(Check one):
No, I've never seen anything like this before
Yes, I've seen similar types of programs here before
29) What is the most important thing that you would like to see happen as a result
of this program? Please state briefly:
Demographic Information
Please provide the following information:
Your Age (Check one): Under 25
25 - 35
35 - 55
55 or over
Your Race (write):
Your sex (Check): Female
Male
How long you have been working in this department (Check one):
Less than two years
Between two years and ten years
More than ten years
Thank you very much for your cooperation in this survey.
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APPENDIX B
BOSTON EMPLOYEE WORK STOPPAGES (1967-1985)
(related incidents in parentheses)
(1) Se Aembc-2?2Z - BotnIahesno
(2) S Ztebec-14 1 2Z5 - B
over lay-offs.
(September 25, 1976 - 6ESQME
threaten to strike over lay-offs
been reached with administration
in exchange for no lay-offs until
Council 45 and SElU 285
but do not -- Agreement had
on 5/12/76 to forego 10% COLA
1977)
(3) Macab_31-12Za - 6ESCME_LQcal_244 (car towing unit) refuses
to work due to blizzard.
(4) 82cil_2Q±-12ZQ - 8ESCME-LQal1822 (Traffic & Parking Dept)
and local 804 (meter maids) over lay-offs.
(5> Max-16±-12Z2 - 6ESCME_CQncil23 (especially motor equipment
repairmen) over no job upgrade.
(May 18, 1979 - 8ESCME local 1489 (Emergency Medical
Technicians at Boston City Hospital) engage in informational
picketing to publicize their desire for a job upgrade from R-10
to R-14 and their disagreement with an arbitrator's
recommendation that they be granted R-11 status. Boston Globe).
(6) Ma-18±a-12Z2 - 6ESCMECQuQnQil_23 (specifically Traffic
Signal Repairmen) over no job upgrade.
(June 7, 1980 - 6ESCME local
professionals) and other library
paychecks not received. Boston 61
1526 (library non-
workers stop work because
obe).
(7) Junp-25.-128Q - BQ _ffiec-3Lcato (Boston City
Hospital doctors) strike for six days over pay and scheduling.
They win demand for 10% pay increase.
(June 27, 1980
over pay and shift
striking. Boston 61
- SEIU Local
scheduling;
obe).
285 nurses
but win 10%
threaten to strike
increase without
(8) July_22.-12aQ - SElU-LQLal_285 Citywide bargaining unit
(specifically clerical and technical workers at Boston City
Hospital) strike for five days for a 10% pay increase and a
seniority provision for provisional and temporary workers to
prevent political manipulation. They win the latter demand, but
settle for a 7% wage increase.
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APPENDIX B, Continued
(July 23, 1980 - 8ESCME local 1489 (City Hospital workers)
stage sick-out in sympathy with local 285 strike. Boston Globe)
(July 24, 1980 - bIyme-Qffic - oiation and SEIU Local
285 nurses vote support for clerical & technical workers strike.
Boston Globe)
(9) 8ygy5-8ZL-128Q - 8ESCME-Coya il_3 (specifically locals 445
- laborers and clericals in Public Works; local 296 - Parks Dept
maintenance persons; local 1198 - engineers in Public Works)
strike for six days, claiming Mayor White created high-paying
supervisor positions in Public Works and Parks for political
campaign workers who had held managerial/supervisory positions
in the Youth Activities Commission (dismantled 7/30/80), but who
had no experience in Public Works or Parks.
Strike ends on 8/14/80 after City and union agree to binding
arbitration and the Civil Service Commission agrees to hear
charges of improper appointing procedures.
(August 8,9,10,11,12,13,14, 1980 - SEIU 285 bridgetenders
and lifeguards, as well as most other Boston AESCME locals and
the E dcatio~f2ricQfficc, vote to support the
aforementioned Council 93 strike (#9 above) and threaten to join
it. Boston Globe and Boston Herald)
(10) Macab-212-1281 - 8ESCME-LQcal_412 (Deer Island correctional
officers) strike for seven days for a seven percent pay
increase. (Boston Globe: March 21,23,28, 1981)
(April 27, 1981 - 8ESCME Local 1489 pickets Boston City
Hospital to protest lay-off of 50 laundry workers and
contracting out of laundry services to a non-union firm.
Boston Globe).
(11) Janyacy-25.-1285 - 8ESME_LQcal-Z83 (heavy motor equipment
operators and laborers in the Tow and Hold Unit). Issue not
recorded.
Succez: All actions numbered 1 - 11 were taken from the City of
Boston Office of Labor Relations records of requests filed with
the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission for a 'strike
investigation," in June, 1985. Item #10 was not recorded in the
Office of Labor Relations records, but is clearly a work
stoppage.
Actions in parentheses are not work stoppages, but are related
incidents that are recorded in the Boston Globe and Boston
Herald.
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APPENDIX C
PROBLEMS OF THE STATE-CITY CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM
This appendix describes the role and functions of the
Massachusetts civil service system, which regulates all public
employment in the State, including the City of Boston. The
system's many problems have profound effects on worker-manager
relations in the City, which are described in the body of this
essay. Hence a more detailed description of the system itself
and its shortcomings is warranted.
The State-City civil service system, which was established
in 1884, consists of an extremely elaborate set of rules
desigend to ensure that employees are hired, promoted,
demoted, transferred, terminated and given raises on the bases
of technical/functional need by the department and of
individuals' technical qualifications. Its purpose is also to
ensure that jobs are evaluated and classified for compensation
purposes on the basis of the technical skills they require.
The City hiring process, for example, consists of 27 steps
involving both the department doing the hiring and the State
Department of Personnel, all of which is coordinated by the
City's Personnel Division. ( 1984)
The State Department of Personnel is mandated to
administer open competitive and promotional examinations for
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all civil service positions on a regular basis. After grading
exams, the Department establishes an eligibility list of
candidates, which is valid for two years. When a City
department head wishes to hire someone, s/he contacts the
relevant appointing authority (in Boston City Hall, the
Personnel Director), who contacts the State to determine if a
valid eligibility list exists. If it does, candidates for the
position must be chosen from among the top five on the list.
- Even when the system works according to plan, its
cumbersomeness retards the hiring process and prompts many
department heads to search for loopholes or other ways to
circumvent it. Especially where promotional appointments are
involved, this behavior provokes suspicion by employees who
believe that they are being passed over by others who have
fewer technical qualifications.
Since the rules are complex and the paper flow
labrynthine, however, neither employees nor union
representatives have the time or access to ascertain whether
most apparent irregularities are actually violations of the
rules. Appeals to the Civil Service Commission typically take
up to nine months to be heard and require that a grievant
speak out against his or her department head, which few in
City Hall are willing to do, according to workers, union
officials and some administrators. (1)
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Far greater abuses allegedly occur, however, when the
system does not operate according to plan, which has often
been the norm. Since over 1,800 job titles exist in the
system statewide (BQ - iila , 1974), the State
often administers exams only after it is requested to do so by
an appointing authority. Hence there are far fewer valid
eligibility lists than there are positions requiring
appointments. (2)
If a department head wishes to make an appointment and no
eligibility list exists, s/he may make an appointment on a
provisional basis and request that an exam be administered.
Yet City of Boston appointing authorities have allegedly been
far less than diligent in requesting exams and/or the State
has been less than diligent in responding to their requests.
As of May 1985, approximately 50 percent of all City employees
were serving in positions for which they had only provisional
or temporary status. ('City of Boston Personnel Statistics,
Management Information Systems Department.')
The use of provisional and temporary appointments
allegedly serves the needs of the patronage employment system
and undermines civil service principles. If eligibility lists
are not required, then appointees can be drawn from a pool of
the authority's choosing, i.e., from targeted neighborhoods
and/or campaign workers. Most important, provisional
appointees do not have permanent civil service status for
their positions, so they can be terminated or demoted to their
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permanent positions without cause. Such employees are
vulnerable to pressures from the Mayor's political
organization to do organizing or other political work as a way
of keeping their jobs, or to be promoted into jobs they
desire. (3)
These and related alleged practices were the proximate
cause of work stoppages, as well as dozens of grievances filed
by the SEIU and AFSCME between 1978 and 1983. (See Table 3.2
and Appendix B.) These actions, as well as years of criticism
by the City Council, State Legislature and media, led to the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1981, which required that current
provisional employees be given the opportunity to take exams
certifying them for permanent status in their positions. The
Act also required State and municipal authorities to establish
objective 'performance appraisal' systems, which are to take
the place of subjective criteria in promotional appointments.
As of Spring 1986, Boston did not yet have a performance
appraisal system in place. Some provisional employees had
taken exams, however.
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APPENDIX C -- NOTES
1) Interviews with State Civil Service Commission attorney
and State Personnel Department officials, July 1985.
Director, Office of Labor Relations, November 1984;
Director of Personnel Division, May 1985; SEIU Local #285
President and other officials, November 1985; Assessing
Department workers, November 1984, August 1985 and January
1986.
2) Assessing senior managers, March 1985;
Director, June 1985; President, SEIU Local
SEIU official, July 1985; State Department
officials, July 1985.
Retirement Board
#285, May 1985;
of Personnel
3) Over the course of the study period, several workers and
managers in the Assessing Department told me that they did
such with the hope of advancing.
-385-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albert, Rory Judd. 'A Time for Reform: A Case Study of the
Interaction Between the Commissioner of the Boston Police
Department and the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association.'
Technical Report No. 11-75, Operations Research Center,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 1975.
Altshuler, Alan A. CommuintlIb-aQamadfQc
E Indianapolis and
New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970.
American Center for the Quality of Work Life. Industcial
Demcai-Ec __-2ZZ c. The American Center
for the Quality of Work Life, 1978.
Argyris, Chris. QcgnizionanIotin. Homewood, IL:
Dorsey Press, 1965.
. "Action Science and Intervention.' IbJQLycnalQf
8ejled_BebayigcalScience 19 (No. 2) 115-140. 1983
. esnigeanngadocin1981
1 Is Capitalism the Culprit?' unpublished paper,
Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1978.
Aronson, R. and Schwartz, E. n
Goecoment-Einance. Washington, D.C. The International
City Management Association, 1981.
AT&T/Communications Workers of America. Ibe_Quality_of_Woch
c March 1984.
Bales, Robert F. and Cohen, Stephen P. SIlg.Ww-.semfc
b New York: The
Free Press, 1979.
Barnard, Chester I. Ib-EuDction QfbExeutie. 30th
anniversary ed. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1982.
Bellak, Alvin 0. 'The Hay Guide Chart-Profile Method of Job
Evaluation.' Prepared for 'Handbook of Wage and Salary
Administration, Second Edition,' published by McGraw-Hill,
1982.
Bennis, Warren G. and Slater, Philip E. IbImQcacSQciet.
New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
-386-
Best, Fred, ed. Ibe_Eutyce_Qf_WQck. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Billings, R., and Greenya, J. E Qwc_±Q-beEyPblic-_Wckec.
Washington, D.C.: Robert B. Luce, 1974.
Black, Rebecca R.W. 'The Employment-Wage Trade-Off.' Master's
Thesis, Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1981.
Blauner, R. elienaioQdEcedom. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1964.
Blumberg, P. IutiialQ cacy. New York: Schocken, 1969.
Bogdan, R. E
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1972.
Boston, City Code, Charter, etc.
BosnE Q-ndEigceigZDies~fSatisticlnlfocao.
Boston Municipal Research Bureau, Inc.. September 1985.
Bii Raymond C. Dooley,
Mark S. Ferber and Kenneth A. Issacs. January, 1984.
RegQct. Mark S. Ferber, Chairperson. February, 1986.
'Boston CCity of] Labor-Management Cooperation Program: A
Grant Submitted to the Federal Mediation and Consiliation
Service by the City of Boston,' May 1984.
Boston, City of. Assessing Department Employee Guide.
Boston, City of. 'Human Resources Program/Assessing
Department, City of Boston,' September 1985.
B---l A Special
Report by the Boston Municipal Research Bureau, December
1976.
Boston Urban Study Group CTheJ. WbQ_Ryles_Bgs±ga? Boston:
The Institute for Democratic Socialism, 1984.
Braverman, Harry. L
fbb New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1974.
-387-
Brayfield, A., and Crockett, W. 'Employee Attitudes and
Employee Performance,' in Mankin, D. QasiQ5-Qf
d New York:
Moore, 1980.
Bright, J. 'Does Automation Raise Skill Requirements?' Hacyacd
Syines_Reiew. 36, 1958.
Brower, Michael J. 'Massachusetts: Lessons from Efforts that
Failed,' in Herrick, Neal Q., ed. Im2cQmingGoecoen:
E New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1983.
Burawoy, M. ayftycin oe. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1979.
Carey, A. 'The Hawthorne Studies: A Radical Critique.'
ci a Vol.32, 1967.
Chandler, Alfred D., Jr. I
liBwsiness. Cambridge, Mass.: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977.
Chickering, A. Lawrence. EubiEmlI-Uin__udQf
bb San
Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1976.
Clark, R. I New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1979.
Cohen, J. and Rogers, J. QQemQocacy. New York: Penguin
Books, 1983.
Cole, R. 'Diffusion of New Work Structures in Japan, Sweden
and the United States.' University of Michigan, 1980.
Cooley, Mike. cbi-bee2_I ba Ib go
8elationQbie. Slough, England: Langley Technical Services
Cno date].
Crozier, Michel. Ibc ai-Ebenomeno. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1964.
Deal, T. and Kennedy, T. c
c Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1982.
Denhardt, Robert B. IbeQcies.ofYubli-Qc9anii. Monterey,
CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1984.
-388-
Demos Research, Inc. 'Organizational Theory and Research
Methodology,' Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1984.
Dickson, John W. 'Beliefs About Work and Rationales for
Participation.' Iyman_8elations 36 (October 1983) 911-932.
Doeringer, Peter D., and Piore, Michael J. I1ntccal_Laboc
a- Lexington, Mass.: Heath
Lexington Books, 1971.
Durkheim, Emile. IbeQiio-fbQciSQciety. New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1933; The Free Press, 1964.
Edwards, Richard. C
W New York: Basic Books,
1979.
Fisher, Roger and Ury, William. i
gcementWib.ut-igingn. Middlesex, England: Penguin
Books, 1981.
Fogelson, Robert M. BigcQity_Eglice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1977.
Fox, A. B
London: Faber and Faber, 1974.
Goodman, P. i New York: Wiley,
1979
Gorz, Andre. gfLa. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.
Gouldner, A. Etco fd cc Glencoe,
Ill.: Free Press, 1954.
Greenberg, Edward S. 'The Consequences of Worker
Participation: A Clarification of the Theoretical
Literature. SQoialScience_Quactacly 56 (September 1975)
191-209.
Hackman, J. Richard and Oldham, G. Wck_Eadsjign. Reading,
Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1980.
Heckscher, Charles C. "Democracy at Work: In Whose Interests?'
Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1981.
Herbst, P.G. S
ultidici2inc R- ccb. London: Tavistock
Publications. New York: Barnes and Noble Import Division,
1974.
-389-
Herrick, Neal Q. 'Cooperative Self-Interest: Learning from Joe
Scanlon.' Eybij-coutivii (March/June 1982)
19-34.
--- _, ed. c
Wcing-.Lif~E Dm. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983.
Higgins, G. V. l
n New York: Macmillan, 1984.
Hill, Stephen. Cm tion-adContcQlWock. Cambridge,
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1981.
Howitt, Arnold M. 'Electoral Constraints on Mayoral Behavior.'
Department of City and Regional Planning, Discussion Paper
D77-4. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, April 1977.
Hunkel, Janet L. 'Future Issues Facing Boston: The Assessing
Department.' Prepared for the John W. McCormack Institute
of Public Affairs, December 1983.
Ingle, Sud. Q
Efficiency. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983.
International City Management Association. 'Employee
Incentives: Baseline Data Report.' Washington, D.C.
The International City Management Association. Volume 17,
Number 2. February 1985.
Jick, Todd D. 'Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods:
Triangulation in Action.' d
Quactecly 24 (December 1979).
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 'Work in a New America.' Qaedalum
(1977) pp 47-78.
Katz, Harry C. 'The Municipal Budgetary Response to Changing
Labor Costs: The Case of San Francisco.' Idymicialand
Laboc-Relaticom_8eyiew 32 (July 1979) 506-519.
_____ 'Municipal Pay Determination: The Case of San
Francisco.' IndymcialRelaicom 18 (Winter 1979) 44-58.
New York: Garland Publishing, 1984.
Katz, Ralph and Van Maanen, John. 'The Loci of Work
Satisfaction: Job, Interaction, and Policy. Human
RelatioQm 30 (Number 5, 1977) pp 469-486.
-390-
Klein, J. 'Why Supervisors Resist Employee Involvement.'
accdBu i_ iw. September/October 1984.
Kochan, Thomas A. i
Management. The University of Wisconsin-Madison:
Industrial Relations Research Institute, 1971.
--. 'A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City
Governments.' ios8eiw 27
(April 1974) 525-542.
. 'City Goverment Bargaining: A Path Analysis.'
lnduztcial-Relation5 14 (February 1975) 90-101.
. "Determinants of the Power of Boundary Units in an
Interorganizational Bargaining Relation.' d icatije
S 20 (September 1975) 434-452.
Ibcc-o-oic--Etic, Homewood: R.D. Irwin, 1980.
Kochan, Thomas A., and Dyer, Lee. 'A Model of Organizational
Change in the Context of Union-Management Relations.'
J 12 (1976) 61-78.
Kochan, Thomas A., Katz, Harry C., and Mower, Nancy R. WQckec
Industrial Relations Section, Sloan School of Management,
MIT, 1983.
Kohn, M. C -dCofocmi -_uioVaye. Homewood,
Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1969.
Kramer, Leo. LbocEad _Ib - cin anEdcionf
a Cy -d-yicia-Em lX -EL:Q. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1962.
Kusterer, K.C. KQowrUownbJb-IbeImmot Q-Wcig
Knowed-LJ silldWocheca." Westview Press, 1978.
Lawler, E., and Mohrman, S. "Quality Circles After the Fad.'
c_ January-February 1985.
Lindenfeld, Frank and Whitt-Rothschild, Joyce, ed. Wgckglaae
ca Boston: Porter Sargent
Publishers, 1982.
Lipsky, Michael. S
lodividual-inEybliaSecyiaes. New York: Russell Sage,
1980.
-391-
Lombardo, Nancy. IbEQliia bicfst _uiial
EmelQyce_Unins, Vols. I & II. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1979.
McGregor, D.M.,
motivatign.
McGregor, D.M..
Adventure i
Anniversary
Management,
MIT, June,
Bennis, W. and Schein, eds., Leadgczbi2-And
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966.
The Human Side of Enterprise. Reprinted
n Thought in Action," Proceedings of the
Convocation of the School of Industrial
MIT, Cambridge, April 9, 1957. Published
1957.
from
Fifth
by
MacKersie, R. and Greenhalgh, Jick. 'Change and Continuity:
Role of a LMC in Facilitating Workforce Change During
Retrenchment.' Working Paper. MIT-Sloan School of
Management, 1980.
Martin, Shan. a
c New York: Russell
Sage, 1983.
Marx, Karl. Qpil Vol. 1, Chapters 14 & 15. New York:
Vintage Books, Random House, 1977.
---. Eoomi-adbil bical-ayEcists. Edited by Erich
Fromm and translated by T.B. Bottomore. New York:
Frederick Ungar, 1961.
Massachusetts. MyniclasZ_MAnyAl. A Municipal Classification
Plan for Massachusetts containing Civil Service Job Titles
and Definitions Authorized by Director of Civil Serfvice
and Approved by Civil Service Commission. Boston, 1974.
Mazany, Terry,
of Cortez."
Held in San
ed. 'Making QWL Make Sense: A Log From the Sea
Proceedings from an Informal Conference on QWL
Carlos, Sonora, Mexico, February 1985.
Mills, T.M. I Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967.
Moch, M., and Huff, A. "L
Mazazina. Summer 1982.
ife on the Line.' IbeWbacIon
Mollenkopf, J. IbQQtested-ijt. Princeton University
Press, 1983.
Morgan, William R. and Ronchi, 0. 'Columbus, Ohio:
Industrial Democracy or Human Relations?' in Herrick, Neal
Q., ed. c
Qf-Wckig.Lif-Sye. New York: Praeger, 1983.
-392-
Murphy, Jerome T. QettigtEtiEieluidQc
E Santa Monica: Goodyear
Publishing Co., 1980.
Nadler, David A., Hanlon, Martin and Lawler, Edward E., III.
'Factors Influencing the Success of Labour-
Management Quality of Work Life Projects.' JQLCQl-Qf
ub January, 1980.
Nickelhoff, Andrew, ed. 'Extending Workplace Democracy: An
Overview of Participatory Decisionmaking Plans for
Unionists.' Labor Studies Center, Institute of Labor and
Industrial Relations, University of Michigan-Wayne State
University, 1981.
Nigro, F., and Nigro, L. IbNwEubiEQcionl
8dminimication. Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1981.
Nordlinger, E.A. Dcnclzn~biz--td~fBso'
LittlIi alls. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1972.
Nurick, A.J. E
Ezeeciment. New York: Praeger, 1985.
Olsen, David. 'San Francisco and Berkeley: Reflections on
Organizational Readiness.' in Herrick Neal Q., ed.
Life_Syatmm. New York: Praeger, 1983.
Olson, Mancur Jr. I
d New York: Schocken Books, 1971.
Oppenheimer, Martin. WbitcQlac_ElitiQ5. New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1985.
Parker, Mike. I
Boston: South End Press, 1985.
Passmore, W. 'Model for Socio-Technical Intervention.' Case
Western Reserve University, Department of Organizational
Behavior, 1980.
Pateman, C. Eticimatin-dDmoaiIbecc. London:
Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Pava, Calvin. 'Socio-Technical Design for Advanced Office
Technology.' Working Paper. Graduate School of Business
Adminsitration, Division of Research. Boston: Harvard
University, June 1982.
-393-
Peters, T. J. and Waterman, R.H., Jr. I- cbfExcelece
- New York:
Harper and Row, 1982
Piore, Michael. 'Computer Technologies, Market Structure and
Strategic Union Choices.' In MIT Union Leader Conference,
T. Kochan and M. Piore, eds., June 1983.
Piore, Michael J., and Berger, Suzanne. Qualismmand
ia (Part One).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Piore, Michael J., and Sabel, Charles F. 'Italian Small
Business Development Lessons for U.S. Industrial Policy.'
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Departments of
Economics and Political Science, Number 288, August 1981.
Powell, Mary. 'New York City: From the Top Down." in
Herrick, Neal Q., ed. I
witb-Quali -fWckingLif-tem. New York: Praeger,
1983.
Prottas, Jeffrey Manditch. 'The Power of the Street-Level
Bureaucrat in Public Service Bureaucracies.' Urban
ffaica-QuAc1. 13 (March 1978) 285-262.
Pugh, D.S., ed. Q
Baltimore, MD.: Penguin Books, 1971.
Quinn, Robert P., and Staines, Graham L. Ibe12ZZ_Quality_Qf
EmelQIment-Sucyey. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social
Research, The University of Michgan, 1979.
Rawls, John. 8_IbecyQf_Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.
'A Revolution in Work Rules: New Job Rlexibility Boosts
Productivity.' Busin&ez_Week, pp 100-110, May 16, 1983.
Ronchi, Don and Morgan, William. 'Springfield, Ohio:
Persisting and Prevailing,' in Herrick, Neal Q., ed.
LifeS~aytem. New York: Praeger, 1983.
Rosow, Jerome M., ed. Ibohcbn-b-b-ig~witb
Cbange. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974.
Sabel, Charles. WQck_and-eiica± Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981.
-394-
'The Internal Politics of Trade Unions,' in Berger,
Suzanne D., ed. Qcganizig-nctin-Westecn Eycome:
EQiliiz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Sathe, Vijay. a (book
manuscript). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School,
1982.
Savas, E. S. and Ginsburg, S. G. "The Civil Service; A
Meritless System?' IbEbli-Intcet (1973) pp 70-83.
Schick, Richard P., and Couturier, Jean J. IbeEublic-Intecent
icl Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger
Publishing, 1977.
Schlesinger, L., and Oshry, B. 'Quality of Worklife and the
Manager: Muddle in the Middle.' Q
Summer 1984.
Schultze, Charles L. I
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977.
Schuster, Michael H. U
EcQocessIwmagt. Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, 1984.
Scott, W. Richard. c
Systemz. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981.
Sennett, Richard, and Cobb, Jonathan. Ibe-diddenJInuciem_Qf
Clazz. New York: Vintage Books, 1972.
Selznick, Philip. L
In2ecctin. New York: Harper and Row, 1957; Berkeley,
CA: The University of California Press, 1984.
Shefter, Martin. E
igaIlf-New-ocity. New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1985.
Showalter, Jon and Yetman, D. 'Pima County: The Dilemma of
Weak Unions and QWL.' in Herrick, Neal Q., ed. lmcgying
GoeoenixecmnswitbQalitz-ofWckingLife
Systemz. New York: Praeger, 1983.
Simmons, John, and Mares, U. Wgcking_IQgetbec. New York:
Knopf, 1983.
Simon, Herbert A. d
(1957), 3rd Edition. New York: The Free Press, 1976.
-395-
Smeltzer, Larry R. and Kedia, Ben L.
Organizational Requirements for
Businemm-dizQn± July-August,
'Knowing the Ropes:
Quality Circles.'
1985.
Smith, Adam. Iba_Wa±b_of_Nation (1776). New York: Penguin
Books, 1982.
Spero, S., and Capozzola, J.
1973.
New York: Dunellen Publishing,
Storper, M. and Walker, R. 'The Spatial Division of Labor:
Labor and the Location of Industries.' in Sawer, L. and
Tabb, W., eds. ybel/Qwbel. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1984.
Szymanski, Al. 'Braverman as a Neo-Luddite?'
SQciQlQgist, 1980.
Taylor, Frederick Winslow.
Management. New York:
InQcgent
Harper & Bros., 1947.
Terkel, Studs. WQcking. New York: Avon Books, 1972.
The Final Report of the Temporary Commission on City
Finances. New York, Arno Press, 1978.
Trist, Eric L.; Susman, Gerald I.; and Brown, Grant R.
Experiment in Autonomous Working in and American
Underground Coal Mine.' duman-Relaions 30 (No. 3,
201-236.
'An
1977)
Trist, E., et al.
Working Life in
January 1980.
'Improving
the Public
to the U.S.
Productivity and Quality of
Sector..." Final Report on
Civil Service Commission,
Union for Radical Political Economics. imi-i-bEuic
Sc~tc. A Reader by the Economics Education Project. New
York: Monthly Review Press, no date.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Qity
EmelIymenl-in-i284, July 1985.
- . Cot ocme-Emnl1mntZinA284, August 1985.
U.S. Department of Labor, Labor-Management Services
Administration. c
Coomecation. October 1983.
-396-
Van Maanen, John. 'The Fact of Fiction in Organizational
Ethnography.' d 24
(December 1979) 539-610.
---- and Barley, Stephen R. 'Occupational
Culture and Control in Organizations.'
Management, Massachusetts Institute of
November, 1982.
Viteritti, Joseph. 'Bureaucratic
Equity in Urban Service Deli
Qfcanbi-Sci , R.
Lexington Books, 1982.
Vroom, Victor H., and Deci, Edwa
1970.
Communities:
Sloan School
Technology.
of
Environments, Efficiency, and
very Systems.' in IbgEQitics
Rich, ed. Lexington, Mass.:
rd L. a
m. New York: Penguin Books,
Wallihan, James. UniQnQscmentQc itioniJ~tbe
Ua Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National
Affairs, 1985.
Walton, Richard. 'The Diffusion of New Work Structures:
Explaining Why Success Didn't Take.' Qcganizational
Qxnamics, (Winter 1975) 3-22.
' "Establishing and Maintaining High-Commitment Work
Systems,' in ganizaion-Lif- l ed., John R.
Kimberly et al. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980.
Walton, Richard E., and Lawrence, Paul, eds.
aagmenIcd ndb bllng. Boston:
School Press, 1985.
HamvarBiuces
Harvard Business
Warwick, Donald P., and Lininger, Charles A. Ib2-SAmgle
Suc -Ib cand-ci. New York: McGraw Hill, 1975.
Weber, Max. 'Essays in Bureaucracy.' In Gerth, H.H. and Mills,
C. Wright, eds. EcQm-i New
York: Oxford University Press, 1946; reprint ed., 1981.
Weitzman, Joan. I
New York: Praeger, 1975.
Wellington and Winter. 'The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
the Public Sector.' in Eubi- LabcI tins:
nd Fueille, T., Kochan, T., and
Lewin, D., eds. New York: T. Horton, 1981.
Wells, Louis J. Jr., ed.
1972.
Boston: Harvard Business School,
-397-
Whyte, William Foote. S
c 3rd edition. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1943; 1981.
Wilson, James Q. IbIQetigatcgingEBI-anNacoic
8geuts. New York: Basic Books, 1978.
Witte, John. DemQcarbiytoi Qai oniiLWoc.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
cfdc Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1973.
Zager, R., and Rosow, M.P. Il ati Q~gniztion. New
York: Pergamon Press, 1982.
Zagoria, S., ed. E iWQcc EybliU n. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.
Zimmerman, Joseph F. IbEedicaedit imyo cQ lin
LacgeCitiez. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972.
